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This thesis offers a novel way of understanding regional organisation 
(RO), not just as an actor in international relations, but more specifically a trade 
diplomat. States’ practice of negotiating trade relations using their respective 
regional organisations are becoming prevalent and amongst these regional 
organisations, the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) stand out in terms of their contribution to global output and 
global trade growth. Coincidentally, the EU and ASEAN also represent two 
different spectrums of regional governance, one characterised by the transfer of 
limited state sovereignty to a supranational institution and the other by the 
continued resistance to transfer any state sovereignty to a higher institution. The 
EU and ASEAN, then, represent two compelling cases of RO’s external trade 
relations. 
In explaining this phenomenon, this thesis adopts the concept of trade 
diplomacy and proposes a new framework since previous studies either focus 
only on individual states or view trade relations independently of the political or 
foreign policy context. Utilising a hybrid inductive-deductive approach and 
building from several streams of literature, document analysis, and research 
interviews, this research offers a three-element framework to explain RO’s trade 
diplomacy consisting of trade actorness, processes, and goals. Applying this 
framework to the EU and ASEAN, it identifies key differences and similarities 
between the two. Further examined, differences between the EU and ASEAN’s 
practices of trade diplomacy can be attributed to three internal determinants: 
their institutional, political, and economic differences while their similarities are 
products of external environments, namely changes in the global-regional 
landscape and their inherent need to be recognised due to their status as non-
traditional actors in IR.  
The final research output is a comprehensive model of RO’s trade 
diplomacy and the internal/external factors affecting the practice. Although this 
research contributes mostly to the field of trade & economic diplomacy, several 
of its outcomes will be of interest to scholars of comparative regionalism. 
Specifically, for its empirical findings, this research is the first to provide a 
comprehensive and detailed account of how and why ASEAN manages its 
external trade relations the way it does.      
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Chapter 1 – Introduction: Trade Diplomacy and Regional 
Organisations     
 
1.1. Introduction  
 Trade diplomacy is no longer the exclusive domain of individual states since 
regional organisations (ROs) are increasingly negotiating and acting on behalf of 
their member states in external trade issues. Multiple regional organisations such 
as the EU, ASEAN, Mercosur, ECOWAS, and SADC have been among the most 
active regional organisations to conduct trade diplomacy on behalf of their 
member states. Mercosur, for example, has completed at least four bilateral 
FTAs with individual countries, one FTA with another regional organisation and 
is currently negotiating four other FTAs, three of which are with other regional 
organisations (Bilaterals, 2012; Daily Star, 2014; Gallas, 2019).1 The EU – as the 
most active RO – currently has more than 40 FTsAs in place with individual 
countries & other regional organisations, in addition to those currently being 
negotiated (European Commission, 2019j).  
 The practice of trade diplomacy by regional organisations was initially 
started by European countries via the European Union (EU), which was then 
followed by many states in Asia, America, and Africa. These trade agreements 
are mostly signed between regional organisations and individual states, although 
there are also several inter-regional trade negotiations such as the EU-Mercosur, 
the EU-ASEAN, and the COMESA-EAC-SADC2 tripartite negotiations. The 
increasing role of ROs in trade negotiations can be partly attributed to the 
acceleration of regional integration during the last few decades where economic 
issues were the main drivers for many of these regional groupings. Within the 
many different forms of economic agreements that ROs engage in (e.g. finance, 
 
1 Mercosur or Mercado Comun del Sur is one of South America’s regional organisation, 
consisting of five states (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela) 
2  COMESA stands for the Common Market for the Eastern and Southern Africa comprising of 
19 African states. EAC stands for East African Community comprised of six African countries 
and SADC stands for Southern African Development Community which consists of 15 African 
member states.    
P a g e  | 2 
 
development cooperation, investment), trade has become the most common, 
with almost all ROs in the world currently engaging in extra-regional trade 
agreements with other parties. Of the 600+ trade agreements currently in place 
(World Trade Organization, 2019b), cross-continent agreements are increasingly 
becoming the dominant form (Baccini et al., 2011). 
 Within these regional groupings, the EU and ASEAN are amongst the top 
three largest economic players in the world in terms of global output and 
contribution to world trade (World Trade Organization, 2017).3 Coincidentally, the 
EU and ASEAN also represent two different spectrums of governance in their 
regionalism projects – supranationalism and intergovernmentalism – which also 
extends to the management of their trade diplomacy. Supranationalism in trade 
focuses on transferring trade authority to a higher institution, while 
intergovernmentalism seeks to retain trade sovereignty within national 
boundaries and at the same time gain benefits from collective negotiation in 
external trade. Given that the EU and ASEAN vary greatly in their management 
of external trade and yet manage to conduct trade diplomacy and maintain key 
positioning in global trade, they represent two interesting cases in the study of 
trade diplomacy by regional organisations.  
 Observing these phenomena, the focus of this research is to explain the 
growing practice of regional organisations’ trade diplomacy, taking the EU and 
ASEAN as case studies. It does so by comparing the two organisations’ practices 
of trade diplomacy, identifying & explaining their differences and similarities, and 
finally, conceptualising a framework to better understand regional organisations’ 
trade diplomacy.  
1.1.1.  Practice & Study of Trade Diplomacy by Regional Organisations  
In his article on the relationship between diplomacy, representation, and 
international relations, Paul Sharp concludes that one major challenge for 
scholars of diplomacy is to understand that the progress of diplomatic studies 
should not rely only on nation-states (Sharp, 1999). In fact, the study of 
diplomacy could benefit more if diplomacy itself were to be perceived more as 
 
3 The other group is North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) consisting of the US, 
Canada and Mexico 
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representations and responses used to solve common problems that arise from 
the need to maintain relationships despite geographical distance, rather than 
being treated strictly as a foreign policy and state instrument (Sharp, 1999). If we 
accept this notion of diplomacy-as-representation, then it can be argued that 
within the last few decades, regional organisations have attained the role of 
diplomats since, nowadays, most states organise themselves regionally and 
present themselves externally through regional organisations. Regional 
organisations have acted on behalf of their member states in multiple forums, 
such as in the UN and WTO, and have established themselves as diplomats in 
various fields of external cooperation.     
The most notable example of this diplomatic agency is the European 
Union, particularly when it established its institutional wing of diplomacy, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2011. Indeed, the establishment of 
EEAS was crucial for modern diplomacy since it was the first modern diplomatic 
entity consisting of regionally collective states, leading to what David Spence and 
Jozef Batora termed as ‘a catalyst of diplomatic innovation’ (Spence and Batora, 
2015). By the end of 2019, EEAS employed more than 4000 personnel and ran 
140 delegation offices worldwide, which shows the massive size of the EU’s 
diplomatic machinery (European External Action Service, 2020).  
Although other regional organisations’ diplomatic machineries are not as 
institutionally sophisticated as the EU’s, their external presence is also 
noteworthy. Several studies have analysed other regional organisations’ external 
presence – or their actorness – such as studies that focus on ASEAN, ECOWAS 
and SADC’s growing presence at the international level, including in explaining 
the relationship between these regions (Doidge, 2008; Wunderlich, 2012b; 
Mattheis and Wunderlich, 2017; Hulse, 2018). Adelmann (2009) documented 
SADC’s evolution in managing its external relations, noting the-1990s and the-
2000s as the two most important decades, while Cremona et al. (2015) identified 
a considerable growth in ASEAN’s external relations since the 2000s. According 
to their research, ASEAN has finalised 175 external legal instruments, with 81% 
of these agreements signed after 2000 (Cremona et al., 2015), meaning that on 
average, ASEAN signed around 9 to 10 external agreements per year during the 
15 years duration (2000-2015).      
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Within the various types of external cooperation, trade and economic 
affairs dominate many of these regional organisations’ external relations. For 
example, Cremona et al. (2015) find that ASEAN is most active in its external 
economic relations, where 82% of its external agreements are within the field of 
economic issues. This alone indicates the significant role of trade in ASEAN’s 
external relations, and while some may find this rather odd, seeing that ASEAN 
is a security-dominated regional cooperation (Narine, 2008; Koga, 2014), this 
should be unsurprising considering that  there has been an addition of more than 
500 trade agreements following the creation of the World Trade Organization in 
1995 (World Trade Organization, 2019b). Trade relations have, indeed, become 
an important component of interstate relations, and regional organisations are 
progressively taking an important role.    
The main advantage of having a collective regional position in external 
trade is clearly in the ability to offer a larger market, and thus, maintain greater 
bargaining power vis-à-vis negotiating partners. However, international trade is 
much more than about maintaining or obtaining markets, since trade has always 
been an important tool of interstate (and human) relations. In his book, Pigman 
(2016) advances the idea of ‘trade as diplomacy’, where he identifies the 
historical origins of trade as an instrument to initiate and maintain relationships 
between different collective entities. Pigman narrates the story of early tribal 
interactions, where one tribe living close to another tribe would be uncertain on 
whether its neighbour is hostile or not. This tribe, then, sends an emissary to 
leave gifts in a place frequented by the other tribe and waits to see whether the 
other tribe reciprocates this gesture. If the other tribe reciprocates this action, 
then the two parties can assume that their relationship can progress further. This 
interaction, while seemingly trivial, is what Sharp characterises as ‘thinking 
diplomatically’ (Sharp, 2009), and illustrates the underlying notion of economic 
exchanges that signify trust, mutual relationships, and long-lasting 
communication. In Pigman’s words, the diplomatic act of trading goes far beyond 
its economic significance because in order for trade to take place, 
communication must first occur and communication is one of the core function of 
diplomacy (Pigman, 2016 pg. 17).                
Taking this to the global level, it can be said that trade relations between 
states often signify more than just commercial or economic values. During the 
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colonial times, ‘trade follows the flag’ denotes a relationship between trade and 
colonialism expansion, and at the present, the existence or absence of trading 
activities may be a good indication of the quality of relationships between 
countries. Present-day trade relations have frequently been interrupted by a 
series of trade wars, trade embargoes, and trade boycotts, many of which are 
due to strategic rather than economic reasoning.  The recent India-China, US-
China, and Japan-South Korea trade wars, for example, while seemingly built on 
economic calculations, are also heavily laden with political and historical 
underpinnings, signifying trade’s strategic role in global politics. Even more so 
for trade relations conducted by regional organisations, these relations can also 
indicate regional specificity and regional projection at the global scene (Tussie, 
2013) since the ability (or inability) of regional organisations to manage external 
trade relations can be a good indicator of the power they can have over other 
players. In other words, not only does trade diplomacy by regional organisations 
forge non-economic linkages between/among regions and countries, but it can 
also elevate the role and positioning of their member states in the global stage. 
Since the 2000s, many countries have shifted their focus to regional sites 
as the cornerstone of their trade diplomacy (Tussie, 2013). While bilateral 
channel remains an important avenue for many states, the increasing focus to 
utilise regional organisations as a vehicle for trade diplomacy is also apparent. 
The 27 member states of the EU, for example, can only rely on regional channels 
for their trade diplomacy and several ASEAN member states utilise regional 
channels more often compared to individual ones. Of the ten active FTAs that 
Indonesia currently has, six of them are signed through ASEAN, while the 
Philippines only has two non-ASEAN FTAs out of their active 8 FTAs (Asia 
Regional Integration Center, 2020a). Lao PDR only has one non-ASEAN FTA 
(out of 8 active FTAs) while both Cambodia and Myanmar has none (Asia 
Regional Integration Center, 2020a). Trade and economic interactions between 
these regional organisations have also increased, adding a new layer of global 
trade governance (Hanggi et al., 2006), eventually reducing the complexities and 
multiple overlaps in existing trade agreements (World Trade Organization, 2021). 
However, considering that regional organisations are not traditional actors 
in IR, they often face difficulties in being accepted as ‘natural’ entities in interstate 
relations and within diplomacy itself, ‘the less natural the identities of the agents 
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appear, the more diplomacy is needed’ (Sharp, 1999). As this thesis will illustrate, 
regional organisations often struggle to be accepted in the legal and social realm 
of international relations, and thus often use trade relations to ascend their 
status. The ‘un-naturalness’ of regional organisations as trade diplomats also 
means that scholarships regarding this issue remain scarce since most literature 
tends to focus on the more ‘natural’ actors such as states. There are several 
studies on the trade diplomacy of individual states, particularly in Asia (see for 
example Yamamoto, 2012; Zeng, 2016; Choi, 2017), but there is very limited 
research on the trade diplomacy of regional organisations. Up to date, the most 
comprehensive work on RO’s trade diplomacy is presented by Stephen 
Woolcock in his book, European Union Economic Diplomacy (Woolcock, 2012a) 
where he suggests six factors affecting the EU’s trade diplomacy.4 Aside from 
this study, no other comprehensive research on RO’s trade diplomacy can be 
found.  
One plausible reason for the limited number of studies regarding the trade 
diplomacy of ROs is perhaps due to the difficulty in defining what trade diplomacy 
is, since up to now, scholars differ on its precise meaning. As the literature review 
will illustrate, the modern practice of trade diplomacy is often studied under the 
larger umbrella term of ‘economic diplomacy’ which, unfortunately, brings more 
confusion rather than clarity (Section 2.3.1). As a field of study, economic 
diplomacy is a newly developed research area with multiple definitions, 
approaches, epistemologies and methodologies, which are often difficult to 
reconcile. Okano-Heijmans, for example, lists four fields of studies that contribute 
to economic diplomacy including International Relations, Economics, 
International Political Economy and Diplomacy & Negotiation, where each field 
of study has its distinct epistemology and methodology (Okano-Heijmans, 2011). 
While these multiple disciplinary approaches can enrich the study of trade 
diplomacy, it nevertheless, also poses a challenge since limited debates and 
dialogues happen between these different disciplines. Unfortunately, as a subset 
of economic diplomacy, trade diplomacy is also prone to this ‘eclecticism’, 
sometimes leading to the lack of discussions between scholars, which ultimately 
hinders its progress as a research agenda. Thus, it is highly important for any 
 
4 These six factors will be identified in the literature review in Chapter 2 
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research on trade diplomacy to first clarify how to define and limit the term. For 
this research, the definition of trade diplomacy follows Okano-Heijmans’s 
understanding of it, which is ‘a strategy and practice where trade/commercial and 
political interests reinforce each other, and thus, should be seen in tandem’ 
(Okano-Heijmans, 2011). Extending this to the regional level, then trade 
diplomacy by regional organisations can be understood as ‘strategy and practice 
by regional organisations where trade/commercial and political interests 
reinforce each other and thus, should be seen in tandem’.  
Aside from clarifying its definition, it is also crucial to denote how trade 
diplomacy differs from other activities relating to external trade relations. Trade 
diplomacy, for example, does not equate to trade policymaking or trade 
negotiation since trade diplomacy focuses on the relational (or relationship-
building) aspect of trade relations (Pigman, 2018). However, this is not to say 
that trade diplomacy is separate from trade policymaking or negotiations but 
rather contrary, that trade diplomacy is strongly connected to trade policy and 
negotiation. Policymaking and negotiation form the core activities of diplomacy, 
and hence, a considerable portion of this thesis also relies on literature from 
these two research areas. Various areas of literature on the EU’s external trade 
relations are particularly useful for this research, including studies on the EU’s 
role in global trade (Meunier, 2007; Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011; Pomorska and 
Vanhoonacker, 2015), the EU’s practice of trade negotiations (Elsig and Dupont, 
2012; da Conceicao-Heldt, 2014; Meissner, 2016) and the social dimension of 
EU’s trade policies (Orbie et al., 2009; Van Den Putte and Orbie, 2015). 
In conclusion, seeing that regional organisations are increasingly 
becoming important actors in trade diplomacy and yet, the explanatory tools to 
understand this practice remains limited, the need to conceptualise this practice 
is becoming more important, and this is precisely what this research aims to 
achieve. In conceptualising this, this research looks at two regional organisations 
that hold central positions in the global landscape of trade diplomacy, the EU and 
ASEAN.     
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1.1.2.  The EU and ASEAN as Trade Diplomats 
Among the regions involved in trade diplomacy, West Europe and East 
Asia stand out in terms of their contribution to total output and total trade growth, 
particularly within the last few decades. West Europe has been a long-standing 
player in trade since the-1950s and from the-1980s, East Asia also excelled to 
become one of the world’s fastest-growing economic regions. Within Europe and 
East Asia, two regional organisations are at the heart of their regional integration, 
the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Although individual states, such as China and Japan, also actively 
pursue trade diplomacy, it is regional organisations that pose many challenges 
to the current study of trade diplomacy due to their new form of ‘actorness’ and 
independence. Actorness can be defined as 'a measure of an autonomous unit's 
capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the 
international system' (Sjöstedt, 1977 pg. 16). Due to changes in global 
governance, regional organisations have gained positions as separate actors, 
and while the EU’s international actorness is not new, ASEAN’s actorness is 
relatively new, stemming from a rather informal/voluntary political integration 
(Wunderlich, 2012). Actorness, in this sense, can be understood as the 
operationalisation of representation in the regional context, where the higher the 
degree of RO’s actorness, the better representation they can perform.      
Historically, the study of actorness is characterised by its exclusive focus 
on the EU (Drieskens, 2017) and its treatment of actorness as a single 
dimension. However, further research has started to investigate the actorness of 
other regional organisations (see for example Doidge, 2008; Adelmann, 2009; 
Murau and Spandler, 2016; Mattheis and Wunderlich, 2017) and even the 
actorness of non-state entities (see for example Aydinli, 2015). Another 
interesting development is the research by Merrian Hulse, who compared the 
trade actorness of two ROs in Africa, ECOWAS and SADC (Hulse, 2014; Hulse, 
2018). Hulse’s study is, by far, the only research which highlights the issue-
specific nature of actorness since previous studies tend to view actorness as 
singular. As can be observed in several interactions, ROs can be strong (or 
possessing a high degree of actorness) in a certain area but weak in other 
external areas of cooperation, and thus, analysing the specific area of 
cooperation to explain actorness is reasonable. This research follows this 
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understanding and uses the notion of trade actorness as one core aspect of trade 
diplomacy, corresponding to the representation element of diplomacy. Of the 
various studies on actorness, the EU and ASEAN are the two ROs that have 
received the most attention, mostly owing to their distinct characteristics and 
active role in international relations.           
As the first and most sophisticated regional organisation, it is no surprise 
that the EU is the most active regional organisation in conducting external 
relations, particularly in trade. In addition to being an active player in the WTO, 
the EU is also actively involved in bilateral, inter-regional, and multilateral trade 
negotiations worldwide. Regarding bilateral and inter-regional free trade 
agreements , the EU currently has more than 40 trade agreements in place, six 
agreements being negotiated and six other agreements under adoption or 
ratification (European Commission, 2020d). Although labelled as ‘trade 
agreements’, many of these agreements cover more than just trade, often also 
including investment, labour and development issues. The EU’s choice of 
negotiating partners consists of states, mainly in Europe and the Mediterranean 
area, as well as regional and sub-regional organisations such as EAC and 
SADC. Aside from the already-completed negotiations, the EU is also still 
negotiating with other countries and group of countries, including reopening 
negotiations with the United States after the previous Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations were deemed obsolete.  
In terms of its presence and actorness, the EU is relatively more cohesive 
compared to other similar organisations due to its supranational features, which 
delegates several elements of states’ power – or competences – to the EU 
bodies. The Treaty of Rome provides the European Commission (EC) with the 
power to make trade proposals and negotiate externally (European Parliament, 
2016). With this power, the EC can negotiate as a single actor at the international 
level, which usually involves several stages of policymaking, namely the 
mandate stage, negotiation stage, and decision stage (European Commission, 
2016b). The mandate stage involves individual member states granting the EU 
mandate to negotiate as well as providing guidelines for negotiations. During the 
negotiation stage, the EU conducts the actual negotiation process and also 
consults widely with internal stakeholders to formulate a negotiation draft. Lastly, 
during the decision stage, the EU will return the agreed draft to the EU parliament 
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or individual member states for the final decision. Although throughout the years, 
there have been changes regarding the EU’s trade competences, these three 
stages have been the core elements of EU’s trade policymaking & negotiations 
for years.  
Quite similar to the EU, ASEAN member states also pursue a regional 
stance in conducting trade diplomacy. To date, ASEAN has completed six trade 
agreements with its external partners and is currently negotiating five additional 
ones (Asia Regional Integration Center, 2020b). Of the five trade agreements 
being negotiated, one is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), where both ASEAN member states, and the ASEAN Secretariat take 
part in the process. This may seem a little confusing since, unlike the EU, ASEAN 
does not have any institution above the state and thus relies on the ASEAN 
Secretariat for its day-to-day activities. The ASEAN Secretariat functions more 
as a facilitator for member states rather than an actual negotiator, making 
negotiations with ASEAN often complex. During the EU-ASEAN FTA 
negotiations, negotiators involved in the process have mentioned that 
negotiating with ASEAN is more like negotiating with ten member states rather 
than with ASEAN as a single organisation (Okano-Heijmans, 2014).    
Furthermore, ASEAN member states’ tendency to individually use 
bilateral channels in addition to the regional channel via ASEAN is often 
problematic, particularly for regional cohesiveness. Since the 1990s, many Asia-
Pacific countries – including Southeast Asian states – have opted for bilateral 
settings (Ravenhill, 2003; Dent, 2006; Wilson, 2015) which resulted in a complex 
economic arrangement within the area. Multiple agreements have been 
discussed and agreed, making Southeast Asian countries intertwined in complex 
trade arrangements, creating a phenomenon commonly referred to as the ‘Asian 
noodle bowl’ of free trade agreements. Although some have argued that mega-
regional agreements, such as RCEP or the Trans-Pacific Partnership, may signal 
the end of Asia-Pacific’s FTA noodle bowl (Murphy, 2014), others contend that 
this mix of bilateral, regional and multilateral trade architecture may actually 
cause Asia-Pacific to be more fragmented (Solís and Wilson, 2017).   
In fairness, ASEAN’s fragmented nature is nothing new, considering its 
member states political, economic and historical background. From an 
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institutional point of view, ASEAN’s integration was meant to facilitate member 
states’ needs for sovereignty – or the Westphalian nation-state system – as 
opposed to the EU-style integration that seeks to overcome the Westphalian 
system (Wunderlich, 2012b). This resulted in strong individual voices by member 
states, including during trade negotiations, often making it difficult to acquire 
ASEAN common positions.  
These divergences are further exacerbated by ASEAN member states' 
internal trade policies that range from highly liberal economies such as 
Singapore to extremely closed economies such as Cambodia. In 2016, 
Singapore’s applied tariff rate (weighted mean for all products) was 0.07%, while 
Cambodia’s was 9.77%, which shows a more than 9% tariff discrepancies 
between the two (The World Bank, 2019). Several ASEAN member states are 
also economically ‘nationalistic’, with various strategic industries highly protected 
by the government. Indonesia, for example, has been consistently protective of 
its mining industries – particularly gas, oil & minerals – while Malaysia had a 
history of continuously defending its national automobile industry from foreign 
competitors (Warburton, 2018; Mustafa, 2020). These differing positions 
regarding external trade, coupled with ASEAN’s limited institutional capacity to 
overcome these differences, mean that ASEAN’s trade diplomacy may not be as 
coherent as the EU.      
However, despite this internal fragmentation, ASEAN’s external 
representation remains relevant since actorness does not only depend on 
internal cohesion but also acceptance by external parties. The fact that ASEAN 
is a legitimate subject of international law and can conclude agreements 
independently indicates its actorness and recognition as a separate entity from 
its member states. While its institutional characteristics and internal 
cohesiveness are highly distinctive from the EU, it is nonetheless, a trade 
diplomat like the EU. ASEAN also utilises several internal mechanisms in trade 
diplomacy to create a more coherent position, such as in the use of country 
coordinators during trade negotiations. As this thesis will elaborate later on, the 
role of country coordinator in ASEAN is instrumental in consolidating these 
various positions and ultimately creating an ASEAN voice in trade negotiations.  
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Given their distinct practices and institutional differences, the EU and 
ASEAN signify two unique cases of regionalism projects and two regional 
organisations engaging in external trade diplomacy. They serve as excellent 
case studies since first, they represent the world’s most economically vibrant 
regions and second, they exemplify two different models of cooperation in 
regional integration. However, this research does not seek to only explain the 
trade diplomacy of the EU and ASEAN but also to conceptualise a framework for 
explaining other regional organisations’ trade diplomacy. Thus, this research 
utilises a comparative approach since it is better suited for generalisability and 
conceptualisation. A comparative case study can provide better outcomes 
compared to non-comparative cases since it sits between a large-n and single 
case study method, and thus, can combine a case study's empirical richness 
with a comparison's analytical leverage (Odell, 2001). Although this research 
does not extend its findings and conclusions regarding the EU and ASEAN to 
other regional organisations, the conceptual framework and the general 
propositions emanating from this research can be tested in the context of other 
regional organisations as well.  
In operationalising the comparative approach, this research relies on the 
field of comparative regionalism to explain how and why differences and 
similarities occur between different regionalism projects. It relies on previous 
works from Lenz and Marks (2016), Borzel (2016), Risse (2016a), Börzel and 
Risse (2019) which sets the ground in understanding the different mechanisms 
at play in RO’s governance of issues, including  trade diplomacy. Comparative 
regionalism literature offers a larger lens in understanding why ROs undertake 
specific actions since it enables us to analyse the interconnectivity and 
absolute/relative gain of ROs actions which are not present in other literature.  
Looking at the research background, focus, and objective of the study, 
this research sheds light, not only on the understudied area of trade diplomacy, 
but also on the external dimension of regionalism projects which tends to be 
overlooked particularly outside of the European Union. 
1.2. Research Questions & Main Arguments   
The linkage between trade and political/strategic elements in interstate 
relations is not new, and yet, the conceptual and theoretical instruments used to 
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explain this remain limited, especially when taken to the regional level. States 
routinely engaged in trade-political relations and many trade agreements are 
built on political/security concerns rather than purely economic ones. Aggarwal 
(2006), for example, differentiates between the economic and political-economic 
arguments regarding the formation of bilateral trade agreements in Asia-Pacific, 
where political-economic factors such as political regime, pressure groups, 
economic ideas, and international environment play important roles. However, 
this assertion is rarely found at the regional level, particularly in explaining the 
behaviour of regional organisations when engaging in trade agreements. 
Although the EU’s external trade relations has been extensively studied, this 
cannot be said about other regional organisations. This thesis, then, seeks to 
offer a framework for explaining regional organisations’ trade diplomacy – or the 
linkage between trade and political strategy – and identify whether differences 
and similarities occur between ROs trade diplomacy and what accounts for these 
differences and similarities by looking at two ROs, the EU and ASEAN.  
To exemplify this, two main arguments are presented. First, trade 
diplomacy of ROs can be understood as a strategy consisting of three 
interrelated elements: trade actorness which denotes ROs cohesiveness and 
ability to function as an actor in external trade relations; processes which explain 
how ROs conduct their trade diplomacy pertaining to two core activities – trade 
decisionmaking and trade negotiation – and goals which identifies the multiple 
objectives that ROs seek to advance by engaging in external trade relations. 
These three core elements – trade actorness, processes, and goals – form the 
basic conceptual framework for describing and comparing ROs engagement in 
trade diplomacy. This framework is then used to describe and compare the EU 
and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy and formulate the second argument. For the 
second argument, this thesis asserts that differences and similarities in the EU 
and ASEAN’s trade diplomacies can be explained by looking at the endogenous 
and exogenous factors within the respective regions. Differences in the EU and 
ASEAN’s trade diplomacy can be attributed to three internal factors: the 
institutional, political, and economic determinants, while similarities can be 
explained by two external factors: global-regional landscape and the EU and 
ASEAN’s positioning as non-traditional actors in international relations. To better 
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frame these arguments and set the structure for this thesis, three main research 
questions are presented below:  
1. How can trade diplomacy by regional organisations be explained and 
compared, particularly for the case of the EU and ASEAN?  
2. What are the differences and similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s practice 
of external trade diplomacy? 
3. What factors contribute to differences and similarities in the EU and 
ASEAN’s external trade diplomacy?   
1.3. Conceptual and Empirical Significance  
Based on the research outcome, this study contributes to the academic 
literature on trade & economic diplomacy, and to a lesser extent, the field of 
comparative regionalism. The proposed framework extends the current literature 
on trade diplomacy, which currently focuses only on the trade diplomacy of 
individual states. By applying this to the EU and ASEAN, this study will be 
amongst the first to focus solely on regional organisations’ trade diplomacy. 
Furthermore, the comparison between the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy will 
contribute to the literature on the external dimension of regionalism which is still 
understudied outside of the European Union context. Trade diplomacy, as a 
specific aspect of RO’s external relations, provides an interesting case since 
external trade is currently the most advanced area of external cooperation for 
most regional organisations. 
One main empirical contribution of this thesis is in providing a 
comprehensive account of the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, which until 
now have been treated separately in terms of either commercial/economic or 
political/strategic aspects. Specifically for ASEAN, this research is the first to 
provide a detailed study of its external trade relations, particularly concerning its 
decisionmaking and negotiation process. Considering that ASEAN tends to 
operate in a secretive and highly elitist manner, the data gathered during this 
research – particularly from elite interviews – provides a rich empirical 
contribution not just to ASEAN studies, but also to the study of trade negotiations 
and trade policy in general. Since trade policy and trade negotiations by other 
ROs, aside from the EU, tends to be underrepresented, the empirical contribution 
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of this research will be useful for scholars wanting to understand how non-EU 
ROs manage their external trade relations.  
1.4. Research Outline  
To elaborate on this research’s core arguments, this thesis is structured 
into seven chapters, including the introduction and conclusion sections. 
Following Chapter 1, Chapter 2 presents a systematic analysis regarding the 
regional organisation’s trade diplomacy and the gaps within the literature. In a 
way, this chapter partially serves as an argument regarding the need to construct 
a framework for explaining the trade diplomacy of regional organisations since it 
highlights the limitations of existing works. Specifically, this research builds from 
two strands of literature, previous studies on comparative regionalism and 
economic diplomacy, with a specific focus on trade diplomacy by regional 
organisations. The comparative regionalism literature provides the basis for 
understanding regional comparison and the approaches used to explain 
differences and similarities between them while the trade/economic diplomacy 
literature highlights the core elements involved in explaining trade diplomacy by 
ROs.  
Chapter 3 contains the analytical framework and operationalisation of the 
framework, as well as the research design and methodological choices. This 
chapter aims to translate the abstract concepts within this research and to justify 
the approach for data collection, data interpretation, and knowledge-building 
process, which are employed throughout the research. A section within this 
chapter also introduces the analytical framework that is used to compare the EU 
and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, consisting of three core elements: trade 
actorness, processes, and goals which also serve as the basis for the empirical 
chapters.  Chapter 4, 5, and 6 are the empirical chapters, each focusing on 
comparing a specific aspect of the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy. Chapter 4 
compares the EU and ASEAN’s actorness in trade, Chapter 5 focuses on the EU 
and ASEAN’s trade diplomatic processes, and Chapter 6 elaborates on the trade 
diplomatic goals of the EU and ASEAN. Within each chapter, is also a brief 
analysis on the causes of differences and similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s 
trade diplomacy.   
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Chapter 7 is a synthesis and conclusion of the main findings in the previous 
chapters and aims to provide a more detailed analysis on the determinants of 
differences and similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy. It also 
introduces a diagram which ties up the whole discussion within the thesis and 
summarises the overall findings. This chapter also elaborates on what these 
findings mean for the larger academic literature and identifies specific areas for 
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Chapter 2 – Reviewing the Literature: External Relations and 
Economic Diplomacy of Regional Organisations   
 
2.1.  Introduction 
As briefly mentioned in the introduction section, the growing practice of 
trade diplomacy by regional organisations is not matched by the academic 
literature in this area, which this research hopes to fill. In doing so, this research 
builds from two streams of literature: comparative regionalism and trade & 
economic diplomacy, employing several interrelated concepts from both 
literatures to form a general analytical framework. Within these streams of 
literature, no single framework can be found specifically on the study of trade 
diplomacy of ROs and hence, the need to combine multiple concepts to explain 
the research object.  
The purpose of this chapter is to present a review on the existing literature 
regarding regional organisations’ trade diplomacy, and based on the systematic 
analysis, three main limitations are identified. First, comparative regionalism 
suffers from the lack of commonly agreed ‘real comparators’ in doing pure 
comparative research, and hence, often needs to borrow concepts from other 
fields. While there has been some progress towards workable concepts, more 
analytical tools are needed, particularly in comparing the external dimension of 
regionalism projects. Second, although the literature on the external dimension 
of ROs does exist under the umbrella term ‘actorness’, it often fails to take into 
account the issue-specific nature of RO’s external relations and so far, there are 
only a limited number of studies outside of the European Union context. Third, 
while trade & economic diplomacy as a practice is not new, this area of research 
is relatively new with many limitations in its theoretical frameworks, particularly 
those relating to regional organisations’ external economic relations. Current 
frameworks focus only on states and to a certain extent, the EU, which may not 
always apply to other ROs. 
With these limitations in mind, this research proposes a new conceptual 
tool to compare regional organisation’s trade diplomacy by combining these two 
strands of literature since no single strand of literature is adequate in explaining 
this phenomenon. Regionalism studies offer the best explanation for regional 
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organisations’ external behaviour, why they undertake specific actions and why 
differences or similarities exist between them while trade & economic diplomacy 
literature can provide detailed accounts on how ROs engage in these external 
economic relations and the foreign policy/diplomacy calculations behind it. A 














Figure 2.1. Theoretical Flow of the Literature Review 
 
To further elaborate on this figure, this chapter is divided into three main sections. 
The first section explains the comparative aspect of regionalism studies by 
highlighting the core issues in comparative regionalism, common approaches 
employed to explain differences, and similarities between regional organisations 
and the external dimensions of regional organisations. The second section 
focuses on trade & economic diplomacy by explaining its core concepts, strands 
and main approaches, and includes a critical assessment on the specific strand 
of economic diplomacy – the trade diplomacy of regional organisations – which 
is the main focus of this research. Lastly, the final section concludes the 
discussion and provides background for the subsequent chapters.  
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2.2. Regions and Regional Organisations in Comparative Perspective  
Like most comparative studies, comparing variables is often difficult due to 
the multiple variables involved. Specifically for comparative regionalism, scholars 
face three crucial problems in undertaking the comparative analysis, the why 
compare, what to compare and how to compare problems.  
2.2.1.  Problems of Comparison in Comparative Regionalism   
The problem with comparing regions is that they are highly diverse. 
Regions differ in almost every aspect, making comparison nearly impossible and 
thus may not generate ‘real’ results. The logical reasoning for this rejection lies 
in the perceived idiosyncrasies of regions and thus each region is often 
considered sui generis – or unique – in their own right. Some scholars, however, 
have argued that there are enough similar traits among regions to make 
comparisons possible (Laursen, 2010). Generally, scholars who have tried to 
compare regions begin by pointing out the logical reasoning for comparison (i.e. 
similarities in characteristics or behaviour) before doing the ‘real’ comparing 
process (see for example Cuvyers 2002; Beeson 2006; Murray & Moxon-Browne 
2013; Murau & Spandler 2016). Other scholars also point out that differences in 
this ‘why compare’ debate can be traced back to the scholars’ epistemological 
positions, where the rejection of comparison is basically ‘an idiographic defence 
against the generalising ambitions of deductive nomothetic social science’ 
(Warleigh-Lack & Rosamond 2010 pg. 996). However, there seems to be a 
growing agreement between regionalism scholars that what is or what is not 
comparable depends on the research question and research design (De 
Lombaerde et al., 2010; Laursen, 2010). While several regional components may 
be difficult to compare, other components are, indeed, comparable, assuming 
that the overall comparison process is conducted within the scientific parameter.    
Compared to the why question, the what and how questions pose larger 
challenges for scholars of comparative regionalism. The ‘what’ question mostly 
has to do with the ontology or the object of study while the ‘how’ question is linked 
to the epistemological concerns or how knowledge is generated within a field of 
study. These problems also exist in classic regionalism studies but become 
much more complex when taken into the comparative context. In terms of 
ontology, comparative regionalism is faced with the problem of conceptual 
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clarity. Earlier scholars such as Nye (1968) have pointed out the ‘fuzziness’ of 
regionalism concepts as a problem for doing comparative research since multiple 
terms such as ‘regions’, ‘regionalisation’ and ‘regionalism’ have been interpreted 
in multiple ways. In earlier studies, regions are based on their geographical 
proximity, social-political-economic interactions, cohesiveness, historical origins, 
shared identities, regional project-building, and other forms of similarities. 
However, these parsimonious attempts to define regions seem to have come to 
an end since researchers nowadays agree that there are indeed, no ‘natural’ 
regions and the definition of region differs according to the question being 
researched (Hettne, 2005). Similar to Hettne, De Lombaerde (2011) accepts the 
use of loose definitions in comparative studies, but argues that there is a 
convergence in defining and understanding regionalisation and regionalism, 
which adheres to Soderbaum’s definition of the term:  
 
“Regionalism’ represents the policy and project, whereby state and 
non-state actors co-operate and co-ordinate strategy within a 
particular region or as a type of world order. It is usually associated 
with a formal programme and often leads to institution building. 
‘Regionalisation’ refers to the process of co-operation, integration, 
cohesion and identity creating a regional space (issue-specific or 
general)” (Soderbaum 2009 in De Lombaerde 2011 pg. 678)  
    
Although not fully resolved, it can be said that there is some degree of 
agreement in understanding and using the various concepts of regionalism which 
can help create better comparative research. In social science, comparative 
research can only be done if the concepts being compared are ‘similar’ (Basedau 
and Kollner, 2007) and they ‘must share a set of relevant descriptive attributes 
or dimensions’ (Gerring and Thomas, 2005). However, the problem with 
comparative regionalism is that despite the clear(er) definitions, it is still difficult 
to set clear indicators and parameters when discussing regionalism or regional 
integration. Nye (1968) lists three types of integration, namely economic, social 
and political integration with different indicators for each type. Nye’s work is 
perhaps the first attempt to fully formulate a comparative framework in 
regionalism studies. However, Nye’s study uses quantitative data sets such as 
exports, budgets, number of staff and gives little attention to the non-material 
elements of regionalism. As a result, other scholars have also tried to create 
indicators, parameters, and other forms of measurements and explanations to 
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understand regionalism. However, the problem is that when different scholars 
use similar concepts but have different interpretations and measurements, it is 
unlikely that these researches can complement each other since they speak a 
different ‘language’. One way to overcome this conceptual problem is to borrow 
well-defined concepts from other fields, such as demonstrated by Borzel’s use 
of the governance approach in explaining regionalism in the EU (Börzel, 2011; 
Borzel, 2016), Hameiri’s use of state theory and political geography to explain 
comparative regionalism in Asia and Europe (Hameiri, 2013), and Murau & 
Spandler’s use of statehood to explain EU and ASEAN’s actorness (Murau and 
Spandler, 2016). Since other fields of study often have more well-defined 
concepts, indicators and/or parameters, borrowing these theoretical tools may 
assist in creating a more defined, valid and robust research.     
The last and perhaps, most difficult, is the how problem in comparative 
regionalism. Broadly speaking, the how problem is divided into two clusters, the 
methodological problem and the theoretical or framework problem. In terms of 
methodology, all studies on comparative regionalism will generally fall into 
quantitative, qualitative, or a combination of both. Any comparative study can be 
classified as either nomothetic or relying on numbers (quantitative) and 
idiographic or relying on prose (qualitative)5 (Gerring and Thomas, 2005). 
Quantitative research is potentially more precise and explicit since it is naturally 
comparative due to the existence of scales (Gerring and Thomas, 2005), and 
hence, many scholars in comparative studies favour this methodology. A 
quantitative approach is mostly appealing to scholars who focus on economic 
regionalism, given the magnitude of economic data and the number of regions 
or countries to be covered. However, a quantitative approach lacks the ability to 
explain complex changes (Hameiri, 2013) and the choice to quantify some social 
science concepts may actually make the concept lose its richness in meaning, 
and thus, the qualitative approach may be more appropriate in this case since it 
offers more depth (Gerring and Thomas, 2005). Since the shift from old to new 
regionalism, and particularly to comparative regionalism,6 scholars treat 
 
5 A qualitative study can also rely on numbers, as long as it does not correspond to a certain 
scale.   
6 Old and new regionalism denote a classification in the temporal and theoretical development 
of regionalism studies. Old regionalism signify regionalism projects during the 1950s up to 
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regionalism as a multidimensional affair (not just an economic one), and 
qualitative approaches seem to be used more often.  
However, the qualitative approach in comparative regionalism is also 
problematic since it faces two major problems: the problem of sampling and 
interpreting results. Sampling is difficult in comparative regionalism since the size 
of the population itself is limited. Early regionalism scholars faced the problem of 
the EU as sui generis and often being the only case (n=1), making any form of 
generalisation nearly impossible. This lack of comparable cases led to the 
growing use of case study methods, creating tensions between regional 
specialisation and comparative analysis, where the former is more dominant (De 
Lombaerde et al., 2010). In fact, most books on comparative regionalism are a 
collection of multiple case studies, where ‘real’ comparative analysis is only done 
either in the introduction or conclusion of the book (Fioramonti and Mattheis, 
2016).  
Furthermore, the fuzziness of concepts in regionalism also creates 
problems when choosing case studies, particularly in deciding the appropriate 
boundaries and criteria for comparison (Genna and Lombaerde, 2010). In other 
words, comparative regionalism is also prone to selection bias or lack of 
objectivity in selecting samples. Due to the limited case studies, comparative 
regionalism may also face difficulties in interpreting and analysing results, as well 
as making generalisations. Most comparative studies suffer from what Lijphart 
(1971) defines as the ‘many variables, small number of cases’ problem and 
comparative regionalism is also susceptible to this since it deals with many 
theoretical explanations (Genna and Lombaerde, 2010). Many theoretical 
explanations mean that multiple variables need to be tested, and with a limited 
population, this can be quite hard to do.  
In terms of theoretical explanations, the biggest concern for comparative 
regionalism is perhaps, in the hegemonic status of European integration, both as 
 
early 1990s, mostly driven by geopolitical changes following the end of World-War II and 
during Cold War, while new regionalism indicates regionalism projects in the 1990s, created 
after the Cold-War and mostly driven by globalisation forces. Comparative regionalism, on 
the other hand, refers more to progress in the theoretical development of regionalism studies, 
where scholars move from focusing only on the EU to include other regionalism projects as 
well (hence the term ‘comparative’). For detailed explanation between these eras, refer to 
Fredrik Soderbaum’s article ‘Old, New and Comparative Regionalism: the History and 
Scholarly Development of the Field’ (Soderbaum, 2016).        
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a theoretical and empirical model. Due to its historical origin, Europe is often 
seen as the ‘prototype’ of regional integration and regionalism studies is skewed 
toward it. This is particularly true for old regionalism where most theories are 
designed to explain European integration, although this may be justified 
considering the progress of Europe during that time. In practical terms, Europe 
is considered as the most advanced regional integration project, overlooking the 
fact that the term ‘advanced’ itself implies some kind of race (Warleigh and 
Rosamond, 2006) which puts Europe in a superior position. Ironically, the effort 
to move away from Europe also creates bias since the EU was often used as a 
‘negative’ example. For example, Poole’s comparative research on the EU and 
ASEAN norms concludes that ASEAN acts as a ‘resister’ to the EU’s norms 
(Poole, 2015), making ‘EU’s norm’ a concept rather than a variable to be 
compared. In this sense, regionalism scholars treat the EU as a yardstick, either 
positively or negatively (Hameiri, 2013; Borzel, 2016) and not as a case study. 
Hence, ‘the challenge for comparative regionalism is to both include and 
transcend European integration theory and practice’ (Söderbaum 2008 pg 17).  
To address these concerns, newer theories of regionalism such as regime 
theory, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism (encapsulated in the ‘new 
regionalism approach’) seem to have gradually lessened the dominance of 
European-based theory (Acharya, 2012). 
A more recent work by Fioramonti & Mattheis (2016) tries to combine old 
and new regionalism approach to create a comparative framework which can be 
universally applied across regions. Based on the similarities between old and 
new regionalism, they suggest seven concepts to be used as comparators in 
doing comparative studies: the process of regionalisation, institutional design, 
type of regional leadership, conditions for membership, approach to sovereignty, 
economic, political or social drivers ,and type of regional identity. Fioramonti and 
Mattheis use this framework to compare the European Union and the African 
Union, concluding that there are more differences between the two than is 
commonly assumed. Hence, they suggest that it is necessary to develop new 
tools and conceptualisation for comparative regionalism to avoid superficial 
generalisation of similarities across regions, in order to develop comparative 
regionalism as a true field of study (Fioramonti and Mattheis, 2016). However, 
while this framework does capture both elements of old and new regionalism, it 
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does not provide clear conceptual definitions and operationalisations of these 
comparators to be applicable to other cases. For example, the assertion of the 
EU and the AU’s regionalism processes as ‘non-linear’ is unclear and confusing 
since it assumes that there is a linear process but does not explain what a linear 
regionalism process looks like.   
In conclusion, there have been gradual moves toward workable concepts 
in comparative regionalism which have enabled scholars to make valid 
comparisons between regions, although more works are needed particularly in 
designing the commonly accepted indicators, and in several cases, parameters. 
Scholars in this field generally have similar understandings regarding the 
definition of general concepts such as regions, regionalisation, regionalism or 
regional identity but often differ on how they operationalise these within their 
research. For example, the institutional design is a commonly used concept in 
regionalism, but indicators for examining it are often different from one scholar 
to another (see for example Fioramonti and Mattheis (2016) and Acharya and 
Johnston's (2007) operationalisation of the term). Thus, one main challenge for 
scholars doing comparative regionalism research is to clarify why, how, and what 
they are comparing in their research.  
For this research, the why, how, and what questions will be elaborated in 
more detail in the methodological chapter of this thesis (Chapter 3). Furthermore, 
this research focuses on regional organisations which have clearer definitions, 
indicators and limitations – at least in the legal and institutional terms – making 
comparisons relatively clearer to achieve. With this in mind, the following section 
discusses literature on comparing regional organisations, particularly on 
explaining why similarities and differences exist between them.              
2.2.2. Approaches in Comparing Regional Organisations  
Regional organisations can be defined as ‘organisations constituted by at 
least two contiguous states, which define their membership therein on a regional 
basis and are multipurpose in scope’ (Jetschke et al. 2016 pg. 2). Despite being 
inter-state organisations, regional organisations have, at some point, exhibit 
state-like features such as demonstrated by the EU institutions which mimic 
conventional state’s separation of power (trias politica). However, not all regional 
organisations behave the same way, since they are all intrinsically different. For 
P a g e  | 25 
 
example, Europe is relatively more institutionalised compared to other regions 
such as Asia and Africa, but Asian and African institutions offer more 
inclusiveness and flexibility in decision-making (Acharya and Johnston, 2007). 
These variations lead to the question of regional organisation’s efficacy and how 
effective they are in solving problems, which can be traced back to their 
institutional design (Acharya and Johnston, 2007). In explaining what institutional 
design is, Acharya & Johnston (2007) suggest five main features or indicators 
including membership, scope, formal rules, norms, and mandate. However, while 
these indicators are useful in identifying the main differences and similarities 
between regional organisations’ institutional design, they cannot explain why 
certain ROs opt for a specific design, and others do not.   
In addressing this, Lenz & Marks (2016) identify four main approaches in 
explaining why the design of regional organisations differs from one to another: 
realism, neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, and diffusion theory. Realism, 
neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism approaches trickle down from 
International Relations’ rationalists and critical perspectives, while diffusion 
theory has its roots in global governance and regionalism studies. For realists, 
differences between regional organisations are best explained by analysing the 
distribution and disparities of power between them, focusing on power-operating 
variables, both internally (e.g. role of hegemonic leadership) and externally (e.g. 
changing relative capabilities of other actors/regions) (Grieco, 1997). Existence 
or absence of hegemonic leadership in a certain region and how this hegemon 
behaves can be a good indication of the relationship among countries in that 
region and, consequently, shapes interaction within the regional institution. 
Hegemon may use side payments or incentives as ways to attain ‘recognition’ 
from other members, ensuring that they benefit from the arrangement (Grieco, 
1997). 
Offering a different approach, neoliberal institutionalism is concerned with 
growing interdependence, particularly in economic relations between states, and 
proposes that regional institutions are solutions for common problems stemming 
from these complexities (Keohane, 1984). According to neoliberal 
institutionalism, varieties in regional organisations are best explained by the 
degree of interdependence between regions since higher interdependence is 
more likely to result in deeper institutionalism. European integration is often used 
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to support this approach, where increasing complexities in economic activities 
have led to deeper integration within the region.   
Employing a non-materialistic approach, constructivists argue that 
differences in regional organisations are results of variances in their internal 
norms, ideas and regional identities. Constructivists believe that social 
interactions and social norms are the basis for institutional formation and 
rulemaking in the regional context, which determines why certain regional 
organisations may prefer one system of governance over another. For example, 
ASEAN is characterised by decision-making process rooted in the ‘ASEAN Way’, 
a practice based in Southeast Asian culture combining a high degree of 
consultation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat) based on discreetness, 
informality, consensus-building, and a non-confrontational bargaining style 
which differs from the legalistic western model (Acharya, 2001). Historical 
accounts also play an important role for constructivists, where past experiences 
affect current perceptions and actions. For example, the EU’s preference for 
supranational arrangements, as opposed to the intergovernmental model where 
states dominate, is mostly due to previous experience with regional interstate 
wars and thus, the need to limit to states’ power.      
The fourth line of inquiry is the diffusion theory, developed mostly by 
scholars of comparative regionalism with a specific focus on global governance 
and international organisations. The underlying assumption of diffusion theory is 
that regional organisations should not be studied independently of each other 
(as is the case with the three previous approaches), but rather should be viewed 
interdependently since they tend to emulate each other through interactions and 
diffusions (Jetschke and Lenz, 2013; Jetschke et al., 2016; Risse, 2016a). There 
are, indeed, several common features in most ROs such as secretariats and 
technical committees (Jetschke et al., 2016) and the propensity that regional 
trade agreements tend to cluster as a result of interdependence among countries 
(Baccini et al., 2015). Risse (2016) also argues that regions emulate each other 
in three main components: ideas of regionalism, features of RO’s institutional 
design, and regional governance pertaining to specific issues. In terms of how 
these components diffuse from one to another, scholars within this stream of 
literature suggest several channels including competition (regions compete for 
resources and ROs cater to this), learning (observing other ROs) and emulation 
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(ROs follow global trends on how to ‘behave’) (Jetschke and Lenz, 2013). In 
recent years, diffusion theory has become more influential in explaining not only 
similarities between ROs, but also in understanding interactions between regions 
(inter-regionalism) and what this means for global governance.         
Comparing these four approaches, it can be observed that each approach 
offers different reference points for comparing ROs. Realism and neoliberal 
institutionalism offer material/tangible accounts as the starting point of analysis 
while constructivism focuses on ideational/non-tangible components in analysing 
ROs. Diffusion theory, on the other hand, can be seen as a combination of both, 
since diffusion may occur through a tangible-based process such as economic 
coercion/incentives or ideational forces such as the adaptation of regional/global 
norms by ROs. However, seeing that one feature of comparative regionalism is 
how it views regional governance as located between the multi-layered global 
governance (Soderbaum, 2016), another acceptable way to classify and 
operationalise these approaches is by looking at the source, whether internal or 
external to the region. For example, internal norms, regional power 
configurations, regional interdependence, and internal distribution of authority 
are determinants that can be found within the regions/ROs while diffusion from 
other ROs and extra-regional power configurations are external to regions/ROs. 
This classification also suits this research’s object (RO’s trade diplomacy) which 
sits between the national, regional and global level of governance.  
Although it is still debatable as to which determinant is more dominant 
(internal/external), it is safe to say that both internal and external factors are 
important in analysing the differences and/or similarities between different ROs. 
Thus, this classification is useful in explaining why regional organisations differ 
from each other and will be integral to this research since it will be used to explain 
why there are similarities and differences between the EU and ASEAN’s 
behaviour and their management of specific issues. In clustering and 
operationalising these determinants, a more detailed discussion will be 
presented in Chapter 3 regarding methodology and research design.    
Summarising the last two sections (Section 2.2.1 & 2.2.2), it can be 
argued that there has been some progress in the study of comparative 
regionalism and some degree of agreements regarding core concepts. However, 
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divergences still occur in several aspects, particularly regarding the 
measurements of regionalism projects which drive scholars to borrow concepts 
from other fields of study. Disagreements also occur regarding the main causes 
of similarities and/or differences in regional organisations institutional designs, 
their internal workings, and collective regional governance. Another noticeable 
gap in this literature is also on how it focuses largely on the internal dimension 
of regionalism and tends to overlook the external dimension of regional projects. 
Addressing this limitation, the following section investigates academic literature 
focusing on the external dimension of regionalism projects, owing mostly to 
scholars within EU Studies.   
2.2.3. External Dimension and Actorness of Regional Organisations 
While there have been numerous studies of the internal dimensions of 
regionalism, both independently and comparatively, not much can be found on 
the external dimension of regionalism. ‘External dimension’ in this sense refers 
to the extra-regional effects that ROs have and the means through which these 
effects are projected. The most straightforward way of analysing an RO’s 
external dimension is by looking at its external relations or policies to see what 
effect it has on its environment. However, in conducting relations with other 
parties, regional organisations differ from states, who are often considered as 
single and unitary actors and thus, is often treated as such.7 Regional 
organisations, on the other hand, are composed of many states, with multiple 
goals and interests and hence may not always appear single or unitary in 
international affairs. Even for a supranational institution like the EU, problems of 
coherence and cohesiveness remains a challenge, yet alone for 
intergovernmental organisations such as ASEAN. In explaining the position of 
regional organisations and the kind of external relations that they engage in, 
scholars have used different approaches, terminologies, and indicators, implying 
the complexity of the issue.  
The terms ‘presence’, ‘coherence’, ‘actorship’, ‘actorness’ and ‘actor 
capability’ have all been used by various scholars to explain the regional 
organisation’s external representation. By the 1990s, the term actorness was 
 
7 It should be noted that not all IR approaches view the state as a unitary actor. Some view states 
as fragmented with different emphasis on the different actors within.     
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perhaps the most dominant, gaining popularity among scholars of regionalism, 
particularly in European integration studies. Historically, the concept of actorness 
was first used to explain the increasing presence and role of the European 
Commission/European Union (EC/EU) in the international arena (see for 
example Sjöstedt, 1977; Taylor, 1982; Allen and Smith, 1990; Ginsberg, 1999; 
Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Initially mentioned 
in the 1970s, actorness tries to capture the growing changes in the international 
environment where nation-states are no longer the only actors in international 
relations (Drieskens, 2017). Actorness itself, is a muddy concept since its root 
word ‘actor’, is also a debatable concept in international relations as there is still 
no consensus on what constitutes as an actor in international relations 
(Drieskens, 2017). Sjöstedt (1977) defines actor capability as ‘a measure of 
autonomous unit’s capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to 
other actors in the international system’ (pg.16). Despite not precisely using the 
term actorness in his work, it was this definition that trickled down to form the 
current literature’s definition of actorness (Drieskens, 2017).  
Generally, analysis of actorness can be approached by two lenses: 
paradigm-driven and unit-driven (Doidge, 2008). Paradigm-driven focuses on 
explaining how the international system works, whom the significant actors are 
and not necessarily explaining what constitutes as an actor (Doidge, 2008). One 
major example of the paradigm-driven analysis is the realism approach which 
rests on the assumption that the international system works based on anarchy 
and that nation-states are the most important actors. Conversely, the unit-driven 
approach focuses on the actor as a unit of analysis, rather than the system. Most 
studies on actorness adopt this approach by systematically trying to explain what 
actor and actorness are, and by setting out pre-defined criteria. For example, in 
answering the fundamental question of what constitutes as an actor, Bretherton 
& Vogler (1999) suggest examining it through the legal-formal and political 
lenses. In international law, the status of ‘international actor’ can be attained 
through the conferment of legal personality to an entity since legal actorness 
comes with the right to participate, to have obligations, and to be held responsible 
by other actors (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). However, legal actorness alone 
is not enough to guarantee an actor’s influence and relevance since a legal entity 
can have weak or no influence at all (e.g. a failed state), while non-legal 
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personalities can have large influence through informal recognition by other 
parties (e.g. a quasi-state). Actors are also more likely to be relevant when they 
possess actor capability, rather than mere formal recognition (Gehring et al., 
2013). Hence, aside from the legal criteria, one must also examine the 
behavioural or trait criteria of an actor.  
In their work, Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006) suggest three 
components for assessing behavioural actorness: opportunity, capability, and 
presence. Opportunity captures the external dimension of actorness, referring to 
the material, ideational, and ideological forces which can be either conducive or 
detrimental to an entity’s actorness. In response to this opportunity, an actor must 
possess the capability to respond effectively to these outside forces. Lastly, 
presence signifies the ability to exert influence by ‘just being there’. Presence 
was also an important notion in Allen & Smith's (1990) work on actorness, 
although they slightly differ on the definition. According to Allen & Smith (1990), 
presence is defined by a combination of factors: ‘credentials and legitimacy, the 
capacity to act and mobilise resources, the place it occupies in the perceptions 
and expectations of policymakers’ (pg. 21). Factors can be either tangible or 
intangible, while perceptions can be either negative or positive, which then 
determines the position of the actor within the system. Allen & Smith also assert 
that presence is not the exclusive domain of ‘actors’ (e.g. states, individuals and 
institutions), but can also denote ‘ideas, notions, expectations and imaginations’ 
(pg.21). This approach differs from most accounts of presence which focus 
mostly on ‘tangible’ actors. 
Due to the EU’s domination in the actorness’ research agenda, the 
subsequent research regarding actorness was mostly used to explain the EU’s 
actorness, and most literature on actorness is really ‘EU actorness’. Currently, 
there is very limited study on non-EU actorness, and even when there is, it is 
mostly in comparison with or in relations to the EU’s actorness. Furthermore, 
non-EU studies on actorness tend to be measured on how well they conform or 
reject the notion of state actorness (or state-ness), which the EU seems to favour 
(Hulse, 2014). Several studies have indeed tried to explain the actorness of other 
regional organisations, such as in Asia (Doidge, 2008; Wunderlich, 2012b; 
Murau and Spandler, 2016; Mattheis and Wunderlich, 2017), Africa (Adelmann, 
2009; Hulse, 2014) and America (Mattheis and Wunderlich, 2017), including 
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introducing the use of actorness in analysing non-state organisations (Aydinli, 
2015). However, these studies are, once again, done in relations to the EU or in 
comparison to the EU.  
One of the few studies which exclusively analyses regional actorness 
outside of the EU is Hulse’s comparative research on the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS)’s international trade actorness. Building on various 
frameworks of actorness, Hulse suggests that the ‘actor quality’ of ROs is a 
combination of presence, decision-making, preference convergence, capabilities 
and, identity. Presence in Hulse’s framework follows Allen and Smith (1990)  and 
Bretherton & Vogler’s (2006) interpretation of the term, defining it as ‘a 
consequence of being’ and the acceptance of the ROs by outsiders, including in 
their expectations of the ROs. Decision-making and preference convergence are 
closely related in Hulse’s framework since effective decision-making is only 
useful when it leads to preference convergence. While institutionalisation, 
supranationalism, and majority-voting are generally more useful in decision-
making, this does not mean that supranationalism will automatically lead to 
higher actorness since there are instances where intergovernmentalism can also 
lead to an effective decision-making process (Hulse, 2014). Preference 
convergence itself stems from the basic notion of interest, which is a function of 
shared identity and material considerations and is closely related to unity or 
cohesion, which may also affect an actor’s external effectiveness. 
In defining capabilities, Hulse uses a set of external instruments, 
borrowed from Börzel & Risse's (2009) framework on moral diffusion, as a way 
to operationalise an actor’s capabilities. Hulse introduces three types of 
mechanisms for external actions by regional organisations: coercion, 
incentivisation and moral suasion. Coercion includes punitive activities such as 
litigation and military intervention, incentivisation is positive/negative 
inducements such as sanctions and provisions of technical assistance, while 
moral suasion is dialogue-based activities such as lobbying and political 
workshops. For the last element, identity, Hulse adopts Wendt’s (1994) 
understanding and classification of the term, by differentiating between the 
corporate and social identity. Corporate identity refers to the ‘intrinsic, self-
organising qualities that constitute actor individuality’ (Wendt, 1994 pg. 385), 
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which for ROs are roughly the same since they all seek to consolidate regional 
resources to maintain international stability and obtain larger gains for their 
member states (Hulse, 2014). What separates ROs is their social identity, 
defined as the ‘meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the 
perspectives of others’ (Wendt, 1994 pg. 385), where for ROs, will vary 
depending on the kind of social actor the ROs wishes to be. For example, a 
regional organisation who champions itself as a democracy may favour 
international intervention in support of worldwide democratic governance, while 
an RO with an underlying non-interference identity may be opposed to this idea. 
In summary, Hulse’s framework is outlined below:     
Table 2.1 Hulse’s Conceptualisation and Operationalisation of Trade Actorness 







The impact of an RO on its 
external environment, 
simply by ‘existing’ 
- Global trade share 
- Participation in a global 
trade organisation  
Capabilities Institutionalised means to 
an end, consisting of RO’s 
budget and external 
instruments directly under 
the RO’s control 
- RO’s budget 
- External instruments 
consisting of coercion 
(e.g. litigation, military 
interventions), 
incentivization (e.g. 
technical assistance) and 
moral suasion (e.g. 
lobbying & workshops) 
Decision-making Decision-making model 




- Decision-making model 
(e.g. intergovernmental 
or supranational)   
- Presence or absence of 
regional leadership 
Preference Convergence Likelihood of interest 
convergence, leading to a 
higher level of actorness 
- Similarity in positions 
and interests 
Identity Exclusivity of the region; 
relating to the 
differentiation between 
‘self’ and ‘others’  
- Corporate identity 
- Social identity  
Source: Hulse (2014)  
 
One major distinction between Hulse’s work and other previous works is 
in her view regarding preference convergence, where she sees that preference 
convergence and interests cannot be treated as similar across different areas of 
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cooperation. For example, similarities in economic interest may not necessarily 
extend to security or political interests, meaning that actorness cannot be 
generalised across different areas of external cooperation. Hence, Hulse also 
suggests the need to treat actorness as issue-specific since it can vary across 
different aspects of regional organisations’ external relations. This is the main 
strength of Hulse’s framework since it rightfully captures variations in RO’s 
external actorness, which is true in many cases. For example, Gehring, Urbanski 
and Oberthür (2017) observe that while the EU can be externally perceived as 
constituting a strong market power, many scholars still perceive it as a relatively 
weak military power. Other ROs may also have these tendencies since it is 
relatively scarce for any RO (or any actors, for that matter) to display strong 
power, presence or cohesiveness in all aspect of cooperation.  
In their seminal book, Bretherton and Vogler (2006) organise the EU’s 
actorness and external relations based on different areas of cooperation but do 
not take into account the issue-specific nature of the EU’s actorness. Thus, 
Hulse’s framework can be seen as a step forward in the literature of actorness, 
which is also relevant for this research since both Hulse’s work and this research 
focus only on one aspect of RO’s external cooperation. For this reason, this 
research will use Hulse’s conceptualisation and operationalisation of trade 
actorness since it best captures the research object. 
Analysing the existing literature on actorness, several observations can 
be made. First, although the term actorness seems to be the preferred concept 
among scholars, there is still disagreement as to what are the specific features 
of actorness. A commonly accepted belief is that actorness should consist of at 
least the legal and behavioural aspect, with the behavioural component more 
crucial in contemporary global relations. Second, actorness seems to still be 
exclusive for the EU with limited use outside of it, and even when scholars do 
use it, it is often in comparison to or in relations with the EU. So far, only one 
study can be found regarding the usage of actorness fully outside of the EU, with 
several others using it in relation to or in comparison with the EU. Third, literature 
tends to view actorness as general and comprehensive with little separation 
between individual issues. The only exception is a study by Hulse (2014, 2018) 
who, like this thesis,  proposes that actorness should be treated as issue-specific 
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since in many cases, ROs may be strong actors in one area of external relations, 
but weak in the other.  
It is therefore crucial to determine the area(s) of external relations being 
examined, which for this research is RO’s external trade relations, falling under 
the larger concept of economic and trade diplomacy.  
2.3.  Understanding Trade and Economic Diplomacy  
The core object of this research is regional organisations’ external trade 
relations or their trade diplomacy. Trade diplomacy is a tricky concept to pinpoint 
since it is often studied in tandem with other economic relations such as finance, 
labour or investments relations, and thus, scholars generally cluster trade 
diplomacy under the larger umbrella term of economic diplomacy. However, 
understanding economic diplomacy itself is a difficult task since scholars of 
economic diplomacy vary greatly in terms of its definitions, cluster/strands and 
approaches/frameworks.   
2.3.1.  Definitions, Strands and Approaches in Economic Diplomacy  
As a practice, economic diplomacy can be traced back to the, classic 
diplomacy of ‘war and trade’ (Okano-Heijmans, 2011), including in the creation 
of the first overseas trade representative in the Mediterranean during the 
Ottoman Empire (Rana and Chatterjee, 2011). In the past, trading activities were 
central for early political entities, and the practice of sending trade envoys was a 
common practice. This trickles down to the current practice of economic 
diplomacy by modern-day states, despite several adjustments in the practice. 
There are at least three main distinctions between classic and the contemporary 
economic diplomacy: the issues covered, channels used, and the actors 
involved. Current economic diplomacy covers wider issues, ranging from 
investment, labour, capital, intellectual property rights, and environment, which 
is in contrast to classic economic diplomacy which focused mostly on trade. For 
the channels of communication, globalisation of technology has created newer 
forms of communications which help in transmitting information faster between 
parties. Lastly, the proliferation of actors also affects the new economic 
diplomacy where individuals, businesses, non-governmental organisations, 
consumer groups and groups of states are becoming actors in contemporary 
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economic diplomacy (Rashid, 2005; van Bergeijk and Moons, 2009). However, 
despite its long practice and increasing popularity, economic diplomacy remains 
an elusive concept.  
In terms of definition, there is currently no consensus on what ‘economic 
diplomacy’ entails since it covers various activities, issues, and understandings. 
There are at least four topics of discussions regarding what economic diplomacy 
is, covering questions on what it is, who is doing it, what is the end goal/purpose, 
and what activities are included. In explaining the question of what it is, scholars 
differ on whether it is a strategy, a policy, a process or merely a set of activities. 
Okano-Heijmans (2011), for example, defines economic diplomacy as ‘foreign 
policy practice and strategy that is based on the premise that economic/ 
commercial interest and political interest reinforce each other and thus should be 
seen as tandem’ (pg.34). Contrary to this, Rana and Chatterjee (2011) offer a 
narrower definition of economic diplomacy as ‘plural sets of activities aimed to 
advance home countries’ national economic interest’ (Rana & Chatterjee 2011 
pg. 3). Rana goes on to explain that economic diplomacy is the process through 
which countries tackle the outside world to maximise their national gains in all 
activities including trade, investment, and other economically beneficial activities 
in which they have a comparative advantage (Rana, 2012). Along a similar line, 
Woolcock (2012) sees economic diplomacy as processes, comprising of 
decision-making and negotiation in economic issues. Bergeijk and Moons (2009) 
also share this view, defining it as ‘a set of activities (both regarding methods 
and processes) related to cross-border economic activities. Rather differently, 
several other scholars see economic diplomacy as policies relating to external 
economic relations such as Berridge & James who suggest that ‘economic 
diplomacy is concerned with economic policy issues, e.g. work of delegations at 
standard-setting organisations such as WTO and BIS’ (Berridge and James, 
2003 pg. 93). Rashid (2005) also follows this understanding, defining economic 
diplomacy as ‘the formulation and advancement of policies relating to production, 
movement, exchange of goods, services, labours and investment in other 
countries’ (pg. 2). 
While these interpretations may seem different, the only distinction 
between them is in the order of significance of economic diplomacy. Processes 
and sets of activities denote a lower level of hierarchy than policies since policies 
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are likely to include multiple processes and activities throughout. Strategy, on 
the other hand, signifies the highest position amongst them all since strategy will 
likely include multiple policies, processes and activities. For example, a strategy 
to enhance trade competitiveness is likely to include specific policies on 
increasing productivity, reducing cost, providing incentives for exporting 
activities, and at the same time, consist of multiple processes/activities in order 
to be implemented. Thus, defining economic diplomacy as a strategy is likely to 
cover all other definitions, and this is also what this research believes. Economic 
diplomacy should be seen as a strategy consisting of policies, processes and 
sets of activities relating to external economic relations.            
The second set of question relates to who is doing it. While it is generally 
accepted that states are diplomats, several scholars see that economic 
diplomacy can also be done by non-state actors since many economic relations 
now incorporate business representatives and NGOs in their interactions (van 
Bergeijk and Moons, 2009; van Bergeijk and Moons, 2018). For example, trade 
representatives and economic negotiations always include the participation and 
input of non-state actors’ and states increasingly rely on business associations’ 
information to undertake external economic policies. However, other scholars 
believe that a better term for international economic relations conducted by non-
state actors would be ‘business diplomacy’ or ‘corporate diplomacy’, thus 
reserving the use of economic diplomacy only for states (Saner and Yiu, 2003). 
In agreement with this, this thesis also holds a similar belief since if economic 
diplomacy is defined as a strategy, then the main actor for the execution of this 
multi-stakeholder strategy has to be a state, although non-state actors may also 
take part. Thus, the focal point and leader of economic diplomacy can only be a 
state or its representatives/agents, which makes them the core actor.  
The third issue is regarding the end goal of economic diplomacy, where 
scholars differ on whether economic diplomacy is only for economic ends (Rana 
and Chatterjee, 2011), only for political/foreign policy ends (Berridge and James, 
2003) or for both political and economic ends (van Bergeijk and Moons, 2009; 
Okano-Heijmans, 2011; Okano-Heijmans, 2016; van Bergeijk and Moons, 2018). 
This separation is indeed rather confusing and, in part, can be due to the different 
point of departure and how economic diplomacy is studied. For example, the 
notion that economic diplomacy can only have foreign policy ends is closer to 
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the field of economic statecraft rather than economic diplomacy. Economic 
statecraft can be loosely defined as the use of economic means to achieve 
foreign policy goals (Baldwin, 1985) and in fact, Baldwin mentions in his book 
that economic diplomacy is not economic statecraft since economic diplomacy 
implies a wider meaning (Baldwin, 1985 pg. 35). Similarly, the view that 
economic diplomacy can only have economic ends is closer to foreign economic 
policy (FEP), which can be defined as government actions which have an impact 
on other countries’ economies through the production and distribution of goods, 
services, and other economic activities which transcends domestic borders 
(Okamoto, 1997 pg. 5). Although economic statecraft and foreign economic 
policy may be considered as parts of economic diplomacy, they are not the only 
elements meaning that strategic, security or economic gains should not be the 
only ends in economic diplomacy. Thus, this research sides with Okano-
Heijmans (2016) and van Bergeijk and Moons (2018), by asserting that economic 
diplomacy serves both the economic and political ends.  
The last issue is concerning which aspect of the economy should be 
included in economic diplomacy since the root word ‘economy’ itself is rather 
fluid. While the classic trade, investment, and finance issues are always 
included, newer forms of economic-related activities are still debatable. For 
example, Lee & Hocking (2010) suggest the inflow of people across border as 
one issue in economic diplomacy, while Woolcock (2012) includes environment 
and development affairs in his analysis of the EU’s external economic diplomacy. 
To overcome this problem, several scholars have tried to develop a 
comprehensive list of the different strands that make up economic diplomacy, by 
grounding their division based on the sets of activities and sometimes, on how it 
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international 
organization 
Source: Author’s Compilation  
    
Looking at these classifications, it can be seen that among the different strands 
of economic diplomacy, trade diplomacy and commercial diplomacy provide the 
clearest and most compelling strands of economic diplomacy since most 
scholars agree on what activities they entail.      
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Further examined, differing understandings of economic diplomacy can 
also be traced to the various views on how economic diplomacy should be 
approached or even debates at the epistemological level. The problem with 
economic diplomacy as a research agenda is not because it has many debates, 
but rather the contrary, it has little or no debate at all. Due to its large scope (or 
strands), economic diplomacy has been studied from various fields of study with 
limited interactions between them. The earliest of these would be from a 
diplomatic and foreign policy approach (see for example Mastanduno, 1998; 
Mastanduno, 1999; Drezner, 1999; Drezner, 2003; Blanchard et al., 2008; Lee 
and Hocking, 2010; Mastanduno, 2012). Despite incorporating the word 
‘diplomacy’ in its phrase, economic diplomacy is not exclusively studied within 
the domain of diplomatic studies but has been studied from various areas of 
research, employing different methodological and theoretical approaches. For 
example, commercial diplomacy has long been studied from an economics & 
business point of view (see for example Naray, 2008; van Bergeijk and Moons, 
2009; Ruel and Zuidema, 2012; Lee et al., 2013; Moons and Van Bergeijk, 2016; 
Moons and van Bergeijk, 2017; van Bergeijk and Moons, 2018) and trade 
diplomacy has been studied using a negotiation approach (see for example 
(Odell, 2000; Rana, 2007; Woolcock, 2012b). 
The different approaches used to study economic diplomacy are useful in 
adding to the richness and depth of analysis, but on the other hand, the 
interaction between these approaches is limited. There is currently very limited 
work which tries to bridge or combine these approaches in a single work, 
resulting in a more serious problem in economic diplomacy, the lack of theoretical 
framework. By far, the closest attempt to fully explain economic diplomacy is 
done by Okano-Heijmans, who offers a conceptual framework consisting of four 
elements, namely context, tools, theatres, and process (Okano-Heijmans, 2011). 
In her work, Okano-Heijmans combines approaches from IR, IPE, economics, 
and diplomatic studies to explain the practice of economic diplomacy. In this 
framework, IR studies provide the context for economic diplomacy, answering 
the when question by explaining the national-global relationship and the power 
interplay between multiple actors involved. IPE studies provide the analytical tool 
to answer the where question by systematically explaining the place or arena 
(theatre) where various players exercise power, either bilaterally or multilaterally. 
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This can also include institutions both at the regional or global level. The 
economic approach is used to answer the question of what by outlining the 
various tools employed by states to conduct their economic diplomacy, which 
includes policy and other forms of activities. Lastly, diplomatic studies elaborate 
on the question of how by pointing out the steps to achieve specific foreign policy 
goals. All these what, when, where and how questions together form the basics 
of economic diplomacy and answer the fundamental question of why (Okano-
Heijmans, 2011). The main goal of economic diplomacy is what Okano-Heijmans 
terms as ‘balance of national interest’, which is a combination of prosperity and 
stability.  
Okano-Hejimans’ framework is, by far, the first and only attempt at 
introducing a comprehensive framework for the study of economic diplomacy, 
and unfortunately, still lacks evidence on its applicability as a general model. This 
framework is built from Okano-Heijmans’ research on Japan’s economic 
diplomacy and has never been tested on other countries or other non-state 
entities. Another problem with Okano-Heijmans framework is its rather confusing 
starting and ending points, which makes it quite difficult to determine where to 
start and to end the analysis (Bayne, 2014). It also lacks consideration on the 
domestic elements since it focuses much on the inter-state level (Bayne, 2014). 
However, despite its limitations, Okano-Heijmans’ framework signals a crucial 
turning point since it marks the first plausible attempt to fully theorise economic 
diplomacy. Overall, while economic diplomacy as a practice is becoming more 
prevalent, the analytical tools to explain this phenomenon remain limited due to 
conceptual and epistemological problems.  
Summarising the discussion, two main conclusions can be made. First, due 
to its multifaceted nature, economic diplomacy lacks a solid foundation in several 
aspects but most importantly, on the definitional and theoretical basis. Scholars 
mostly focus their definition on three core elements: who (is doing it), (what are 
the) activities/processes included and (what are the final) goals/objectives and 
since this common thread runs in all definitions of economic diplomacy, it can 
also be used to construct the backbone of this research’s analytical framework, 
with several adjustments. Theoretical frameworks are also problematic where no 
single theory/framework can grasp the complexities of economic diplomacy and 
even when they do, it is only at the state/national level, and not on other levels. 
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Second, considering these complexities, any research on economic diplomacy 
should at least be clear on the definition, strand, and framework being used. For 
this research, a more detailed discussion regarding this is presented in Chapter 
3 as a part of the research analytical framework.  
With this clearer perspective on economic diplomacy, the next section 
focuses on a specific form of economic diplomacy, the trade diplomacy of 
regional organisations. 
2.3.2.  Trade Diplomacy by Regional Organisations  
Historically, international traders have always been diplomats (Tussie, 
2013) and many forms of classic diplomacy incorporate commerce as part of 
their interstate activities. Brown (1914) wrote about ‘fur trade diplomacy’ in 
America during the 1800s, but it was not until after World War II that trade 
diplomacy really gained prominence, mostly due to the creation of GATT and the 
birth of modern global trading system. Literature during this period focused 
mainly on either rulemaking from legal perspectives or on the 
economic/commercial gains acquired from trade diplomacy and pay little 
attention to the individual strategy of states (see for example Hudec 1975; Lipton 
and Bell 1970).  
In general, trade diplomacy is concerned with the management of trade 
regimes and market factors affecting it, with market actors actively involved in 
the process either tacitly or explicitly (Tussie, 2013). It is often studied in tandem 
with – or even in exchange of – trade policy and trade negotiation, albeit with 
several differences among them. First, trade diplomacy incorporates both 
policymaking and negotiation in its analysis (among other things) and second, 
since trade relation is increasingly becoming an integral part of modern 
diplomacy, it is strongly tied to foreign policy goals, which trade policy and trade 
negotiation literature does not focus on (or focuses on minimally). In a way, trade 
diplomacy can be understood as a part of foreign policy practice and strategy 
where trade/commercial and political interests reinforce each other, and thus, 
should be seen as a tandem (Okano-Heijmans, 2011). This is rather different 
from trade negotiation studies which focus on the internal and external factors 
affecting outcomes of negotiations as well as trade policy literature which 
explains determinants and processes of policy formulation within a given system. 
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Trade diplomacy in this sense sees policymaking, negotiation and (achievement 
of) foreign policy goals as complementary within a single continuum.     
As a field of study, trade diplomacy has not progressed as fast as other 
classic forms of diplomacy since historically, economic and commercial issues 
are perceived to have a ‘lower’ status in diplomacy (Lee and Hudson, 2004). 
However, during the 1990s and early 2000s, a growing literature on economic 
diplomacy started to emerge, with trade diplomacy being perceived as one 
component of it. As a subset of economic diplomacy, trade diplomacy also faces 
several limitations, particularly with regards to its analytical tools. Most trade 
diplomacy literature focuses only on individual states or the EU (see for example 
Benvenuti, 1999; Hamilton, 2014; Okano-Heijmans, 2014; Chen and Garcia, 
2016), while the emergence of regional organisations as trade diplomats has not 
been supported by corresponding theories which highlight the slow progress of 
this field. Within the limited literature, several notable works can be highlighted, 
originating mostly from studies of the EU, which until now have been the most 
advanced regional organisations in terms of conducting trade diplomacy. While 
these studies do not specifically use the term trade diplomacy, they all focus on 
either trade policy, trade decisionmaking, trade negotiation, or a combination of 
these, which all form part of trade diplomacy.  
There is, however, a difference between how the EU and other regional 
organisations indicate their external trade choices. For example, while the EU 
opts to use the term trade policy, other regional organisations choose to use the 
phrase trade decisionmaking process. The main reason for this is because, for 
most regional organisations, the term trade policy is reserved for individual 
member state’s actions rather than collective actions through regional groupings. 
Despite this minor difference, the core activities remain the same, essentially on 
how external trade decisions are made involving different actors within the 
regional organisations. For non-EU regional organisations, the literature on 
external trade decisionmaking focuses solely on how trade decisions are 
formulated, authorities are distributed, and different actors are involved within 
the systems. This includes various studies on trade decisionmaking in ASEAN 
(Chng, 1990; Yi-Hung, 2010), SADC (Adelmann, 2009; Moyo and Manyeruke, 
2015), Mercosur (Pena and Rozemberg, 2005) and sometimes, a comparison 
between these organisations (Hulse, 2014). These studies use various 
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theoretical approaches including rational choice theory (Yi-Hung, 2010), 
institutional-based analysis (Pena and Rozemberg, 2005) and decisionmaking 
models (Moyo and Manyeruke, 2015), which highlights their different analytical 
lens. Despite variations in their theoretical approaches and analyses, this area 
of research does not gain too much traction and is often outdated (as evidenced 
by the publication dates), perhaps owing to the slow progress of regionalism 
within these regions. This is in contrast with the research on EU trade policy, 
which is among the most vibrant area of research within the EU studies.  
Within the EU, trade policy is often seen as the most integrated, 
independent, and prominent area of the EU’s policy due to its historical role in  
the EU integration (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 
2011). Moreover, trade policy is often noted as the main source of the EU’s 
civilian, or non-military, power on the global stage, making the EU not just a 
global power in trade but also through trade (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011). The 
EU’s trade policy research focuses on multiple areas including the evolution and 
development of the EU’s trade competence/authority (Meunier, 2003; Woolcock, 
2011; Kleimann, 2011; Orbie and Kerremans, 2013), the role of different EU 
institutions in trade policy (Dür et al., 2015; Eagleton-Pierce, 2018; Nilsson, 
2018; Rosen, 2018; Garcia, 2018), the social dimension of the EU trade policy 
(Van Den Putte, Orbie, et al., 2015; McKenzie and Meissner, 2017), and the EU 
in international trade negotiations (Meunier, 2007; Elsig, 2007; Elgström, 2007; 
Larsén, 2007; Dür, 2008; da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014; Meissner, 
2016). These numerous studies and varying focuses highlight the richness and 
rapid progress of the EU trade policy literature.  
One notable development in the EU’s trade policy literature, which is 
relevant to this research, is in the emergence of studies that focuses on the 
relationship between trade policy and foreign policy which is in line with this 
research’s underlying assumption. Smith (1994; 2001; 2018) and Peterson 
(2007) are amongst the first and most prominent scholars to document and 
advocate this relationship, and although several scholars have argued that the 
EU’s trade and foreign policy remains incoherent and unconsolidated (Bossuyt 
et al., 2020), debates on the relationship between the EU’s trade and foreign 
policy continue to develop. More recently, the term ‘non-trade policy objectives’ 
or NTPO was introduced to explain the pursuit and achievement of non-trade 
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goals in the EU’s trade policy (see for example Basedow et al., 2020; Yildirim 
and Basedow, 2020; Borchert et al., 2020), which once again highlights the close 
linkage between trade and foreign/political goals in EU’s trade policies.       
Another common feature in the discussion of the EU’s trade policy is the 
tendency to treat trade negotiations as part of the EU’s trade policy, where many 
scholars discuss the two in close linkages with one another (see for example 
Damro, 2007; Dür and Zimmermann, 2007; Dür, 2008). The underlying reason 
for this is the EU’s institutional structure where international trade negotiations 
by the EU are mostly shaped by the internal distribution of trade authority and 
thus is highly prone to shifts in trade policymaking.          
This is rather different from the literature on trade negotiations of other 
regional organisations which tends to separate between (internal) trade 
decisionmaking and (external) trade negotiations. For example, Selmier and Oh 
(2013) discuss the strategy of value-claiming and value-creation in ASEAN’s 
trade negotiations with little concern about their internal trade decisionmaking 
process. Similarly, Das's (2014) discussion on the growing use of ASEAN FTAs 
also focuses only on the economic gain and negotiation side of the agreements 
with little emphasis on the internal policymaking structure. Botto and Bianculli's 
(2016) study on the asymmetric negotiations by Mercosur and its external 
partners also continues this pattern, with analysis focusing mainly on the 
negotiation gains, losses, and bargaining processes.  
Another stark comparison between EU and non-EU’s trade 
decisionmaking/policy and negotiations process is in the amount of literature 
dedicated to each. For the EU, numerous studies can be found covering various 
aspects while for the non-EU studies, only few literatures can be found. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that the EU’s historical origins predate that of most other 
organisations and has evolved faster in terms of its trade policymaking and 
negotiation processes compared to other regions. However, these differences 
demonstrate the fact that literature on regional organisations’ trade diplomacy 
tends to be clustered into the EU and non-EU camps, with several differences 
between them. Furthermore, the EU literature also tends to dominate, both in 
terms of quantity and variations of analysis, which makes it rather influential for 
this research.                     
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Of main importance to this thesis is Woolcock’s extensive study on the 
economic decision-making and negotiation process of the EU or what he defines 
as EU economic diplomacy (Woolcock, 2012a). Although not specifically 
focusing on trade diplomacy and using a different definition of economic 
diplomacy from this research, Woolcock’s research remains highly relevant.8 In 
his study, Woolcock argues that the EU’s trade diplomacy is shaped by six 
factors: external drivers, economic power, recognition, normative power, 
decisionmaking regime, and coherence. Using these six factors as a benchmark 
to compare between the different EU policy areas (e.g. trade, finance, 
development and environment), Woolcock concludes that trade is the policy area 
where the EU is most effective and suggests that the EU is fairly efficient in trade 
decisionmaking and negotiation. These six factors which form the basic 
analytical framework for the EU’s trade diplomacy is perhaps the first and only 
analytical framework to explain trade diplomacy by regional organisations. 
However, Woolcock did not elaborate much on the operationalisation of this 
framework, making it difficult to be replicated in other studies. Furthermore, it 
builds only from the EU experience, making it difficult to be tested outside of the 
EU. For example, normative power as one of the core factors, is highly distinctive 
of the EU, which is difficult to replicate by other regional organisations, and thus, 
while this framework may be useful, several adjustments are still required.  
One interesting observation, however, is that Woolcock’s six factors slightly 
mirror the core elements of trade actorness, as suggested by Bretherton & 
Vogler, (1999; 2006) and Hulse (2014) which indicates the close connection 
between trade diplomacy and regional organisations’ actorness. Woolcock’s 
‘economic power’ and ‘coherence’ closely mimic ‘trade presence’ and 
‘preference convergence’ in Hulse’s interpretation of trade actorness, while 
‘normative power’ is a combination of ‘identity’ and ‘capabilities’ in Hulse’s 
operationalisation. Decisionmaking regime is present in both frameworks while 
‘external drivers’ and ‘recognition’ correspond to Bretherton & Vogler’s general 
understanding of actorness. As it will become more evident in the next chapters, 
trade actorness is one of the core elements in RO’s trade diplomacy since it 
 
8 Woolcock defines economic diplomacy as decisionmaking and negotiation in economic issues. 
Extending this to trade, then trade diplomacy by Woolcock can be interpreted as 
decisionmaking and negotiation in trade issues.  
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denotes the external façade of ROs which is less relevant in the case of an 
individual state. Although an individual state may also be incoherent (or less of 
an ‘actor’) at times, the degree tends to be lower compared to that of ROs 
therefore making trade actorness highly relevant for understanding trade 
diplomacy by ROs.      
So far, this section has discussed literature that focuses on trade diplomacy 
by regional organisations, albeit not specifically using the exact term. However, 
these studies only explain part of trade diplomacy by focusing on only one or 
several activities of trade diplomacy (i.e. policy/decisionmaking, negotiation or 
both), or focusing only on the EU with little applicability outside of the region. If 
we take into account the definition of trade diplomacy as a practice and strategy, 
then it should at least include other components aside from these activities. 
Trade policy/decisionmaking and negotiations only cover activities and 
processes with little insights regarding political goals, and thus, illustrate the 
need to also add a political/foreign policy dimension to the analysis. However, 
since regional organisations do not behave in the same way as states, a classic 
foreign policy approach may also not suffice, and hence, this research also 
assesses the regional dimension of trade diplomacy by elaborating on the 
external aspect of regional integration. Thus, by evaluating and combining 
literature from comparative regionalism and trade & economic diplomacy, this 
research seeks to construct a specific framework to explain the trade diplomacy 
of regional organisations.          
2.4.  Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to evaluate the existing knowledge 
on comparative regionalism and trade diplomacy to identify concepts, 
frameworks, and theories relevant for this research and assess whether gaps 
exist within the current literature. A systematic analysis of the literature suggests 
that several limitations can be identified within the literature, which this research 
expects to address. Two limitations are pertinent to comparative regionalism 
studies, the first being the absence of commonly agreed comparators amongst 
scholars and the second being the lack of studies on the external dimension of 
regionalism projects. Although the literature on actorness as a manifestation of 
RO’s external dimensions has been developed, it tends to focus on the EU and 
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often fails to acknowledge the issue-specific nature of RO’s external relations. A 
third limitation relates to the literature on trade & economic diplomacy, where 
existing frameworks and theoretical models are either partial or only applicable 
to states or the EU, with limited relevance outside of these actors.  
Extending these limitations to this research, a comparative study of the EU 
and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy would be relatively difficult to do if relying only on 
the currently existing analytical tools. While several tools and concepts may be 
applicable, several adjustments and expansions are also needed in order to 
explain the research object. Building on this, the next chapter elaborates on 
these by introducing this research’s analytical framework and how it will be 
operationalised and interpreted throughout. It also discusses the methodological 
challenges and limitations of this research to provide a comprehensive picture 
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Chapter 3 – Analytical Framework and Research Design 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
The previous chapter has pointed out the limitations and inadequacy of 
existing frameworks and literature in explaining the research questions, and 
therefore, justifies the need for a new framework of analysis. This chapter deals 
with this issue by introducing the analytical framework used for this research and 
how it will be operationalised throughout the thesis. The framework itself is a 
synthesis of several concepts drawn from economic diplomacy and regionalism 
literature, as well as concepts developed through this research's data-gathering 
and data analysis process, employing both deductive and inductive logic. The 
result is a framework that describes and compares regional organisations' trade 
diplomacy, which is then operationalised in the case of the EU and ASEAN. 
Similarities and differences between the two are identified via this framework, 
and a separate concept on determinants of regional organisations similarities 
and differences is employed to explain why the EU and ASEAN are similar and 
different in their practice of trade diplomacy. The analytical framework is 
designed to answer the who, how and what questions of the EU and ASEAN's 
trade diplomacy while determinants of similarities/differences are used to answer 
the why question with regards to comparisons between RO's trade diplomacy.     
Closely related to a research's analytical tool is its methodological choices 
and research design which together determine how research is managed, 
scientific procedures are adhered to, and most importantly, how knowledge-
building is developed throughout the research process. For this research, a 
comparative approach with two case studies was chosen, and qualitative data 
analysis with hybrid deductive-inductive reasoning was used for inference 
building. This approach was chosen since the research object relates more to 
non-numerical data, and the comparative method was the best approach to test 
the applicability of the framework in two least similar organisations. Furthermore, 
the EU and ASEAN were chosen as case studies since they best represent the 
overall population, owing to their distinct institutional characteristics which are 
often seen to sit in two separate spectrums of regional governance. Lastly, the 
inductive-deductive process for inference building was chosen since it best fits 
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the characteristics of this research which relies on pre-formulated frameworks 
for analysis but also needs to cater for flexibilities throughout the data collection 
process.        
The analytical model, methodological choices, and research design will be 
the focus of this chapter, before moving on to the empirical chapters of this 
thesis.           
3.2. Analytical Framework of Research 
3.2.1. Conceptualisation of Research Framework  
As previously mentioned, the primary purpose of this thesis is to compare, 
explain and analyse the trade diplomacy practices of regional organisations by 
looking at two major ROs, the European Union and Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations. In doing so, this thesis builds from two strands of literature: trade 
& economic diplomacy literature and studies on comparative regionalism. Trade 
& economic diplomacy provides the main components for comparison, while 
comparative regionalism literature offers the basis for comparison between 
regional organisations and assists in explaining why similarities and differences 
occur between them.   
To encapsulate trade diplomacy, this research adopts the definition 
proposed by Okano-Heijmans (2011, 2012) who sees economic diplomacy as 
'foreign policy practice and strategy that is based on the premise that economic 
or commercial interest and political interest reinforces each other and thus 
should be seen as tandem' (pg.34). The main reason Okano-Heijman's definition 
is preferable is due to its inclusive interpretation, which sees economics and 
political affairs as intertwined. As will be evident in the discussion, states and 
groups of states do not engage in trade activities only for economic gains, but 
rather with the intention of pursuing other non-economic agenda as well. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, any analysis of trade diplomacy should 
at least incorporate three main elements: the actors or representative agents, 
the processes involved, and the goals to be achieved (Section 2.3.1). Building 
from this understanding, this research suggests a framework consisting of the 
three main components – trade actorness, processes, and goals of trade 
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diplomacy – where each of these components relates to three specific questions: 
who does it, how it is done and for what purpose(s). 
More specifically, the notion of trade actorness is used to signify the 
'representative agents' or actors involved in the trade diplomatic process of ROs. 
Processes of trade diplomacy provide detailed accounts on how it is done 
institutionally and the third component, goals of trade diplomacy, is the RO's 
equivalent of 'national interests', commonly perceived as the main objective of 
foreign policy strategies. Since this thesis leans toward a foreign policy 
perspective in explaining trade diplomacy, the formulation and achievement of 
foreign policy goal is also central to this research. From the regionalism literature, 
this research adopts the concept of trade actorness, borrowing from Bretherton 
& Vogler (1999) and Hulse's (2014, 2018) interpretation of the term. Actorness 
in this research is materialised through two forms: the legal actorness and 
behavioural actorness, which sets the basis for RO's credibility and capacity to 
act in trade. Processes in the framework use Woolcock's (2012) understanding 
of the term, consisting of decision-making and negotiations in trade diplomacy 
while goals of trade diplomacy incorporate two core components: 
economic/commercial goals and non-commercial goals. The choice to separate 
between commercial and non-commercial goals resulted from the data collection 
process, where official documents and interviews suggest that non-commercial 
goals are also highly present throughout the process.        
In short, the research framework illustrated below is a synthesis of several 
concepts and research data: 
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Figure 3.1 Analytical Framework of Research  
 
This framework serves as the comparative model for assessing the EU and 
ASEAN's trade diplomacy and in answering the first two research questions. 
Operationalisation of this framework enables us to see what the main differences 
and similarities are between the two. The structure of the subsequent chapters 
also follows this framework, where each chapter discusses one element of this 
framework.  
Once similarities and differences are obtained using this model, the last 
research question regarding determinants of similarities & differences will be 
explained using the various approaches in explaining RO's institutional design, 
as presented in Section 2.2.2 (Chapter 2). Generally, determinants of similarities 
and differences between ROs can be clustered into two primary sources: internal 
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Table 3.1 Determinants of Differences/Similarities in RO's Design  
Approach Internal Determinants External Determinants 








Constructivism  Regional norms, ideas & 
regional identities 
Global norms, ideas  
Diffusion Theory - Interactions with, and 
observations from, other 
ROs 
Source: Author's Compilation from Lenz & Marks (2016)   
 
 Different approaches list different causes of similarities and differences 
between regional organisations, depending on their philosophical positions. As 
the literature review in Section 2.2.2 describes, these approaches can be partly 
attributed to the larger perspectives of IR, global governance and international 
organisations. Realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism are 
among the most widely used approaches in IR while diffusion theory has its roots 
from global governance, particularly on how the management of specific issues 
by countries tend to converge over time. While each of these approaches are not 
individually applied to the research, they form the building blocks for the internal 
and external dichotomy which guides this research’s analysis of the EU and 
ASEAN’s differences and similarities in conducting trade diplomacy. Lastly, in 
order for these frameworks to be applicable, they first need to be operationalised. 
This is discussed in the following section. 
3.2.2. Operationalisation of Research Framework 
One of the challenges in empirical research is to devise ways to translate 
abstract concepts at the theoretical level to concrete observations in order to 
answer research questions (Manheim et al., 2008). This process is commonly 
referred to as operationalisation, where concepts are interpreted into workable 
definitions, measurements, indicators, or parameters, in order to explain the 
phenomena. For this research, several main concepts need to be translated, 
both for clarity purposes and to determine the sets of data required to explain 
these concepts. The concepts used in this research include trade actorness, 
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processes and goals, with each concept having sub-concepts and specific 
indicators to follow.       
The definition of actorness in this research follows Sjostedt's explanation 
where he defines actor capacity as 'a measure of autonomous unit's capacity to 
behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international 
system' (Sjöstedt 1977 pg.16). To operationalise this, this research follows 
Bretherton and Vogler's (1999) understanding of the term actorness, which 
consists of legal and behavioural actorness. Legal actorness can be understood 
as the lawful authorisation granted to any subject of international law, and for this 
research, refers to any form of legal documents granting the EU and ASEAN a 
legal status as a subject of international law. For behavioural actorness, this 
research follows Hulse's criteria for trade actorness due to several reasons. First, 
Hulse's framework rightfully captures the issue-specific nature of RO's external 
relations which aligns with this study's focus. Her preference convergence 
indicator can be used to pinpoint to a specific area of cooperation and obtain 
more detailed analysis, which is what this study aims to do. Hulse's framework 
can also differentiate between regional organisations who are strong or weak in 
a particular area, but not in the other. Second, Hulse's model incorporates both 
the material and ideational elements of actorness, which fits with both the EU 
and ASEAN's model of regional integration. The 'EU values' and 'ASEAN Way' 
are present in many of the external activities of their respective organisation, 
which is why an ideational-based analysis should also be included. Thus, this 
research will base its behavioural actorness analyses on Hulse's five criteria 
which cover presence, capabilities, decision-making, preference convergence, 
and identity.  
Presence is 'the impact of an RO on the external environment, simply by 
the fact of its existence' (Hulse, 2014 pg. 552). In a way, presence captures an 
RO's 'relevance' in the global environment, by assessing what impact it has by 
just being there. However, presence should not be understood as universally 
applicable to all domains since an RO can have a high degree of presence in 
one issue but not in the other. Thus, assessment of an RO's presence should 
correspond only to the issue being questioned, which for this research, is 
translated to 'trade presence', roughly defined as an RO's overall contribution to 
global trade. Closely related to an RO’s presence is its capabilities, or the 
P a g e  | 54 
 
'institutionalised means to an end', referring to the accessible instruments that 
can be used at their disposal (Hulse, 2014). These include an RO's budget and 
instruments for transforming policies, consisting of various tools such as 
litigation, military intervention, incentives, sanctions, technical assistance, 
political dialogue, workshops, statements, and lobbying activities (Börzel and 
Risse, 2009; Hulse, 2014). These instruments can be directly observed, and 
most are listed as part of ROs programs and activities.      
Decision-making refers to procedures employed by regional organisations 
to achieve agreements and decisions between themselves and may be 
influenced by various factors including cultural identity (Wunderlich, 2012b), 
distribution of power and historical origins. For Hulse (2014), decision-making is 
only useful if it leads to preference convergence, which is the likelihood of RO's 
members to achieve similar voices regarding their interests and preferences. 
While preference convergence is more challenging to observe, decision-making 
procedures are clearly stated in RO's statute or charter and often acts as a 
guiding principle. For preference convergence, looking at published agreements, 
statements, or directly speaking to bureaucrats are the best options to gather 
data. The last indicator of behavioural actorness – identity – refers to a sense of 
geographically-based identity, created from a combination of cultural, economic, 
linguistic, or political ties (Mansfield and Milner, 1999), which determines regional 
organisations’ exclusivity and thus, separating themselves from outsiders (Hulse, 
2014). This usually comes in the form of specific values, ideas, and norms (may 
it be political, economic or societal) that are shared and commonly accepted 
throughout the region. This may be observable through repeated practices or in 
several regional organisations, clearly stated in their legal documents. In short, 
analysis of actorness should be based on two connected criteria: the entity's 
legal actorness and behavioural actorness, which are a combination of several 
criteria, observable through interactions.         
Processes in trade diplomacy explain how ROs conduct their trade 
diplomacy and can be broken down into two main components: decision-making 
& negotiations, with the aim of answering the 'how' question of trade diplomacy. 
Goals refer to the formulation and achievement of commercial and non-
commercial goals in trade diplomacy and correlate to the 'for what' question. 
Goals are often stated as specific sets of strategies and targets to be achievable 
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within a given time frame and are commonly present in many official publications 
by ROs. The summary of the concepts, definitions and their operationalisations 
in this research is presented below: 
    
Table 3.2 Concepts and Operationalisations in Research 
Main Concept & Sub-
Concept 
Conceptual Definitions Operationalisation in 
Research 
Trade Diplomacy Foreign policy practice and 
strategy that is based on the 
premise that economic or 
commercial interest (i.e. 
trade) and political interest 
reinforce each other and thus 
should be seen as a tandem 
(Okano-Heijmans, 2011; 
2016) 
Consisting of three core 
elements: trade actorness, 
processes and goals 
Trade Actorness 
- Legal Actorness 
- Behavioural 
Actorness 
A measure of an autonomous 
unit's capacity to behave 
actively and deliberately in 
relation to other actors in the 
international system 
(Sjöstedt, 1977); consisting of 
legal and behavioural 
actorness (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 1999; 2006) 
specifically relating to trade  
- Legal actorness comes in 
the form of legal status 
and/or granting of 
legitimate authority to the 
EU and ASEAN by its 
member states to conduct 
trade and other trade-
related activities  
 
- Behavioural actorness in 
trade consists of 5 
observable 
characteristics: the EU 
and ASEAN's trade 
presence or the 
significance of their trade 
contribution to total world 
share; their capabilities to 
undertake actions 
particularly those relating 
to trade; the existence of 
decision-making 
procedures in trade and 
that these procedures 
lead to preference 
convergence; and the 
existence of a regional 
(trade) identity that 
separates them from 




- Trade Negotiations 
Internal decision-making in 
trade and management of 
external trade negotiations by 
- Trade decision-making 
refers to how the EU and 
ASEAN make collective 
decisions regarding trade. 
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regional organisations 
(Woolcock, 2012a)    
This can be observed by 
looking at their legal 
documents and through 
the standard practices 
demonstrated by its 
players.  
  
- Trade negotiation refers to 
the intra and extra-
regional negotiation 
process within the EU ad 
ASEAN leading to trade 
agreements. This can be 
observed through legal 
documents and common 
practices within the 





Objectives being pursued by 
regional organisations 
through engagement in 
external trade relations with 
other parties  
Goals in trade diplomacy 
relate to the main objectives 
to be pursued by the EU 
and ASEAN through their 
external trade relations. 
This covers both the 
commercial and non-
commercial goals and is 
often explicitly stated in 
their legal documents and 
can also be observed 
through their interactions 
with other actors. 
 
These concepts also set the structure of this thesis, where each chapter 
discusses and compares one of these elements within the EU and ASEAN 
context. 
In addition to conceptual clarifications, for any analytical tools to be 
operational and validly translated into research, it is also fundamental to define 
how data and information are gathered, analysed, and deducted to form 
arguments while also providing evidence for knowledge building. The next 
section deals with these issues, providing explanations on methodological 
challenges, choices and the overall research design.        
3.3. Methodological Challenges, Choices and Reflections        
In doing research, methodological choices and research designs are 
determined by the research question and how a researcher plans to answer it. 
Based on the research question and phenomena being assessed, this research 
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uses a qualitative approach and employs a comparative research method with 
two case studies. The comparative method is one of the primary tools for creating 
generalisations, and for case studies that seek to contribute to theory-building or 
'law-like' explanations of social phenomena, the comparative analysis must be 
present in order for their theoretical implications to have any value (Hopkin, 
2010). While this research does not go as far as generalising its findings 
regarding the EU and ASEAN for all regional organisations, it seeks to introduce 
a framework which can be applied to other regional organisations.  
The qualitative approach is chosen since it is best at capturing details and 
in providing in-depth analysis of the phenomenon, which this research aims for. 
As the literature suggests, the qualitative approach focuses on 'detailed, text-
based answers that are often historical or include personal reflections from 
participants in political institutions, events, issues or processes' (Vromen 2010 
p.249). The object of this research is trade diplomacy, which is a political strategy 
involving processes and events, administered by actors in political institutions 
and hence require many detailed answers that only a qualitative approach can 
provide. However, as with all research methods and approaches, there are 
limitations on what they can do and thus, require careful examination and 
personal reflection on their utilisation as research tools. The remainder of this 
chapter discusses these challenges, ways to mitigate them and justifications for 
employing a qualitative approach in this research.  
3.3.1. Challenges in Using a Comparative Regionalism Approach 
As section 2.2.1 in Chapter 2 suggests, there are several problems 
concerning comparative regionalism research which can be clustered under 
three main issues: why compare, what to compare, and how to compare, as 
illustrated by the following figure.     

































































What to Compare Conceptual Problems
Fuzziness of concepts




Bias towards European 
integration




Unable to explain complex 
changes
Lack of depth and richness 
Qualitative 
Sampling Problem




(many variables, small number 
of cases)Source: Author’s Compilation 
P a g e  | 59 
 
The complexity of problems and debates indicates that one must be cautious 
when employing a comparative approach in regionalism since several issues 
remain unresolved. These problems were also taken into consideration when 
undertaking this research, and several necessary steps were taken to mitigate 
the risks of producing a biased, unempirical, unreliable or unvalidated research 
output.  
For the problem of why compare, this research stands with many 
comparativist scholars who posit that what is comparable or not is determined 
by the research object in question, rather than a mere generalisation that all 
regions are sui generis and thus, incomparable. While several characteristics of 
regions are, indeed, exclusive (although this can also be tested through 
comparative study), several elements may be similar between regions. For this 
research, the object is the EU and ASEAN's trade diplomacy, where definitions 
and indicators have been defined in the previous section and have helped 
resolve the 'why compare' problem. Furthermore, the EU and ASEAN are both 
regional organisations with clear indicators of being so, observable through 
qualities such as the existence of headquarters and personnel, presence of 
organisational and decision-making structures, capacity in producing policy or 
rulemaking, and availability of internal funding, which makes the object of 
comparison relatively clear and well-defined.  
Regarding the 'what to compare problem', this research has explicitly 
stated the preferred definition of trade diplomacy being used, which is the 
practices and strategy relating to external trade as a larger part of regional 
organisations' external relations. This concept is divided into three core 
elements: trade actorness, processes, and goals and has been explained in the 
previous section. 
In overcoming the how problem, two mitigations were taken. First, for 
theoretical problems, this research borrows from concepts outside of regionalism 
studies (i.e. trade diplomacy) to avoid bias towards the EU theories, and at the 
same time, provided a 'neutral' comparator for research. Furthermore, in 
explaining the actorness of the EU and ASEAN, this research uses indicators 
which were tested outside of the EU to confirm their applicability and 
generalisability as part of a model. This choice ensures that the actorness 
concept employed in this research applies to both the EU and ASEAN. Second, 
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for methodological challenges, this research only employs a qualitative approach 
as its primary methods of inquiry, since trade diplomacy is best captured and 
explained by its qualities rather than quantities. Trade diplomacy is challenging 
to compare through a quantitative inquiry since not much of its essential 
information comes in numerical forms. Although several data pertaining to trade 
diplomacy may be in numbers (e.g. global/regional trade share, number of 
signed FTAs, number of meetings), these can only complement the majority of 
data which comes in a non-numerical format, and is why the qualitative inquiry 
is more appropriate for this research. 
While this research has both qualitative and quantitative data, its data 
analysis method is only done qualitatively. As with most qualitative comparative 
research, comparative regionalism also faces the problem of inference-building 
(i.e. many variables but a limited number of case studies) which affects validity 
in making claims and in providing generalisations. Thus, this research does not 
generalise any findings outside of its given scope, which is the EU and ASEAN. 
Although this research does introduce a framework for comparing a regional 
organisation's trade diplomacy, more research is still needed to test its 
application outside of these two organisations.  
Together, the why, what and how to compare questions are the main 
challenges in carrying out comparative regionalism research, and this thesis has 
taken that into account. While these methodological challenges may be 
problematic, with careful methodological choices, a proper analytical framework 
and appropriate research design, valid results are, indeed, attainable.  
3.4. Research Design 
A research design is a logical model of proof that allows the making of valid 
causal inferences (Nachmias, 1979 pg. 21 in Manheim et al., 2008). For 
inferences and claims to be valid, proper research design must be employed, 
which is determined not only by the research question but also by the type of 
research. This research is both descriptive, in the sense that it provides detailed 
descriptions of how two regional organisations conduct their trade diplomacy, 
and also explanatory since it seeks to explain why there are similarities and 
differences in doing trade diplomacy between these two organisations. Both 
descriptive and explanatory research require unbiased and reliable observations 
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to ensure a strong basis for an accurate depiction of the phenomena and to infer 
causalities (Manheim et al., 2008). This section is dedicated for that purpose by 
explaining how research questions were answered, data was obtained, 
analysed, and lastly, how inferences were made.              
3.4.1. Research Approach 
This research employed a qualitative approach, using case studies to 
provide empirical explanations. Case studies excel in providing rich empirical 
data since they focus only on specific object(s). However, case studies are not a 
specific method per se, but more of a focus which aims to look at something in-
depth and from many angles (Thomas, 2011). Moreover, they are a form of social 
science inquiry, appropriate for situations: 'where the main research questions 
are 'how' or 'why' and when a researcher has little or no control over behavioural 
events and the focus of the study is a contemporary phenomenon' (Yin 2014 pg. 
2).  
Considering that this research seeks to answer the ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions respectively and focuses on the contemporary phenomenon, the case 
study method is a logical choice. Furthermore, since this research seeks to 
formulate a general framework of trade diplomacy by regional organisations, a 
comparative or multiple case study method is the most appropriate option. For 
the case studies, the EU and ASEAN were carefully selected to represent the 
larger population of ROs since they depict the two spectrums of regionalism and 
regional governance (supranationalism and intergovernmental). Individually, the 
EU and ASEAN can each provide rich data and substantive empirical findings. 
However, since this research also seeks to find commonalities that can lead to 
further generalisations, a comparative case study also provides better outcomes 
compared to a single case study since it is often perceived as a middle-ground 
that can combine a case study's empirical richness and comparison's analytical 
leverage (Odell, 2001).  
For the comparative method, Mill's method of agreement was chosen 
since it focuses more on finding and analysing similarities between two different 
regional organisations, although several differences between them are also 
discussed. Generally, most comparative research will follow either one of Mill's 
two methods of comparison: method of difference, where similar cases are 
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compared, and the un-similar variable(s) are examined, or method of agreement 
where different cases are chosen, and similar variable(s) between them are 
analysed (Ragin, 1987; Hopkin, 2010). For this research, finding similarities was 
of more concern due to the researcher's methodological and epistemological 
position that is in line with the belief that regions are, indeed, comparable since 
several similarities do exist between them.  
Hence, for comparative research, the number and selection of cases are 
crucial since they determine whether real comparisons can be made and 
whether that comparison can lead to better generalisations or not.      
3.4.2. Selection of Case Studies 
Selection of cases is a crucial step in the case studies research method. 
For a small or very small sample size, selection of case studies must employ a 
purposive (non-random) selection technique to ensure that cases that are 
representative of the population can be adequately isolated, and at the same 
time, allow variations for theoretical or empirical purposes (Gerring, 2008). 
Generally, there are seven types of case studies: typical, diverse, extreme, 
deviant, influential, most similar, and most different case studies (Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008), which correspond to different research questions and aims.9 For 
this research, most different case studies were chosen for a comparative 
purposes on the basis that this research seeks to explain similarities and 
determinants of similarities between the EU and ASEAN's trade diplomacy.  
Regional organisations were the overall population being researched, and 
two case studies of regional organisations were chosen to represent this. 
Methodologically, samples should fulfil two main criteria of selection: first, they 
must be able to represent the whole population and second, they must be 
different in almost every aspect, except for the variable being tested. With these 
criteria in mind, this research chose the European Union and ASEAN as case 
studies based on their internal characteristics, differences between each other. 
and their history of regional integration and trade diplomacy. For the 
representativeness criteria, the EU and ASEAN are often seen to represent two 
 
9 For explanation on differences between these seven types of case studies, please refer to 
‘Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Options” by Seawright, J. & Gerring, J. (2008)      
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different models of regional integration, one based on a supranationalism 
approach and the other on an intergovernmentalism approach. Although in 
practice, not many regional organisations adopt a pure supranational or 
intergovernmental approach, their dominant approach in their regionalism project 
will lean towards one of this. Hence, the EU and ASEAN are two appropriate 
cases to represent these camps.  
For the 'most different' criteria, the EU and ASEAN differ on almost every 
accounts of their regionalism project from historical origins, internal norms & 
values, mode of governance and decision-making up to the distribution of 
authority between member states, so in a glance, the EU and ASEAN are' mostly 
different'. However, despite all these differences, both are able to engage in trade 
diplomatic activities which is the main focus of this research.        
Another important consideration is to ensure that enough data can be 
collected and compared. So far, the EU has demonstrated the most advanced 
practice of trade diplomacy and is the first modern regional organisations to 
negotiate trade agreements collectively as a regional group. ASEAN, on the 
other hand, started relatively late (only since the 2000s) and yet has been 
increasingly active in pursuing this approach, resulting in multiple trade 
agreements with external parties throughout the years. This ensures that enough 
data can be collected from both case studies. Once these case studies were 
established, the next step was to determine the data type and collection 
procedure in order to interpret these case studies.  
3.4.3. Data Collection Method   
This research employs a qualitative research method where document 
analysis and elite interviews are the dominant methods of data collection. 
Qualitative research refers to "a set of non-statistical inquiry for gathering data 
about social phenomena", relying on words, symbols or other non-numeric data 
collected by the researcher (McNabb, 2010 pg. 225). This method  is best used 
to explain or understand why a political institution, event, issue or process came 
about (Vromen, 2010), which is in line with this research's objectives. There are 
two types of data collection performed in this research: documentary research to 
collect secondary data and elite interviews as a source of primary data.  
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This research collected documents in the form of official documents, 
newsletters, newspaper articles, and other online materials. For both the EU and 
ASEAN, official documents include reports, papers, statements, speeches, 
(transcribed) recordings, press releases and legal documents such as charters, 
treaties, communique, and agreements. Systematic searches to acquire various 
documents were utilised to ensure that multiple sources were covered, and all 
available documents were accessed. However, documentary research also has 
its limitations which includes subjectivity, unavailability, inaccuracy and the 
possibility of presenting information which has been curated to portray a 
particular view of events, activities or individuals (Fitzgerald, 2012). Hence, this 
research also employed an additional method of data collection, both as a way 
to triangulate data and to obtain additional data not acquired through 
documentary research.  
The second set of data comes from elite interviews with government 
officials, private sectors, researchers, and civil society organisations. In a 
research context, subjects are referred to as elite if they have specialised 
knowledge regarding the issue and thus require individualised treatment 
(Manheim et al., 2008). Being elite in research interviews does not mean that a 
person should be of political, social, or economic importance (although many of 
them are), but rather that their access to information is crucial for the research, 
which gives them an elite or chosen status (Manheim et al., 2008).  
Interview data was crucial for this research, especially from the ASEAN 
side since official documents and previous studies regarding ASEAN’s external 
trade are very limited. Through interviews, this research uncovered many new 
materials including a detailed account of ASEAN’s external trade decisionmaking 
and negotiation process, as well as views from non-state actors involved in the 
process, both in the EU and ASEAN. Without the interview process, it is very 
unlikely that these data would be available and documented. For the interview 
process, face-to-face and phone interviews were conducted to collect data on 
specific information including roles, relationships, decision-making procedures, 
distribution & delegation of authority, negotiation process, perspectives, views, 
opinions on certain issues, specific strategies, goals, and objectives relating to 
regional organisations' external relations and trade. Semi-structured interviews 
were used for all interviews to balance between the researcher's preconceived 
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ideas and richness of grounded empirical data. The semi-structured interview 
was the most appropriate technique for this research since it combines 
structured interviews where the researcher can get factual data based on the 
operationalisation of pre-existing concepts, and at the same time, unstructured 
interviews where the researcher can probe deeper into the respondents' 
perceptions and experiences to gain more depth and understanding (Halperin 
and Heath, 2012). All interview questions were open-ended, capturing various 
elements including background information, behaviours, opinions, perceptions, 
feelings and knowledge of informants. 
The interviewees were clustered into four broad categories: national or 
regional level officials, private sectors, civil society organisations and 
researchers/academics, where each group provides different sets of data. 
Government officials represent formal views of the policymakers and the lead 
negotiators in trade diplomacy while private sectors and CSOs represent the two 
major stakeholders in trade diplomacy. Both the private sectors and the CSOs 
were crucial in providing information regarding representations, connections, 
transparency and inclusiveness of trade diplomacy in both the EU and ASEAN 
while researchers excelled in providing up-to-date research findings, opinions, 
and perceptions relating to trade diplomacy and in adding or providing access to 
key respondents. All these groups were spread out in both the EU and ASEAN 
and roughly distributed in equal amount between them.  
 
Table 3.3 Distribution of Research Interviewees 
Clusters/Groups Number of 
Interviewees in 
Europe/EU 
Number of Interviewees 
in Southeast 
Asia/ASEAN 
Government Officials (affiliated to) 8 8 
Private Sectors (affiliated to) 3 3 
CSOs (based in) 1 1 
Researchers/Academia (based in)* 5 1 
Total = 30 interviewees 17 interviewees 13 interviewees 
Note: *) Although most researchers were based in Europe, not all of them specialised in the EU's external 
trade relations. Of the five Europe-based researchers interviewed, two researchers specialised in the EU's 
external relations, one researcher in Southeast Asia's external relations and two researchers in the EU-
Asian external relations. 
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These interviews were conducted in six countries from December 2017 to 
June 2018, with a total of 30 interviewees. Most interviews were done face-to-
face (28 interviews), and two were conducted via phone, due to logistical 
reasons. Most of these interviews were recorded via an audio-recording device, 
while several others were not, due to objections by respondents to being 
recorded. In situations where recordings were not allowed, notetaking became 
the primary method for recording conversations.      
For the EU, the European Commission's exclusive competence has 
enabled the EC to become the sole negotiator for EU's trade diplomacy, which 
simplified the data collection process since all officials were based in a single 
location. ASEAN however, posed a different situation since the ASEAN 
Secretariat currently does not hold any mandate in negotiation and hence, the 
negotiation process is performed by its member states. With regards to this, 
additional data were gathered from representatives of three ASEAN member 
states, namely Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam. There are several reasons 
why these countries were chosen for data collection, but mostly since these 
countries best represent ASEAN's political, economic and social conditions. 
Firstly, these countries are at three different stages of economic development 
which mirrors ASEAN's economic conditions. Singapore is classified as a 
developed country with a current GDP per capita standing at US$65.630 (ranked 
1st in ASEAN), while Indonesia and Vietnam are both developing countries with 
GDP per capita of US$4.120 (ranked 5th in ASEAN) and US$2.730 (ranked 8th 
in ASEAN), respectively (International Monetary Fund, 2019a). Secondly, these 
countries rightfully illustrate the two-tier ASEAN membership with Singapore and 
Indonesia representing the original ASEAN-5 members (or founding members) 
and Vietnam representing the new ASEAN member states. Being an original or 
new ASEAN member state means that interests, positions and views on specific 
matters will be different, since a member’s initial starting point is also different. 
This choice ensures that different views and interests are rightfully captured in 
this research. Thirdly, these countries adopt different political systems with 
Singapore and Indonesia each classified as a 'flawed democracy' and Vietnam 
considered as an ‘authoritarian regime’ (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020), 
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which once again is an illustration of the region's political landscape.10 Lastly, 
these three countries account for more than half of the region's population 
(around 56%), which is a good approximation of ASEAN's overall population 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2018c).  
In several cases, interview data were compared against documentary 
data to ensure consistency in the data triangulation purpose. Most of these 
interviews were done in English with several of them done in Bahasa Indonesia, 
which is the native language of the researcher and several of the interviewees. 
Once interviews were completed, they were then transcribed for further analysis.   
3.4.4. Data Analysis Method 
This research employs thematic analysis in interpreting its data and build 
from hybrid deductive-inductive reasoning for inference-building. Thematic 
analysis can be defined as 'a method for identifying, analysing, and interpreting 
patterns of meaning (themes) within qualitative data', usually involving six 
stages/phases of the analytical process (Clarke and Braun, 2017 pg. 297). These 
six phases are: familiarising with data, generating codes, constructing themes, 
reviewing potential themes, defining & naming themes, and producing the report 
(Terry et al., 2017). In performing a thematic analysis, codes and themes can be 
derived from previous theoretical concepts (deductive coding or theory-driven), 
created during the analysis (inductive coding or data-driven) or a combination of 
both (hybrid coding).  
For this research, thematic analysis was applied to the data sets, with 
codes and themes created both deductively and inductively. Initially, deductive 
coding and preconceived themes were used, derived from an initial framework 
of economic diplomacy using a combination of Okano-Heijman's framework and 
Woolcock's concepts. However, halfway through the data collection (and partial 
interpretation of it), the researcher realised that these codes and themes could 
not be applied to all the data and that several data did not fall into any specific 
themes within the initial framework. For example, the initial framework does not 
 
10 The Economist Intelligence Unit classified countries into four main clusters: full democracy, 
flawed democracy, hybrid regime and authoritarian regime. For a more detailed information 
regarding this classification and the methodology of the survey, refer to “Democracy Index 
2019: A Year of Democratic Setbacks and Popular Protests” by The Economist Intelligence 
Unit (2020)    
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explicitly define or cover the specific goals of trade diplomacy. However, during 
data collection, multiple interviews suggested that in many cases, non-
commercial goals may outweigh commercial goals in trade diplomacy, and thus, 
the need to develop a separate coding and theme for differentiating between 
commercial and non-commercial goals.  
Another inductive theme which emerged from the data was the concept of 
trade actorness, which was initially not included in the framework. However, 
further interpretation of the data showed that since the EU and ASEAN organise 
themselves differently in external trade, a separate notion on 'external trade 
representation' should be included in the analysis, which resulted in the inclusion 
of trade actorness as a variable. Fortunately, actorness was already a well-
developed concept in the EU studies literature, so this research only needs to 
apply the pre-existing concept to the data. The decision to employ both deductive 
and inductive analysis in this research resulted in a better depiction of data and 
a refined research framework which is presented in Section 3.2.          
Ultimately, one of the main strength of thematic analysis is its flexibility, 
not just in theoretical terms, but also in the formulation and reformulation of 
research questions, sample size, data collection method, and approaches to 
meaningful generalisation (Clarke and Braun, 2017), which this research also 
finds Thus, this mode of analysis did not just rightfully capture the nature of this 
research but also ensured that throughout the process, all data could be correctly 
interpreted for knowledge-building purposes.         
3.4.5. Ethical Considerations in Research  
Ethical considerations were integral to this research. Before any data 
collection process commenced, ethical review documents were submitted to the 
university's Research Ethics Committee, and a favourable ethical opinion was 
granted in October 2017. Throughout the research process, all ethical 
procedures were adhered to which includes ethics in contacting and 
communicating with interviewees, providing a research information sheet and a 
consent form for interviewees, maintaining the anonymity of interviewees, and 
consent to use an audio-recording device during interviews. All participants were 
recruited voluntarily and made aware of their rights with clear information on how 
their information would be used in this research. Anonymity was also maintained 
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throughout to ensure that no information could be traced back to the 
corresponding informant. Management of research data followed the university's 
policies and procedures with strict regulations regarding storage, usage, and 
retainment of data. For documentary sources, digital copies were made 
whenever possible and were stored in pdf formats. For interview data, recordings 
were kept in digital audio format, which was then transcribed, and once all texts 
had been transcribed, all audio files were deleted. With the participants' 
permission, the researcher also kept several personal and professional 
information for future references. All data were kept in password-protected 
documents and were stored in a password-protected computer to ensure that no 
one besides the researcher, could have access to the data.  
3.5. Limitations of Research 
As with most research, this research also has several limitations. First, 
there are limitations relating to sample size and access to data, particularly for 
data regarding ASEAN. Due to its institutional structure, ASEAN trade diplomacy 
is mostly conducted by its member states, and this research could only choose 
a specific amount of member states (Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam) as 
representatives of the population. However, the inclusion of more – or all – 
ASEAN member states may increase the validity of data and interpretation of 
results. Furthermore, several data and information within ASEAN were not 
available, either because no secondary data was available (such as the ASEAN 
FTA’s preference utilisation rate) or because the person with the required 
information could not be accessed. For example, this research could not conduct 
any interview with the representatives from Vietnam’s Ministry of Trade since the 
interview request was not granted. Hence, the researcher could only rely upon 
interview data with the two remaining member states’ Ministry of Trade. While 
this limited access and absence of data do not diminish the validity of the 
findings, the inclusion of these data may provide stronger evidence for this 
research.  
Second, personal and cultural limitations may also create bias since the 
researcher is originally from an ASEAN member state. This may create either a 
positive or negative bias towards ASEAN (and presumably the EU) although rigid 
measures were taken to ensure that this bias was minimised. Throughout the 
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research process, the researcher constantly reflected on these biases and 
discussed them with the research supervisors to ensure that these biases were 
thoroughly addressed. However, since personal and/or cultural bias is often 
extremely subtle, the above measures may not always overcome this, and thus, 
personal and/or cultural biases are worth mentioning as one limitation of the 
research.  
3.6. Conclusion 
Among the many choices that a researcher has to make, research 
methodology, research design, and analytical framework are among the most 
important, and this chapter has elaborated on these choices. In terms of 
methodology, there are indeed several challenges on employing a comparative 
approach in studying regional organisations and while there may be several 
pitfalls, employing a comparative method is the best approach for finding 
similarities between two distinct ROs and in testing a comparative framework of 
trade diplomacy by ROs. Based on the research questions and aims, qualitative 
research methods using case studies were employed, coupled with documentary 
research and elite interviews as the primary methods for data collection. 
Thematic analysis and hybrid deductive-inductive coding were used for data 
analysis since they offer more flexibility in interpreting multiple data. Overall, the 
methodology and research design were selected based on the research 
questions, and the analytical framework is built from a hybrid deductive-inductive 
process, combining both theoretical groundings and data-driven findings which 
resulted in the comparative framework.   
The comparative framework itself consists of three core elements: trade 
actorness, processes and goals, which will be operationalised according to the 
given indicators. All these elements are used as the basis for 
comparison/analysis between the EU and ASEAN and are the guiding logic for 
the overall chapter organisation where each chapter corresponds to one element 
of the framework. The subsequent chapters discuss data and findings that are 
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Chapter 4 – Actorness of the EU and ASEAN in Trade Diplomacy 
 
4.1.  Introduction  
Unlike states, regional organisations are traditionally not diplomatic actors 
in international relations. While they may have the capacity to engage in 
relationships with other actors, there are limitations on the type of engagements 
they can have and how other actors perceive and interact with them. This 
external representation is often explained in the literature by several interrelated 
concepts such as presence, actorness, actorship, actor capability, and 
coherence,11 all of which refer to how ROs behave, are perceived, and are 
treated in the international system. Actors’ presence and capability are 
determined by many factors, both internally and externally, and can change over 
time. This recognition is often a prerequisite before they can engage in any 
meaningful external relations, including trade diplomacy.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the notion of external 
representation – or the who question in trade diplomacy – by examining the EU 
and ASEAN’s trade relations, building from the concept of actorness, introduced 
and elaborated in Chapter 2 and 3. External representation is the first element of 
RO’s trade diplomacy and is perhaps the most important one since it indicates 
RO’s ability to engage in any meaningful external trade relations with other 
parties. As discussed in Chapter 2 & 3 and presented in Section 3.2.1, actorness 
consists of two components: the legal and behavioural element of actorness 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 1999) which is issue-specific (Hulse, 2014), meaning 
that one needs to explain trade actorness rather than general actorness. While 
several aspects of trade actorness may trickle-down from general actorness, it 
is crucial to pinpoint specific elements which set trade actorness apart from other 
forms of actorness. Borrowing from Hulse (2014), behavioural actorness in this 
chapter is operationalised into four main components: trade presence, 
organisational capabilities, preference convergence, and identity. One additional 
component, decisionmaking, will be discussed in Chapter 5 since it links more 
with processes in trade diplomacy. 
 
11 This research uses the term ‘actorness’ to define RO’s external representation since it is the 
most developed body of literature, and thus, is the most useful 
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The main argument of this chapter is that although the EU and ASEAN both 
possess legal actorness in trade, the EU displays a higher level of behavioural 
actorness in trade compared to ASEAN. For legal actorness, the EU and ASEAN 
are both legal entities, as confirmed by their treaties and charters, making them 
legally accepted international trade entities. However, when behavioural 
actorness is taken into consideration, the EU excels compared to ASEAN in three 
components: trade presence, organisational capabilities, and preference 
convergence due to its higher level of economic development and better 
mechanisms for overcoming regional disparities. Although divergence of 
preferences also occurs within the EU, it is more likely to happen between the 
EU institutions and the EU member states, rather than between individual 
member states such as in ASEAN. This is due to the EU’s institutional structure, 
where a trade-focused supranational institution (SNI) is present. As for regional 
identity, both the EU and ASEAN display strong regional identities, owing to their 
distinct values and different modes of operation. Overall, of the five components 
being compared, the EU and ASEAN are similar on two fronts: the existence of 
legal actorness and strong regional identity, and are different on the rest: trade 
presence, organisational capability, and preference convergence.  
This core argument is derived from various data sources including legal 
texts, trade data sets, opinion polls, press releases, publications from 
regional/international organisations, and interviews with several EU and 
ASEAN’s officials who were/are in charge of external trade relations. Interview 
data were crucial to provide data unavailable within the legal texts and to give 
insights on the internal workings of each organisation, particularly ASEAN.     
This chapter focuses on answering the second research question regarding 
(one aspect of) similarities and differences between the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
diplomacy and its determinants. In explaining these similarities and differences, 
this chapter will be structured as follows. Following the introduction, two 
comparative sections on the EU and ASEAN’s actorness will be presented, 
consisting of legal and behavioural actorness. The fourth section will be an 
analysis of the determinants of these differences and similarities, followed by a 
conclusion.   
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4.2. Legal Actorness of the EU and ASEAN 
Analysis of the legal actorness of a regional organisation is straightforward 
since one only needs to check the legal status of the respective regional 
organisation. Legally, both the EU and ASEAN are legal entities in international 
relations since they have both acquired legal status through international law. 
The European Union was granted international legal entity through Article 47 of 
the Treaty on the European Union (later amended to the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union/TFEU in 2011) which stated that “The Union 
shall have legal personality” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012a). 
This Article and the subsequent amendment legally replaced the European 
Community as the previous holder of legal entity and gave it full rights to conduct 
external relations on behalf of the member states. This also means that the EU 
is constitutionally and legally separate from its member states which strengthens 
its organisational nature. In practice, conferment of legal status means that the 
EU has the ability to conclude and negotiate international agreements in 
accordance with its external commitments, become a member of international 
organisations, and join international conventions such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (European Union, 2012). 
Initially, the road to the EU’s international legal entity was not easy since 
member states were reluctant to grant legal personality to the EU in the fear that 
it could compromise their sovereignty in foreign affairs. Although the term ‘the 
European Union’ has been discussed since the mid-1970s, it was not until the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) that the European Union formally became a legal term 
in the EU regulation (Schoutheete and Andoura, 2007). However, despite it being 
introduced as a legal term, the EU was not yet granted legal personality until the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009 since the legal entity was initially held by the European 
Communities. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU consisted of three interrelated 
pillars: European Communities, Common Foreign & Security Policy, and 
Cooperation in Justice & Home Affairs, with each of these being assigned a 
distinct legal identity/role. Over time, there were suggestions that a consolidated 
European Union legal personality was required for better functioning of the EU’s 
external relations.  These growing suggestions culminated in the creation of a 
working group on legal personality, who in 2002 suggested the need to eliminate 
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the EU’s multiple legal personalities and replace it with a single legal entity under 
the European Union (Schoutheete and Andoura, 2007).  
This finding was taken into consideration at the 2002 European Convention 
in Brussels and was translated into a draft treaty, which later formed the basis of 
the TFEU and lead to the abolition of the three pillars of the European Union. 
More importantly, the TFEU also introduced the different forms of the EU’s 
authority, or competences in different policy areas. Competence is the EU’s 
terminology for ‘power’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999), loosely defined as ‘the 
legal capacity to deal with a matter’ (Cini and Borragan, 2016). Articles 2–6 of 
the TFEU outlines the three different types of the EU’s main competences: the 
exclusive competence, shared competence, and supporting or coordinating 
competence. Exclusive competence refers to policy areas where only the EU can 
legislate and adopt binding acts; shared competence refers to policy areas where 
both the EU and member states can legislate and adopt binding regulations, 
under the condition that the EU chooses not to act; and supporting competence 
refers to policy areas where the EU’s role is only to harmonise or coordinate the 
actions of member states (European Union, 2020). Under this classification, the 
member states’ collective trade policy falls under the exclusive competence of 
the EU.  
This competence includes the right to set a trade policy – or Common 
Commercial Policy – and to negotiate & conclude trade agreements as stipulated 
by Article 207 of the TFEU (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012a):   
 
Article 207 (previously Article 133 TEC) 
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff 
and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the 
commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, 
the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy 
and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of 
dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be 
conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's 
external action. 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of 
regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
adopt the measures defining the framework for implementing the 
common commercial policy. 
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3. Where agreements with one or more third countries or international 
organisations need to be negotiated and concluded, Article 218 shall 
apply, subject to the special provisions of this Article. 
The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which 
shall authorise it to open the necessary negotiations. The Council and 
the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the agreements 
negotiated are compatible with internal Union policies and rules. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a 
special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in 
this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may 
issue to it. The Commission shall report regularly to the special 
committee and to the European Parliament on the progress of 
negotiations. 
4. For the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in 
paragraph 3, the Council shall act by a qualified majority. 
For the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade 
in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, as well 
as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act unanimously where 
such agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for 
the adoption of internal rules. 
The Council shall also act unanimously for the negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements: 
a. in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these 
agreements risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic 
diversity; 
b. in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where 
these agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organisation 
of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States 
to deliver them. 
5. The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field 
of transport shall be subject to Title VI of Part Three and to Article 218. 
6. The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in the field of 
the common commercial policy shall not affect the delimitation of 
competences between the Union and the Member States and shall not 
lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the 
Member States in so far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation. 
 
As Article 207 states, the EU institutions (consisting of the Commission, the 
Council, and the Parliament) oversee member states’ trade policy, and when this 
is combined with the EU’s legal status as granted by Article 47 of TEU, it can be 
argued that the EU holds both the legal status and the capacity to act in trade. In 
short, the EU is, indeed, a legal actor in trade.  
Contrary to the EU, ASEAN member states do not give de facto power or 
competences to ASEAN to undertake specific tasks or actions. Instead, member 
states only grant international legal personality to ASEAN as a way for it to be 
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recognised at the international level. Legally, ASEAN was granted a legal 
personality through Article 3 of the ASEAN Charter which states that ‘ASEAN, 
as an intergovernmental organisation, is hereby conferred legal personality’ 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2007b).  
The choice to create the ASEAN Charter and grant legal personality to 
ASEAN was a collective decision by member states to form a ‘rules-based’ and 
institutionalised ASEAN since ASEAN was previously considered a ‘relations-
based’ organisation, relying mostly on informal channels and personal 
interactions (Leviter, 2010). The ASEAN Charter and ASEAN’s legal personality 
were perceived as logical consequences toward a more integrated ASEAN and 
were required for better internal and external functionality. In practice, the 
conferment of juridical personality and legal entity to ASEAN has several 
consequences for the organisation (Caballero-Anthony, 2008). First, ASEAN is 
now recognised as an entity under international law and thus can enter 
international transactions on its own. Second, due to ASEAN’s new status, 
domestic laws of member states must now acknowledge ASEAN and ASEAN 
can benefit from certain privileges such as tax exemption under these domestic 
laws. Third, ASEAN’s new legal status (and the Charter) provides a better legal 
framework for the adoption of ASEAN decisions, treaties, and conventions into 
the domestic legal systems of the member states (Caballero-Anthony, 2008). 
However, while the Charter does provide ASEAN with greater legal power, this 
does not mean that ASEAN was granted the capacity to act since the exercise 
of power is not only a matter of legal competences but also an issue of political 
will and the institutional capacity to use them (Cremona et al., 2015).  
The persistent problem with ASEAN is that even after the granting of its 
international legal status, there is a gap between what it is and what it can do.12 
Scholars have pointed out that despite its legal status, ASEAN has remained a 
weak international actor since its actual capacity continues to be  limited due to 
the unwillingness of member states to empower it (Chesterman, 2008; Chun 
Hung, 2010). In their study, Cremona et al. (2015) find that while there has been 
an overall increase in ASEAN’s external legal instruments following the Charter, 
 
12 This is often referred to as the ‘expectation-capability gap’, first observed by Christopher Hill 
within the EU context (1993)   
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there has not been an increase in treaty-making by ASEAN per se. Instead, the 
preferred method has been to sign legal instruments using the label ‘collectively 
ASEAN’, rather than just ASEAN, hinting that member states collectively agree 
through ASEAN rather than independently by ASEAN (Cremona et al., 2015). 
This is also apparent in the legal text of ASEAN FTAs, which were signed with 
the names of the individual member states, followed by either ‘collectively 
ASEAN’ or ‘ASEAN member states’. In a way, this is a paradox in ASEAN’s 
external relations where member states seek to reinforce ASEAN’s global 
standing but at the same time are hesitant in using ASEAN as an independent 
apparatus outside of their state’s control (Cremona et al., 2015).  
Moreover, member states also diverge on their vision of ASEAN’s future 
after the ASEAN Charter, with old members (or the ASEAN-6)13 wanting the 
Charter to be an important stepping stone for a more cohesive and effective 
ASEAN, while new member states (CLMV countries)14 are in favour of keeping 
ASEAN as simply a mediator (status quo) of Southeast Asian affairs (Leviter, 
2010). This divide accentuates the disparity between member states’ positions 
on how ASEAN should function and whether an externally cohesive ASEAN is 
required for effective external relations. In practice, conferment of legal status to 
ASEAN means little since legal personality at the international level is more of a 
status rather than actual capacity (Chesterman, 2008). Actual capacity to act 
relates more to member states’ political will and for ASEAN, political will has been 
a long-standing issue since member states are never interested in granting 
ASEAN the adequate power to take actions, and consequently, this is precisely 
what separates the EU and ASEAN. 
Legally speaking, both the EU and ASEAN are actors in the international 
system and have demonstrated legal actorness in various affairs, including trade. 
However, they differ on how this legal status is translated into actions, where the 
EU transforms it into different modes of competences, and ASEAN defines it as 
a status rather than an actual capacity to act. Since a large portion of interstate 
relations function based on legal understandings, having an international legal 
 
13 ASEAN-6 refers to the six original ASEAN members which are Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, and Brunei Darussalam 
14 CLMV refers to the newer ASEAN member states incorporating Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and Vietnam 
P a g e  | 78 
 
status certainly adds weighting to both the EU and ASEAN as regional 
organisations. Legal actorness alone, however, is not enough to explain an 
actor’s position and relevance in the international system, and hence, an analysis 
of its capabilities, or in conceptual terms, behavioural actorness, is more 
important.      
4.3. Behavioural Actorness of the EU and ASEAN    
For this research, the regional organisation’s behavioural actorness 
consists of multiple indicators including presence, capabilities, decisionmaking, 
preference convergence, and identity (Hulse, 2014). Each of these components 
will be discussed and compared below except for trade decisionmaking since it 
is a part of processes and thus, will be discussed in the next chapter. However, 
preference convergence in this sub-section will slightly touch upon 
decisionmaking since preference convergence is a result of the collective 
decisionmaking process.  
Based on the data collected, it can be argued that in all indicators of 
behavioural actorness, the EU possesses a higher level of actorness compared 
to ASEAN except for identity, where both the EU and ASEAN are equally distinct 
since they both display a strong sense of regional identity. 
4.3.1. The EU and ASEAN’s Trade Presence  
Presence is the impact that ROs have simply by being present. In other 
words, presence is a ‘consequence of being’, without the RO needing to take any 
actions (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999) and is determined by external conditions 
and outsiders’ acceptance of the actor (Allen and Smith, 1990).  In certain 
conditions, there can be situations where an outsider’s expectation of the actor 
does not match the actor’s internal capabilities, creating what Hill (1993) terms 
as an ‘expectation-capabilities gap’.  
In trade, an RO’s presence can be measured quantitively using their 
global trading share, which measures their overall contribution to the global 
goods’ exchange (Hulse, 2014). This number shows how ‘relevant’ an actor is in 
the global trading structure and how likely they are to influence global trading 
outcomes. Data shows that in 2016, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the EU, and ASEAN accounted for 58% of total world merchandise 
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trade, along with 56% of total world exports and 60% of total world imports (World 
Trade Organization, 2017), which shows the EU and ASEAN’s rather influential 
positions in global trade. Counted individually, the EU accounts for 34.2% of total 
world merchandise trade with a market size of 509 million consumers, while 
ASEAN contributes  7.1% of total world merchandise trade and accounts for 603 
million consumers (World Trade Organization, 2017). This means that globally, 
the EU and ASEAN are the world’s first and third largest trading blocs 
contributing to world merchandise trade with a combined market size of more 
than 1 billion consumers in 2016. Their discrepancies, however, were quite large, 
which stood at 27.1 per cent in 2016, highlighting the EU’s dominant position in 
global trade. However, one major difference between the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
share is that the EU mostly trades within themselves (intra-EU trade), while 
ASEAN’s trading activities are mostly dominated by trade with its external 
partners (extra-ASEAN trade). In 2018, intra-EU trade stood at 64%, while intra-
ASEAN trade stood at only 24%, with ASEAN’s largest trading partner being its 
regional Asian counterparts such as China, Japan, and South Korea, who 
accounted for 43% of the organisation’s total trade (World Trade Organization, 
2018).  
Another main difference between the EU and ASEAN’s trading structures 
is their position regarding exports. Many of the EU’s dominant member states 
are major producers and exporters (e.g. Germany, France, Netherlands, UK), 
and in fact, the creation of EU’s common market was a way to make the EU more 
competitive globally. ASEAN member states, on the other hand, were initially not 
exporters, especially during their early years of integration. ASEAN’s increasing 
share of world trade is mostly due to the region’s economic policy which favoured 
export-oriented policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, or more than two 
decades after the initial integration project. ASEAN countries opt for an export-
oriented policy due to the ‘demonstration effect’ from Northeast Asian 
countries,15 the increasingly liberal economic environment since the 1980s, and 
variations in production technology and the lump of commodity prices that forced 
ASEAN countries to develop new export commodities (Ariff and Hill, 2011).    
 
15 Demonstration effect refers to Southeast Asian countries’ replication of the Northeast Asian 
countries’ (i.e. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) development model which is a combination of 
the ‘strong state, strong market’ economic principles.   
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In addition to quantitative measures, the presence of the EU and ASEAN 
can also be observed by looking at how globally accepted they are, particularly 
through participation in trade-focused organisations such as WTO. In the WTO, 
the EU currently holds full membership status while ASEAN holds neither 
membership nor observer status. However, all 10 ASEAN member states are 
members of the WTO, which gives them an individual voice in trade-related 
issues. The choice to opt for an individual approach rather than a collective one 
is mostly due to differences in ASEAN member states’ economic level and 
interests, making it difficult to undertake a common position in the WTO. As one 
interviewee asserts, with a highly developed country like Singapore and least 
developed one such as Cambodia, it makes more sense for ASEAN member 
states to engage in trade coalitions with those that are economically alike, rather 
than to engage in coalitions based on geographical proximity.16 Thus, ASEAN’s 
lack of status and cohesiveness in the WTO has more to do with its internal 
differences and institutional choices and little to do with its acceptance by 
external actors.  
Another qualitative feature unique to the EU – and is absent in ASEAN – 
is the existence of an internal market and its consequences to other parties. This 
is known as the ‘Brussels effect’ or situations when country/countries are able to 
externalise their laws and regulations across their borders through market 
mechanisms, creating a global standardisation of regulations (Bradford, 2012; 
Bradford, 2014). Initially, the EU’s regulations and standards were meant to 
strengthen its internal market as a part of its integration project. However, 
increased economic liberalisations, including in trade, means that any economic 
exchanges with the EU must also adhere to these regulations, thus, creating a 
unilateral regulatory power for the EU. Due to its market size and level of 
economic growth, the EU can have massive control over economic regulations 
and standardisation, despite not necessarily intending to do so. Currently, the 
Brussels effect covers regulations and standardisation of goods such as foods 
and chemicals as well as economic activities like competition policy and 
protection of privacy (Bradford, 2012). These externalities were the by-product 
 
16 Anonymous interview with ASEAN member state’s trade official 
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and unintended consequences of the EU’s internal market, which, until now, can 
not be matched by other regional organisations.  
To sum up, in both quantitative and qualitative measures, the EU displays 
a higher trade presence compared to ASEAN.       
4.3.2. The EU and ASEAN’s Organisational Capabilities  
The term capabilities refers to the institutionalised means to an end, 
consisting of overall budget and instruments directly under the control of the 
organisation (Hulse, 2014). Overall budget includes membership fees and any 
other forms of payment by member states as well as other external sources such 
as grants and financial assistance. The instruments of regional organisations 
cover external actions by member states, classified into three forms of 
mechanisms: coercion, incentivisation, and moral suasion, and have the ultimate 
goal of changing other actors’ behaviour. Not all regional organisations can or 
will utilise these instruments since it depends on the authority delegated to them 
and the willingness of their member states to use these instruments. The different 
mechanisms of ROs’ external instruments can be summarised below:     
 Table 4.1 Instruments for External Actions 
 
Source: Börzel & Risse (2009) in Hulse (2014) 
 
Based on this definition, the EU and ASEAN’s organisational capabilities can be 
compared by looking at their overall budget and external instruments available 
at their disposal.  
As a regional organisation made up of many developed countries, the 
EU’s budget is relatively high and has, on average, displayed an increase over 
time. Within the last five years, the EU reported an annual revenue of €143.940 
million (2014), €146.027 million (2015), €144.089 million (2016), €139.023 
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million and €158.642 million (2018), with Germany, France and the UK being the 
top three largest contributors of the EU’s income (European Commission, 
2020b). For 2019, the EU reported a 3.2% increase in budget commitments, 
totalling to €165.8 million of available funds (European Council, 2019b). The EU 
allocated this revenue into different posts including smart & inclusive growth, 
sustainable growth, natural resources, security & citizenship, Global Europe, and 
administrative purposes. Allocation for Global Europe includes the budget for the 
EU’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and ‘other external purposes’ 
(European Commission, 2020b). While there is no further explanation on what 
other external purposes entails, it can be inferred that this budget covers the 
EU’s other external relation activities, including in the formulation and utilisation 
of their external instruments. In 2018, this post accounted for €8.073 million, or 
around 5.15%, of EU’s total expenditure (European Commission, 2020b), which 
indicates the EU’s strong budget capabilities in financing its external instruments.            
From 2014 to 2020, the EU lists nine funding instruments for its external 
cooperation and external aid, distributed based on thematic issues and 
geographical areas.  These range from democracy & human rights, nuclear 
safety, and stability & peace to European neighbourhood instruments (European 
Commission, 2019f). Political or economic conditionalities are also often included 
within these instruments, such as the ‘more-for-more’ clause in the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy where recipients will get more economic benefit from the 
EU (e.g. technical assistance, financial assistance, market access), in exchange 
for more political reforms within their country (European Union External Action, 
2016). Moral suasion activities such as lobbying, workshops, and dialogue are 
the day-to-day activities of the EU’s representatives abroad and form an integral 
part of the EU’s external instruments. During the research interview, an EU 
representative noted that EU representatives are roughly involved in three to four 
meetings per week with the host country and this number is likely to increase 
when EU officials from headquarters are visiting.17  
Aside from these less intimidating mechanisms, the EU has also utilised 
several coercive mechanisms, such as military interventions (or in EU terms, ‘civil 
and military missions’) in several African, Asian, and European countries as part 
 
17 Anonymous interview with an EU’s overseas representative   
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of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in several cases, 
economic sanctions. Since 2003, the EU has launched more than 30 missions 
worldwide, and as of today, the EU has 16 CSDP operations in place (European 
Union External Action, 2019). Sanctions are also one of the EU’s core external 
instruments, covering embargoes and restrictions on several aspects including 
financial, trade, and movement targeted for third countries, terrorist groups, or 
individuals. Currently, the EU lists 45 entities which are under the EU’s sanction 
list, 35 of which are countries (European Commission, 2020c).  
Comparing the scope and magnitude of the EU’s external instruments, it 
can be argued that generally, most of the EU’s external instruments fall within 
incentivisation and moral suasion mechanisms, covering activities such as 
technical and financial assistance, worldwide development and cooperation 
programmes, dialogues and workshops. Although the EU does employ several 
coercive measures such as military interventions and sanctions, its scope, 
magnitude, and frequency are rather limited compared to other external 
instruments.   
Specifically, for trade, the EU’s full membership in the WTO gives it 
access to the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanisms as a form of its coercive 
instruments. This means that the EU, as a group, can make use of international 
law and (indirectly) enforce other countries to obey global trade regulations or 
punish others for not playing by the rules. Since the creation of WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) in 1995, the EU has been one of its most active users, 
being involved in 187 cases, 102 as complainants and 85 as defendants 
(European Parliament, 2019b). The EU even has specific trade defence policy 
and instruments to safeguard its trade interest against external parties and 
employs a dedicated sub-directorate level unit on trade defence at the DG Trade 
(European Commission, 2020e). Moreover, the existence of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) means that, internally, the EU also has a regional 
dispute settlement mechanism that can be used for trade affairs. The CJEU’s 
General Court handles cases between the EU and other legal entities, including 
foreign-owned companies, which once again provides the EU with instruments 
to enforce trade regulations.  
The EU’s wide range of external instruments and willingness to utilise 
them corresponds directly to the EU’s capabilities in managing external relations 
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with others. The fact that EU has a large budget, can use multiple mechanisms 
of external instruments and has used them in the past shows that the EU’s 
capabilities are strong, and its member states are willing to use these 
instruments, which cannot be said about ASEAN.  
Unfortunately, it is rather difficult to get an exact estimate of ASEAN’s 
overall budget since no specific data regarding this could be found and hence, is 
difficult to infer whether there are any increases/decreases in ASEAN’s budget. 
However, several rough estimates regarding this can be found from newspapers, 
journal articles, and international institutions’ reports. Since most of ASEAN 
member states are developing countries, ASEAN has a limited budget, and 
conversely, a limited ability to undertake external actions. ASEAN Secretariat’s 
annual budget was around US$17-20 million in 2016, paid in equal amounts by 
the ten member states (Foo, 2016; Chalermpalanupap, 2016). Aside from 
member states’ contributions, ASEAN also receives external funding from 
donors amounting to US$60 million but is mostly spent on specific projects rather 
than on the day-to-day operations of the Secretariat (Asian Development Bank 
Institute, 2012). If we total these numbers together, then ASEAN would roughly 
have an estimated budget of around US$72-80 million or around €65-72 million 
per year, with around 75-86 per cent of this budget coming from external sources 
which, in a way, creates a dependency and jeopardises ASEAN’s funding in the 
long run. Comparing this to the EU, ASEAN’s annual budget accounts for only 
0.04% of EU’s total budget in 2018, which shows ASEAN’s meagre budget 
capabilities.        
In addition to ASEAN’s limited budget, its external instruments are also 
restricted. Due to its core principle of non-interference and absent use of force, 
ASEAN cannot employ any coercion or incentivization as external instruments 
(or internal instruments, for that matter). Military interventions or sanctions are 
never on ASEAN’s list of external instruments, and frankly speaking, are also 
never used when internal problems arise. For example, ASEAN has been 
pressured several times by other countries to undertake sterner action regarding 
Myanmar’s human rights violations of the Rohingya (Heijmans, 2019) and 
however, until now, no coercive measures have been taken. Considering that for 
internal affairs ASEAN is reluctant to use any type of coercive measures, it is 
very unlikely that ASEAN member states would use coercive measures in 
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pressuring non-member states. Furthermore, since ASEAN does not have any 
form of a regional dispute settlement mechanism, its ability to produce any 
powerful legal instruments are limited, both internally and externally. While the 
WTO does provide a dispute settlement body for trade matters which individual 
ASEAN member states can access, ASEAN does not have this option 
collectively as a group since they are not a full member of the WTO.  
Hence, ASEAN can only use moral suasion, which involves workshops, 
dialogues, statements or lobbying when faced with an external crisis. One 
example of employing moral suasion in external crisis is ASEAN’s handling of 
the South China Sea territorial dispute which is only discussed in interstate 
summits, with the hope of finally securing a Code of Conduct which, essentially, 
has little or no binding force. Although the Philippines, as a member of ASEAN, 
reported an arbitration case in 2013 against China regarding the South China 
Sea dispute, this was done individually rather than collectively through ASEAN.  
ASEAN’s preference for non-binding external instruments is also visible 
in its external economic relations, as observed by its FTA texts. Generally, it is 
expected that dispute settlement provisions in political or security agreements 
tend to be weaker than economic agreements due to the degree of technicalities 
involved. However, for ASEAN, even its FTAs tend to have limited binding power, 
especially for provisions on non-traditional trade issues such as services, 
intellectual property rights and investment (Gao, 2019). Even ASEAN’s newest 
and largest trade agreement, the RCEP, is being singled out specifically for its 
lack of provision on investor-state dispute settlements, which again points to 
ASEAN’s proclivity for less coercive measures in managing its external relations.             
Aside from differences in their internal capabilities, another notable 
difference between the EU and ASEAN is in their willingness to employ external 
instruments that correspond to their core regional values. For the EU, its external 
relations are based on the principle of promotion of human rights and democracy 
inspired by the Union’s creation, development, and enlargement (European 
Parliament, 2019a). The EU has a dedicated external instrument for the 
promotion of democracy and human rights – the European Instruments for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) – in addition to EU’s Election 
Observation Missions (EOM) which monitor democratic practices around the 
globe. Moreover, the inclusion of sustainable development and good governance 
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principles in trade agreements can be seen as a way to externalise the EU’s core 
values through economic relations, which is not evident in ASEAN. ASEAN’s 
core values such as non-interference, absent use of force, and consensus-
building are upheld for internal purposes and regional stability only, and not for 
expansive purposes. As Rumelili (2007) argues, the EU’s core values have an 
underlying universalising aspiration, while ASEAN’s core principles are 
regionally exclusive and are not aimed to be applied universally. This distinction 
between universal and regionally exclusive norms simultaneously shapes the 
EU’s willingness to use coercive measures and positive/negative inducements in 
their external instruments and ASEAN’s unwillingness to do so. Since ASEAN 
member states believe that their norms are only fit for regional purposes, there 
is no point in using any punitive measures to enforce these values to non-
members.  
To sum up, since ASEAN does not have enough financial resources and 
see no added value in projecting their norms externally, ASEAN is both unable 
and unwilling to undertake sterner forms of external instruments, which is exactly 
the opposite of the EU. In short, assessing ASEAN’s overall budget, availability 
of external instruments, and willingness to use such an approach, it can be 
assumed that as an international actor, ASEAN has very limited capabilities 
compared to the EU.       
4.3.3. The EU and ASEAN’s Preference Convergence 
Preference convergence is closely related to both the decisionmaking 
process and to some extent, identity. Effective decision-making procedures are 
important for high levels of actorness since they contribute to the convergence 
of preferences. The type and processes of decisionmaking can facilitate 
easiness of preference convergence while a relatively similar identity may signal 
similar ideas and similar interests, thus leading to convergence in preferences 
(Hulse, 2014). Several decisionmaking models may also facilitate or hinder 
preference convergences, such as in the EU, where policy areas that use the 
intergovernmental model tend to reduce the EU’s preference convergence 
(Hulse, 2014). However, this does not necessarily mean that all 
intergovernmental decisionmaking models cannot lead to convergence since 
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they can also facilitate convergences if some form of hegemonial leadership 
exists within the organisation (Doidge, 2011).            
For the EU, its decisionmaking structure differs based on the policy areas 
and for trade policy which falls under the exclusive competence of the European 
Commission, supranational and centralised decisionmaking is the dominant 
method. In trade, the EU follows the community method where the Commission 
has the right of initiative, and the European Council and European Parliament 
have shared co-decision making power.18 Under this arrangement, individual 
member states have limited authority since their interests are only represented 
through the Council and the Parliament who work in tandem with the 
Commission, making divergence more likely to happen between the different EU 
institutions rather than between member states. An example of this was in 2012 
when the Commission and the Parliament’s position did not align regarding the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) since the Parliament believed that 
the treaty was ‘too vague and open to misinterpretation and could, therefore, 
jeopardise citizens’ liberties’ (European Parliament, 2012). This was also the first 
time that the Parliament used its power after changes in the Lisbon Treaty which 
grant them the power to reject international trade agreements. Divergences in 
preferences are also likely to happen internally between different directorates in 
the Commission where one study have noted that the Commission’s position in 
negotiation is often characterised by rivalries among different functional 
divisions, with DG Development having a more development-friendly position 
compared to DG Trade, and DG Agriculture being the most protectionist (Dür 
and Zimmermann, 2007).  
Although divergences still occur within the EU’s external trade position, 
the EU has generally undergone a shift in its preference formation, leading to 
better convergences in the long run. Since the mid-1990s, member states have 
gradually added and expanded the EU’s competence area in trade, initially only 
for trade in goods, and later expanded to include services and investment.19 The 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty also increased the EU’s rulemaking power 
 
18 A more detailed explanation on this will be discussed in the subsequent chapter on the EU 
and ASEAN’s processes of trade diplomacy 
19 A more detailed explanation on this will be discussed in the subsequent chapter on the EU 
and ASEAN’s processes of trade diplomacy 
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in trade, particularly for the EU parliament, which further shifted trade authority 
from member states to the EU institutions. This means that over time, the EU’s 
trade decisionmaking structure has become more centralised – or supranational 
– and divergences are more likely to happen at the regional level, rather than 
national level. As a result, member states are most likely expected to diverge 
only when they collectively discuss the transfer of trade negotiation authority to 
the EU – or the granting of negotiation mandate to the Commission by the 
Council – and unanimity is used as the decisionmaking method. Under 
unanimity, all member states are expected to agree before any trade negotiation 
with a third-party can commence, meaning that all member states have equal 
power, and thus, the likelihood of disagreements is high.  
However, this may also change since, in April 2019, the first incident of 
non-unanimity occurred when member states used qualified majority voting 
(QMV) on the granting of mandate to the Commission. This option was taken 
since France and Belgium refused to grant negotiation mandate for the opening 
of the EU-US trade negotiations, and yet, the mandate was still granted since 
the majority of member states were in support (Schreuer, 2019). The granting of 
the negotiation mandate resulted in the first precedent of QMV, which may have 
future effects for the EU’s trade decisionmaking process, and subsequently, the 
EU’s preference convergence. However, it is still too early to tell whether this will 
lead to a higher level of preference convergence or not since this may require an 
analysis of multiple case studies, which is beyond the scope of this research. 
Overall, while divergences still occur in the EU’s external trade position, 
particularly between and within the EU institutions, the EU has gradually 
developed an institutional mechanism to facilitate better preference 
convergences between member states which ASEAN still lacks.   
In trade, ASEAN adopts an intergovernmental decision-making model 
where all member states have equal power, meaning that in essence, no state 
has real power. This decisionmaking model has led to difficulties in maintaining 
coherence among members since practically all ASEAN member states’ have 
veto power, and thus, any agreement can fail even if only one member-state 
refuses to agree. ASEAN member states do not delegate any form of trade 
authority to regional institutions, but rather only create a secretarial body (e.g. 
ASEAN Secretariat) to facilitate interactions between member states and 
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external partners meaning that no centralised institution nor mechanism is 
present to assist preference convergence in trade. As several trade officials from 
ASEAN member states have confirmed during the research interviews,  
decisions on whether to engage or not in trade negotiations are decided by the 
head of states, assisted by the foreign ministers, while trade ministers are only 
in charge of conducting trade negotiations.20 Multiple interviewees also affirm 
that ASEAN FTAs currently only covers trade in goods and limited services, 
which is far from the ‘gold-standard’ FTAs that often include other areas such as 
intellectual property rights and government procurement. Moreover, for 
instances where the lowest common denominator is deemed not satisfactory 
enough by individual member states, there are options to conclude individual 
agreements outside of the ASEAN scheme, thus furthering divergences within 
ASEAN.21  
Despite these divergences, one interest convergence can be identified 
within ASEAN. To a certain degree, all ASEAN member states agree to some 
level of economic openness and economic liberalism due to their export-oriented 
policies and thus, generally support free trade agreements as a group. However, 
they differ on the scope and timing of liberalisation due to differences in domestic 
conditions and socio-economic players. Jones (2016) observes that in ASEAN, 
domestic socio-political players need to push some degree of economic 
openness to generate additional wealth, but at the same time, require 
protectionist measures to retain wealth and eliminate social unrest, resulting in 
‘a constrained, partial, and uneven liberalisation’ within ASEAN. For instance, 
during the research interview, an EU negotiator involved in EU-ASEAN FTA 
observed that several topics/issues such as investment protection or government 
procurement proved to be a difficult issue during collective negotiations with 
ASEAN, but not so much when discussed individually with corresponding 
member states.22 This leads to the conclusion that while ASEAN member states 
favour economic openness as a group, they are yet to agree on what aspects 
are to be liberalised.  
 
20 Anonymous interviews with several ASEAN member states’ trade officials 
21 This will be discussed in more details in Chapter 5 
22 Anonymous interview with DG Trade official 
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Furthermore, due to the different economic performances of ASEAN 
member states, the timing of liberalisation is also an issue since not all countries 
all equally prepared to be liberalised. In managing its economic affairs, ASEAN 
adopts an ‘ASEAN minus X’ formula where X points to the numbers (and names) 
of countries excluded from an agreement. Another similar form is the ‘2+X’ 
formula where two or more ASEAN countries can proceed with specific economic 
arrangements, and other countries can follow at later dates. These formulas offer 
flexibility in economic decision-making within ASEAN and have been practised 
since the 1980s to incorporate the different economic levels of ASEAN member 
states. While this solution may be effective in overcoming disparities among its 
member states, it also creates complications for external partners since they are 
presented with ten different tariff schedules, which further exacerbates ASEAN’s 
divergence problems. As one former EU negotiator involved in the EU-ASEAN 
FTA recalls during the interview, ‘it is difficult to negotiate with ASEAN since they 
have ten different tariff schedules, meaning that we have to discuss it separately 
which is time-consuming’.23 Overall, although all ASEAN member states can 
agree on some level of economic openness, they often have difficulties in 
maintaining similar preferences throughout the process.  
Comparing the EU and ASEAN’s preference convergence, two 
observations can be highlighted. First, the EU’s preferences can diverge 
between/among member states and the EU institutions, while ASEAN tends to 
diverge only between its member states. Second, the degree of preference 
divergences is likely to be higher for ASEAN since its decisionmaking structure 
allows exceptions for member states to opt-out from agreements. Although this 
may seem to be internally cohesive since it facilitates member states’ economic 
interests, it is externally incoherent since it creates multiple fronts to external 
parties. In summary, the EU’s institutional structure and mechanisms have 
created better avenues for interest aggregation, leading to higher preference 
convergences compared to ASEAN.        
4.3.4. The EU and ASEAN’s Identity       
 
23 Anonymous interview with former EU negotiator involved in the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations 
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In determining an actor’s identity, Wendt (1994) distinguishes between 
corporate identity and social identity. Corporate identity is the ‘intrinsic, self-
organising qualities that constitute an actors’ individuality’ while social identity 
refers to the ‘sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the 
perspective of others. Identities determine actors’ interest and are shaped (and 
reshaped) through social interactions in the system. For ROs, corporate identity 
can be easily discerned by looking at their physical resources, set of institutions, 
members, and the organisations’ practical goals. An RO’s social identity, 
however, is more difficult to distinguish since it requires deeper level 
commonalities such as shared norms, regional values, and ‘imagined’ 
communities. Regions are not geographically or culturally given, and hence, 
region-building involves both political and social activities, and so identity-based 
approach looks beyond the physical limits of the region (Acharya, 2005). Identity 
is what limits regions and regional organisations from their external environment, 
separating between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and creating a sense of exclusivity for the 
region. This can be shaped by geographical, cultural, or historical underpinnings, 
such as in Europe where historically, regional integration was perceived as a 
solution to wars, leading to the regionally-held belief that regionalism, a liberal 
market economy, and certain political values like democracy and respect for 
human rights should be the regional norms (Doidge, 2011; Hulse, 2014).  
For corporate identity, the EU and ASEAN’s general goals are rather 
similar such as promoting peace, fostering economic development and 
enhancing social progress through regional integration. The main difference 
though is that for economic integration, the EU mentions the aim of ‘establishing 
an economic and monetary union whose currency is the Euro while ASEAN lists 
‘creating a single market and production base’ as their goal for economic 
integration (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2007b; European Union, 
2019). This distinction is crucial since it sets the basis for two distinct corporate 
economic identities where the EU sees itself as an ‘economic and monetary 
union’ (EMU) and ASEAN perceives itself as a ‘common market and production 
base’, each bearing different consequences for their regional economic choices. 
As an EMU, the EU requires an integrated fiscal and monetary policy in addition 
to common trade policy, and since economic and financial stability is central for 
this, member states also need to ensure that no economic or financial shocks 
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will disrupt the region. For ASEAN, a single production base and a common 
market will require activities aimed towards cutting production costs such as the 
free flow of goods, services, capitals, and labour. In this sense, both the EU and 
ASEAN have created distinct corporate economic identities for themselves, 
which also shape their actions, choices, and how others receive them.  
For example, although the EU and ASEAN both experienced financial 
crises during their integration process, they responded rather differently. For 
ASEAN, although the 1997-1998 financial crisis hit several of its member states, 
ASEAN’s aftermath response was only in the creation of the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI),24 which is a multilateral currency swap arrangement between ASEAN and 
its northern neighbours (China, Japan, and South Korea), without any formal 
institution to manage or oversee this fund. Although ASEAN does have the 
ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), its function is more on the 
regional economic surveillance side rather than on the management of the 
regional financial crises (AMRO, 2018). Contrary to this, the EU’s response to 
the 2009 Eurozone crisis was to create a new intergovernmental organisation, 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which is in charge of providing financial 
and technical assistance to the Eurozone countries who were/are facing liquidity 
problems (European Stability Mechanism, 2020). The ESM was an upgrade from 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) which is a temporary body 
initially designed as a ‘crisis resolution mechanism’ for debt-laden countries in 
the Eurozone (European Stability Mechanism, 2020). This shift from temporary 
to a permanent institution is in line with the EU’s long-term goal and economic 
identity as a monetary union.  
The different approaches taken by the EU and ASEAN in handling the 
financial crisis are indications of the different economic identities and goals being 
pursued. For an economic and monetary union like the EU, having a permanent 
institution for ensuring regional financial stability will strengthen its economic 
identity, while for ASEAN the creation of a permanent institution in charge of 
ensuring financial stability is still not high on their agenda considering that 
member states  ‘only’ form a common market and production base.              
 
24 In 2009, Chiang Mai Initiative was changed to Chiang Mai Initiative and Multilateralisation 
(CMIM) and the foreign reserves currency pool was doubled. Initially starting at US$ 78 billion 
of currency reserves, CMIM currently has a currency reserve of US$ 240 billion   
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However, corporate identity alone is not enough to fully explain an actor’s 
identity since another important point is in understanding how the EU and 
ASEAN’s perceptions of themselves, in other words their social identities, are 
shaped by their interactions with other actors. In identifying the EU and ASEAN’s 
social identities, several points of references need to be considered. First, 
whether the EU and ASEAN share any collective identity as a group, and second, 
whether either shares any common regional values which are discernible to non-
members. Also, it should be noted that the EU identity does not equate to the 
European identity and ASEAN identity is not the Southeast Asian identity since 
an individual can feel like he/she is European/Southeast Asian but not an 
EU/ASEAN citizen.  
For the EU, the shared collective identity has been captured and 
documented through the bi-annual Eurobarometer public opinion survey, where 
one aspect of the survey includes ‘European citizenship’, specifically answering 





   
Figure 4.1 The Feeling of EU Citizenship 
Source: Eurobarometer (Spring 2019) 
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In the 2019 Eurobarometer Spring Report, findings suggest that 70% of 
respondents felt that they were EU citizens and 29% indicated that they did not 
(European Commission, 2019l). The feeling of EU citizenship has seen a decline 
of 3% compared to the previous report, despite five countries reporting an 
increase. On average, more than half of the EU population feels that they are, 
indeed, ‘an EU citizen’ and share socio-legal commonalities with other EU 
residents.  
For ASEAN, no official polls, surveys or studies can be found regarding 
this although several independent polls, surveys and studies have been done. 
The first and perhaps earliest of these was conducted by the Institute for 
Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in 2007 and 2014 and measured students’ 
perceptions regarding ASEAN.   The study concluded that overall, most students 
have a positive outlook regarding ASEAN and over 80% consider themselves 
‘ASEAN citizens’ (Thuzar, 2015). Other studies also find similar results, stating 
that more than 75% and even 90% of the ASEAN population feels that they are, 
indeed, ASEAN citizens (Intal et al., 2016; Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, 2019). One common thread within these surveys is that younger 
generations of ASEAN tend to feel more connected regionally compared to older 
ones, suggesting that youth interactions between ASEAN citizens may well 
contribute to ASEAN’s citizenship building. Overall, both the EU and ASEAN’s 
population display a ‘moderately strong’ to ‘strong’ feeling of citizenship to their 
respective regional organisations, indicating a strong socio-legal regional 
identity.           
The second aspect of social identity is whether the EU and ASEAN 
possess any shared norms or values and whether these norms/values are 
perceived as being distinct to them. As a formal organisation, the EU defines its 
values as ‘values common to the EU countries in a society in which inclusion, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity, and non-discrimination prevail’ (European Union, 
2019). The EU considers these values as an integral part of the ‘European way 
of life’ consisting of specific values including respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights (European Union, 2019). 
These regional norms are how the EU see themselves, what others should 
adhere to if they were to become part of the EU, and to a certain degree, what 
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external actors should agree to if they were to develop a relationship with the 
EU.  
The link between the EU’s norms and other external actors have been 
documented extensively, culminating in what Ian Manners termed as the 
‘normative power’ of the EU. The EU as a normative power means that the EU, 
as an actor  can exercise the ability to shape the conception of ‘normal’ in global 
affairs, or in other words, has the ability to shape global opinion (power over 
opinion) (Manners, 2002). A common feature of the EU’s normative power is how 
the EU ‘exports’ its norms, or in the words of several EU’s officials during the 
interviews – uphold global agreements – including in trade relations. In trade 
agreements, the EU’s inclusion of its core values, usually formalised through one 
chapter of the agreement, has become a widely accepted practice by their 
negotiation partners, noting it as a distinctive EU practice in trade. Since 2009, 
EU trade agreements have included the Trade and Sustainable Development 
(TSD) chapter, which is an additional chapter containing a commitment by both 
parties to uphold certain standards relating to labour, human rights, 
environmental protection and other forms of social clauses. From 2011 onwards, 
most of the EU’s trade agreements have also included the creation of an advisory 
group to advise on the implementation of these TSD chapters (European 
Commission, 2019h).  
From the perspective of the EU’s external partners, it is relatively clear 
from the start that any trade negotiations with EU will always involve some 
clauses on labour, human rights or environmental issues since these are part of 
the EU values. Although not all countries can accept this, it is always seen as an 
integral part of EU trade negotiations. As one ASEAN trade negotiator puts it 
during the interview, ‘Not all countries are happy with the EU’s inclusion of their 
so-called values in trade negotiations, but I think most countries know that the 
EU is going to ask it anyway’.25 As such, most (if not all) global trade players are 
aware that the EU is unique since, in trade negotiations, the inclusion of labour, 
human rights or environmental clauses has in a way created a distinct trade 
identity for the EU which is different from other actors. Although the inclusion of 
social clauses in trade is not exclusive to the EU, since other countries such as 
 
25 Anonymous interview with ASEAN member state trade official 
P a g e  | 96 
 
the US and Australia often require this as well, the EU is by far the only regional 
organisation to do so and is the most visible trait that separates the EU from 
other regional trade entities.  
One reason for the EU’s distinctiveness in trade identity is perhaps due to 
its learning curve as a long-standing trade actor, coupled with the internal 
pressures from domestic players. Prior to 2009, the EU was like any other trade 
entity, except for the fact that it was a unique political entity (e.g. not a state) 
which is more of a general feature rather than a trade feature. After 2009 though, 
the EU started to incorporate TSD chapters in their trade agreements which, until 
now, is the EU’s trademark in trade agreements. The move to include these 
social clauses in trade was driven by changes following the Lisbon Treaty where 
the EU Parliament, who favours human rights and democratic principles, was 
given larger authority to supervise trade negotiations and also due to the need 
to win support from the  public support who were increasingly becoming critical 
of free trade agreements (Van Den Putte and Orbie, 2015). An increase in the 
Parliament’s power was a response to the democratic deficit that the EU was 
facing, and the inclusion of the Parliament in the EU’s trade decisionmaking 
process was beneficial for many civil society groups since the Parliament is the 
one EU institution that is most likely to respond to public opinion.26 These 
combined factors resulted in the ascending status of social clauses as an 
‘unobjectionable norm’ within the EU’s trading relations (Van Den Putte and 
Orbie, 2015), which the EU still upholds until now.   
Like the EU, ASEAN also exhibits certain identity traits that separate it 
from its external environment, although their trade identity is less clear compared 
to the EU. As an organisation, ASEAN does not specifically identify any core 
values, but rather a set of fundamental principles which includes:  
 
1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity, and national identity of all nations;  
2. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion;  
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
4. Settlement of disputes by peaceful manner; 
5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 
 
26 Anonymous interview with representative from trade-focused civil society organisation in EU  
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6. Effective cooperation among themselves    
 
Source: Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) 
 
These six core principles are often summed up as ASEAN’s principle of 
non-interference, or non-intervention, and absent use of force, which have 
guided ASEAN’s internal conduct throughout the decades. During their 53 years 
of existence, these are the most consistent principles that ASEAN has upheld 
and preserved, despite multiple criticisms. The sustained cases and accusations 
of human rights abuse (e.g. Myanmar’s Rohingya case, the Philippines’ war on 
drugs) and undemocratic government practices in Southeast Asia are often 
viewed as ASEAN’s inability to tackle such issues due to the organisation’s 
underlying principle of non-interference in member states’ domestic issues. The 
closest form of ‘intervention’ that ASEAN has engaged in is perhaps its policy of 
constructive engagement used towards Myanmar in the hopes that the country’s 
behaviour  could be changed through private dialogues – or in ASEAN’s 
terminology ‘quiet diplomacy’ – and continued interactions leading to 
socialisations of normally accepted behaviour without the use of punitive 
measures. Overall, ASEAN’s principle of non-interference and absent use of 
force are, for the most part, accepted and maintained due to the ‘shared 
understandings’ of members that domestic issues should be managed 
domestically (Suzuki, 2019). Although many interstate relations also adhere to 
these principles, ASEAN’s strong emphasis on non-interference, sometimes 
even at the expense of other issues such as human rights, is what separates it 
from other regional organisations.      
Another distinctive norm often attributed to ASEAN is the ‘ASEAN Way’, 
which refers to specific sets of practices typical to Asian cultures. Explicitly, the 
ASEAN Way was never mentioned in any of ASEAN’s core legal texts (unlike 
the principle of non-interference) although it has been used many times by 
ASEAN member states’ officials in multiple occasions. The term ‘ASEAN Way’ 
only came into prominence during the 1990s, almost 25 years after ASEAN’s 
creation, due to the regular use by member states’ officials, and later on, was 
rightfully captured by academic circles (Yukawa, 2018). The ASEAN Way can 
often be difficult to conceptualise since it may consist of different elements 
depending on whom you talk to, however, the widely accepted elements are 
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decisionmaking procedures consisting of informality, non-confrontation, 
consultation & consensus, and thinking multilaterally but acting bilaterally 
(Acharya, 1998). In his study on the discourse analysis of the ASEAN Way, 
Yukawa (2018) found that the ASEAN Way was used to deliberately present the 
unique human rights and democratic values of ASEAN’s member states’ that 
differ from Europe and the United States’, which highlight not just the ideational, 
but also the political function of the term. During multiple occasions, ASEAN 
leaders have also used the term ‘ASEAN Way’ to distinguish themselves from 
the western practice (Acharya, 2001), suggesting that ASEAN member states 
deliberately coined the term ASEAN Way to set up a distinct identity to  separate 
them from the rest, particularly the western identity.  
This distinction also extends to external trade relations where ASEAN 
member states separate themselves from other regional organisations, 
particularly the EU. As one official from ASEAN member states points out during 
the interview: 
“We are not the EU, and it is impossible to expect us to work like the EU. We 
have our own internal mechanisms and our external partners understand 
that. We need to reach consensus and find common ground first before 
entering into any external negotiations, and although some may find this 
complicated, they need to understand that this is how ASEAN works.”27  
In managing trade, ASEAN also adopts the ASEAN Way, particularly in 
using consultation & consensus, as their only method in negotiation. However, 
since this is used for all policy areas and not specifically for trade, it can hardly 
be considered a distinct trade identity. Furthermore, aside from its rather 
‘shallow’ trade agreements,28 no distinct trade characteristics can be observed 
from ASEAN. The content of ASEAN trade agreements is typical of any FTAs as 
consultation/consensus are also common in most trade agreement negotiations. 
Hence, unlike the EU, which can be easily distinguished by its TSD chapters in 
trade negotiations, ASEAN does not exhibit any distinctive traits that set them 
apart from other trade entities. Regardless of this, a common feature between 
the EU and ASEAN is that they both have strong and distinct regional identity, 
 
27 Anonymous interview with ASEAN member state’s trade official 
28 Shallow in this sense refers to the quality of trade agreements, where ‘deeper’ trade 
agreements tend to cover more areas (goods, services, investments, governments 
procurement etc.) and lower tariff rates.    
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which can be easily distinguished from other regional organisations. Citizens of 
both the EU and ASEAN perceive themselves as part of a ‘regional group’, and 
each organisation exercises core values within themselves, serving as a distinct 
regional practice that further sets them apart from other regions. Hence, for both 
the EU and ASEAN, the notion of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is relatively clear, owing to both 
their regional sense of belonging and normative practices.           
Comparing the EU and ASEAN’s overall behavioural actorness, it can be 
concluded that in general, the EU displays a higher level of actorness compared 
to ASEAN, owing mostly to its economic capabilities, internal foundations, and 
regional mechanisms. The only indicator where both the EU and ASEAN are 
strong is in their regional identity, which explains why these two regional 
organisations are often compared in an opposing spectrum since they each 
display a distinct identity.  
4.4. Comparing the EU and ASEAN’s Actorness in Trade Diplomacy  
Comparing the EU and ASEAN’s legal and behavioural actorness, a 
summary of the main findings of this chapter is outlined below:   
 
 
Table 4.2 Comparison of the EU and ASEAN's Actorness in Trade Diplomacy 
Element of Comparison EU ASEAN 
Legal Actorness International actor as 
granted by a legal 
instrument 
International actor as 























between/among MS and 
the EU institutions; lower 
level of divergences 
 
Divergences between 
member states; higher 
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It can be observed that the EU and ASEAN are different on three elements: their 
trade presence, organisational capabilities, and preference convergence; while 
being similar on two elements: their legal actorness and identity. Closely 
examined, the similarities between the two organisations can be linked to how 
they wished to be perceived externally and whether it is possible for them to 
‘stand out’ as an actor, which, consequently, also indicates the EU and ASEAN’s 
quest for international recognition and regional agency. On the contrary, their 
differences are mostly the result of internal differences, particularly due to 
variations in their domestic resources, degree of liberalisation, and institutional 
settings.        
4.4.1. Explaining Differences in the EU and ASEAN’s Trade Actorness 
Based on the previous discussion, differences in the EU and ASEAN’s 
actorness in trade can be attributed to three main causes: differences in their 
levels of economic development, their institutional settings where a trade-
focused supranational institution is present in the EU and absent in ASEAN, and 
the availability of a regional mechanism to minimise preference divergences 
between member states in the EU and the absence of one in ASEAN.  
Differences in level of economic development affect the EU and ASEAN’s 
trade presence, capabilities, ability to finance external instruments, and acquire 
solid positioning in global trade. Discrepancies in the EU and ASEAN’s budget 
can be easily attributed to their overall GDP and the number of budget 
contributions that each member state can afford. In 2018, the GDP per capita 
(PPP) of ASEAN and the EU averaged at US$ 4.601 and €28.280 (equivalent to 
US$ 31.179), respectively (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019; Eurostat, 2020), 
suggesting that on average, the EU’s ability to finance its external instrument is 
six times larger than that of ASEAN. This, in itself, is a clear indication of a 
massive difference in their financial capabilities and their ability to finance their 
respective regional organisations.  
Adding to these discrepancies is the fact that, member states contribute 
equally to ASEAN, meaning that regardless of their economic performance, each 
member state is expected to contribute a similar amount to ASEAN’s budget 
(Chalermpalanupap, 2016). This is contrary to the EU, where national 
contributions are linked to gross national income (GNI), meaning that wealthier 
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countries are likely to contribute more to the EU’s budget. In 2018, Germany, 
France and the UK were the EU’s top three contributors while Estonia, Cyprus 
and Malta were its three smallest contributors (European Commission, 2020b). 
The EU’s GNI-linked model of contribution means that the EU’s yearly revenue 
may increase or decrease depending on the economic performance of member 
states, while ASEAN’s budget can only increase or decrease if member states 
agree on doing so, regardless of their economic performance.  
Comparing the EU and ASEAN’s economic performance, as measured 
by GNI per capita from 1990-2018:  
 
 
Figure 4.2 The EU and ASEAN’s GNI per capita, PPP, (in current international $), Year 
1990-2018 
Source: The World Bank (2020) 
 
Comparing the EU and ASEAN’s GNI change over the last 28 years, it can be 
seen that on average, the wealth of both the EU and ASEAN shows an increase 
over time. However, this increase will be reflected only in the EU’s organisational 
budget, and not in ASEAN’s, due to its financial arrangements. Contrary to the 
EU, where the wealth of member states is linked to wealth of the EU, an increase 
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also becomes wealthier. Thus, in addition to the EU’s higher levels of economic 
development, this mechanism also makes the EU’s overall budget more superior 
compared to ASEAN.   
 The second factor contributing to the differences in trade actorness 
between EU and ASEAN is the existence of a trade-focused supranational 
institution in the EU which is absent in ASEAN. While a trade-focused SNI may 
have various effects on the management of external trade,29  for trade actorness, 
it creates additional layers of preference formulation between SNI-member 
states and within the SNI itself. In the EU, divergences happen within the EU 
institution itself and between the EU and its member states as a consequence of 
an additional level of governance in the organisation’s  trade diplomacy, which is 
unlikely to happen in ASEAN since no trade-focused SNI is present in ASEAN.  
 





Figure 4.3 Illustration of the EU and ASEAN’s Preference Divergences in Trade 
Diplomacy 
 
As the illustration above shows, due to the existence of a trade-focused 
SNI in EU, there are at least three possible forms of preference divergences in 
the EU: between individual member states, between different EU institutions, and 
between member states and the EU institutions. On the contrary, ASEAN’s 
preference divergences only happen in one form: between individual member 
states, and sometimes, between technical ministries of member states although 
this is less likely to happen since technical ministries have very limited power in 
ASEAN trade diplomacy.30 Due to ASEAN’s unidirectional decisionmaking 
 
29 The effect that trade focused SNI can have on trade decisionmaking and trade negotiation 
process is discussed in the subsequent chapter   
30 The relationship and distribution of authority between member states and their technical 
ministries are discussed in depth in the following chapter.  
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structure, the head of states instruct their technical ministries, thus minimising 
the likelihood of preference divergence within a state, and therefore making the 
only substantive divergences within ASEAN between its member states. The 
EU’s multilevel trade governance means that divergences are likely to happen 
not just between levels but also within levels. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that the EU faces a higher level of divergences compared to ASEAN, but 
merely that it has more types of divergences compared to ASEAN. In fact, 
ASEAN faces a higher degree of divergences compared to the EU due to its lack 
of mechanisms for preference convergence.    
A higher/lower level of divergence is mostly determined by the availability 
of relevant mechanisms to overcome this, and for the EU, several mechanisms 
have assisted in minimising these preference divergences. The first mechanism 
is the Copenhagen Criteria, which is a set of accession criteria for countries 
wishing to join the EU. Article 49 of the TFEU states that: 
“Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and 
is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the 
Union.” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012b) 
 
Referring to Article 2 of TFEU:  
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012b)     
 
These articles set the basis for the Copenhagen criteria, which is further broken 
down into three main criteria: (a) political criteria which requires the stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities; (b) economic criteria relating to a functioning 
market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; 
and (c) administrative and institutional capacity in order to effectively implement 
the EU’s regulations and ability to take on the obligations of membership 
(European Commission, 2016a). Of main importance for the external economic 
relations is the economic criteria which consist of a functioning market economy 
and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces. Each of these 
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criteria is further broken down into specific requirements which is reported and 
monitored annually through the annual progress review carried out by the 
Commission. The Commission also conducts medium-term economic 
surveillance for prospective member states to assess whether a country is 
prepared to join the EU.  
In addition to this, the EU also has the Euro convergence criteria (or 
Maastricht criteria) which set out the guidelines for countries wishing to use the 
Euro as their currency, consisting of price stability, sound and sustainable public 
finances, exchange rate stability, and long-term interest rates (European 
Council, 2019a). What these guidelines and criteria do is set the bar for 
prospective countries enabling them to be at least, at the same ‘level’ – or 
process – as other EU member states. This means that from the start, all EU 
members belong to the same ‘convergence club’. Furthermore, the EU also 
manages a specific program to assist in member states’ accession process – the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which aims to provide technical 
and financial assistance to potential and candidate countries. This means that 
while not all member states have the same level of economic development, these 
criteria ensure that all member states are better attuned to the types of economic 
policies and targets that they should pursue. In brief, one main reason for the 
EU’s better convergence compared to ASEAN is that it has specific mechanisms 
in place to mitigate the risks of having possible outliers or highly divergent 
member states. While divergences do occur within the EU, it is at a smaller scale 
since the path towards economic convergences is laid from the very beginning.    
Conversely, ASEAN does not have any specific economic criteria for its 
prospective members, aside from the general geographical criteria and 
acceptance from other member states. Article 6 of the ASEAN Charter states 
that:  
(1) The procedure for application and admission to ASEAN shall be 
prescribed by the ASEAN Coordinating Council.  
(2) Admission shall be based on the following criteria:  
(a) Location in the recognised geographical region of Southeast 
Asia     
(b) Recognition by all ASEAN Member States 
(c) Agreement to be bound and to abide by the Charter; and 
(d) Ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of Membership  
(3) Admission shall be decided by consensus by the ASEAN Summit, 
upon the recommendation of the ASEAN Coordinating Council.  
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(4) An applicant State shall be admitted to ASEAN upon signing an 
Instrument of Accession to the Charter.  
 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2007b) 
 
The lack of convergence criteria means that there is no bar that prospective 
member states need to meet, making it more difficult for member states to 
achieve convergence since they face large discrepancies. Adding to this is the 
fact that ASEAN has limited mechanisms in place to narrow the economic gap 
between its member states. Since the late-1990s, there have been growing 
concerns regarding a two-tiered ASEAN, with the original six-member countries 
as core states and the newer member states (the CLMV) as peripheral countries, 
leading to the so-called development gap within ASEAN. In 2000, ASEAN 
leaders adopted a special programme to narrow this development gap, the 
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), which is currently in its 3rd Working Plan 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2016). The initiative focuses on five 
strategic areas: food & agriculture, trade facilitation, education and health & well-
being and is supported by a task force and a secretariat to provide policy 
guidance and assist in its implementation and monitoring process. Following this 
initiative, ASEAN reports that ‘the poorest countries of ASEAN have generally 
grown the fastest, meaning that the gaps that exist between ASEAN Member 
States in living standards have steadily narrowed’ (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, 2017 pg. 2). However, no quantitative datasets can be found 
regarding this statement or the precise contribution that AIA has made on 
decreasing this development gap, making it unclear whether this narrowing is 
due to ASEAN’s initiatives or individual countries’ economic performance.  
Another component that contributes to better convergence in the EU, 
compared to ASEAN, is its decisionmaking model which has shifted from 
unanimity to QMV meaning that preference convergence is more likely to be 
achieved since no single country can block a decision. This is in contrast to 
ASEAN, which still follows the consensus procedure meaning that all member 
states have veto power, making it more difficult to achieve convergences.  
In sum, while both the EU and ASEAN face preference divergences, the 
types of divergences are likely to be more in the EU, but the level of divergences 
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will be higher in ASEAN due to their internal mechanisms and the existence of a 
trade-focused SNI in the EU.         
4.4.2. Explaining Similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s Trade Actorness   
One common feature between the EU and ASEAN is that since they are 
not states and are not conventional actors in international relations, possessing 
an international legal status increases their position and acceptability by other 
actors. Since most global relations rely on legal groundings, possessing an 
international legal personality fulfils both the legal, and to a certain degree, the 
political aspect of global relations. This is particularly true for ASEAN, where legal 
personality ‘serves the purpose of giving symbolism and legal effect to the 
group’s efforts in becoming an increasingly rules-based and cohesive group’ 
(Hsu, 2008 p.74 in Lenz, 2011). In the words of the former ASEAN Secretary-
General: ‘the ASEAN Charter will serve the organisation well in three interrelated 
ways, such as, formally accord ASEAN legal personality, establish greater 
institutional accountability and compliance system, and reinforce the perception 
of ASEAN as a serious regional player in the future of the Asia-Pacific region’ 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2007a). These ‘giving symbolism’ to 
ASEAN and reinforcing the ‘perception’ of the organisation as regional player 
were meant to raise ASEAN’s international profile by creating the impression that 
ASEAN is now a legitimate actor on its own, despite its limited authority. So, 
while this is indeed a legal move from ASEAN member states, it is also a political 
one mostly linked to external perceptions of the organisation.       
Similarly, the move by the EU member states to grant legal personality to 
the EU was also driven by the growing discourse on strengthening the EU’s 
coherence in external affairs, in addition to maintaining its distinct international 
status. As previously discussed, the fact that the EU consists of multiple legal 
entities has created external confusions and limited the organisation’s coherence 
in managing its external relations, and as a result, has led to demands for a more 
unified EU. In the Reflection Group’s report for the 1995 EU’s intergovernmental 
meeting, the team stated that ‘the fact that the Union does not legally exist is a 
source of confusion outside and diminishes its external role’ (European 
Commission, 1995), which highlights the EU’s need to respond to external 
demand for a more integrated EU. For the EU, its international legal status was 
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meant to create a unified and coherent EU image while the granting and 
distribution of competences were meant to support and implement this goal. This 
is slightly different from ASEAN member states who only seek to grant 
international legal status without the intent of granting any further power to its 
institution. Nevertheless, the EU and ASEAN member states’ choice to grant 
international legal personality to their institutions was mostly driven by external 
forces and the need to take appropriate internal actions in response to this.  
Correspondingly, the second similarity between the EU and ASEAN – 
strong regional identities – is also a product of external forces, and more 
specifically, as a way to maintain clear positioning in global affairs. In their study, 
Slocum and van Langenhove (2004) introduce the concept of positioning theory 
to the study of regional integration, arguing that regional integration should also 
be viewed by understanding the ‘meanings attributed to spaces and interactions’ 
and ‘the process of how regions are constructed as actors and meaning is 
engendered’. Even the seemingly unconscious choice of labelling regional-type 
cooperation as integration, rather than cooperation is always connected to a 
specific discursive context, although factual elements are also at play (Warleigh-
Lack et al., 2010). On identity, Slocum and Langenhove argue that identity is 
‘neither an object nor a causal force’ but rather a concept used as a discursive 
tool by actors or agents to ‘accomplish social tasks within a given context’ 
(Slocum and van Langenhove, 2004). This means that identity is not a final 
product, but rather a means toward specific purposes as intended by the actors, 
which in this research, refers to the EU and ASEAN.  
For regional organisations, the attribution of an identity is a way to position 
themselves as actors since the concept of ‘regions as actors’ is relatively new in 
contemporary discourse (Slocum and van Langenhove, 2004). The EU, as the 
first modern-day regional organisation, was only created in the 1950s, making it 
a relatively new actor, compared to nation-states. Hence, regions need to set 
specific identities for themselves in order to gain enough properties to be 
considered actors in international relations, particularly in the social sense. For 
the EU and ASEAN, obtaining the status of social actors complements the legal 
status that they have attained through the granting of legal personality, which 
further strengthens their position in global relations.  
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Another function of a strong regional identity is to create both a barrier and 
a magnet for other actors within the international system since actors who 
possess similar identities are likely to be attracted or compatible with each other 
while those who do not will tend to shy away. For example, ASEAN bureaucrats’ 
first use of the ASEAN Way in the 1990s can be considered as a speech-act 
serving several purposes including to shield themselves from outward critiques 
concerning the region’s human rights and democratic performance and as a way 
to appeal to the outside world regarding their internal workings as ASEAN was 
establishing itself and creating regional security cooperation in the process 
(Yukawa, 2018). ASEAN’s general resistance to being compared to the EU’s 
economic integration process is also an indication of this, where ASEAN 
promotes its own economic identity (e.g. a regional production base) in defence 
of its internal economic mechanisms which are often seen as ‘inferior’ compared 
to the EU.  
Similar to ASEAN, the EU’s distinct identity (as captured by the EU values) 
can be viewed as a way of creating barriers between the EU and other actors, 
and at the same time, attract those who share similar values. The EU’s values 
are central to membership accession, as stipulated by the Copenhagen criteria, 
particularly in the political criteria which states that any country wishing to join 
the EU must guarantee the implementation of democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities. This inevitably creates a 
barrier for non-democratic and non-liberal European countries who may want to 
join the EU. Another barrier which stems from the EU’s distinct identity is in its 
FTAs and the inclusion of TSD chapters which can be interpreted as a passive-
aggressive statement from the EU on their unwillingness to engage with external 
actors who do not share similar identities with them.           
What can be concluded, then, is that similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s 
actorness in trade diplomacy have been the result of three elements. First, the 
need to gain external recognition as legal and social actors since the EU and 
ASEAN are not actors in the traditional sense. Second, the necessity to respond 
to external pressures such as ASEAN’s use of the ASEAN Way to defend their 
human rights position and the EU’s granting of legal status due to external 
confusion; and third, the need to create either a barrier or magnet which 
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ultimately shapes their relationship with other actors. Thus, a single common 
thread between these causes is that they are all exogenous to the regions.      
4.5. Conclusion 
Diplomacy is strongly correlated with elements of representation, which in 
the traditional definition, equates to appointed delegates of individual states in 
the form of diplomatic missions. More recently, ROs are increasingly becoming 
representatives of states specifically in managing trade relations with others. 
Nevertheless, since not all ROs are equipped with formal diplomatic missions, 
the concept of representation relating to ROs cannot be perceived like that of 
individual states. This thesis suggests that in explaining how capable and 
acceptable ROs are, the concept of actorness should be used as an indicator, 
consisting of legal actorness and behavioural actorness. Even more so, 
actorness of RO should be specific to issues managed by regional organisations, 
and for this thesis, the notion of trade actorness is used to explain one 
component of the EU and ASEAN’s practice of trade diplomacy. ROs should at 
least possess some degree of trade actorness in order to represent member 
states and the minimum would be a legal one. However, while legal actorness is 
a legitimate source of actorness, what matters most is RO’s behavioural 
actorness or their real ability to engage in meaningful trade relations. So far, this 
chapter has compared five elements which are central to the notion of trade 
actorness in the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy (e.g. legal actorness, trade 
presence, organisational capabilities, preference convergence and identity) and 
provided explanations on the causes of similarities and differences between 
these elements.  
From the discussion, it can be concluded that the EU and ASEAN are 
similar on two fronts: the existence of their legal actorness as confirmed by their 
corresponding legal documents and their strong regional identity which sets them 
apart from other entities. Apart from these two, the EU and ASEAN are different 
in all other aspects of their external representation which is due to several 
factors. Differences in the EU and ASEAN’s external representation can be 
attributed to internal determinants within the regions, particularly in three core 
elements: levels of economic development which relates to variations in trade 
presence and organisational capabilities; the existence of trade-focused SNI 
P a g e  | 110 
 
which links to the EU and ASEAN’s variances in their preference convergence; 
and availability of regional mechanisms to minimise these preference 
divergences. In contrast, similarities between the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
actorness can be attributed to external causes which force the EU and ASEAN 
to behave similarly.  
For starters, both the EU and ASEAN member states opt to grant legal 
personality to their institutions since this minimises confusion and increases both 
the legal status and unity of their respective organisations. In addition to this, the 
EU and ASEAN also choose to present a strong regional identity which plays 
several crucial roles, including to obtain recognition as a social actor (in addition 
to a legal one), to protect its internal workings and behaviours from external 
judgement, and to create a barrier or magnet for other external actors. Each of 
these functions play a specific role in explaining the behaviour of the EU and 
ASEAN regarding their trade diplomatic activities.  
To sum up, this chapter has described, compared, and explained one core 
element of the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, as one part of the three-
element framework. and additionally, has partially answered the second and third 
research questions regarding similarities/differences and their determinants. 
Following this, the next two chapters focus on the other two elements: processes 
and goals, which together form the core analytical framework of regional 
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Chapter 5 – Processes in the EU and ASEAN Trade Diplomacy  
 
5.1. Introduction    
The previous chapter has discussed the first component of the EU and 
ASEAN’s trade diplomacy – trade actorness – which correlates to the who 
question, while this chapter focuses on explaining the second component – 
processes – which links to the how question in trade diplomacy. In explaining the 
processes of trade diplomacy, this research adopts Bayne and Woolcock’s 
understanding of the trade diplomacy and sets out two main activities in trade 
diplomacy - trade decisionmaking and trade negotiation. This classification is 
used as the underlying structure of this chapter and is used for comparison. This 
chapter contributes to the second research question regarding the similarities 
and differences of the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy and partly to the third 
research question which looks at the determinants of these similarities and 
differences.  
The data for this chapter are obtained through various sources, including 
legal texts, regional organisations’ websites & press releases, newspaper & 
magazine articles, and interviews. Interview data are particularly important for 
this chapter since trade decisionmaking and negotiations tend to be done in 
secrecy, and thus, secondary data may not always be available. This is 
particularly true for ASEAN’s case where limited research is available regarding 
this topic, making this chapter rather significant since it is the first-ever attempt 
to fully document ASEAN’s external trade decisionmaking and negotiation 
process. Interviewees for this chapter include the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
officials, representatives from business associations, trade-related NGOs, and 
researchers based in Europe and Southeast Asia.  
Based on the data obtained, this chapter identifies numerous differences 
between the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomatic processes and only one similarity 
between them, namely their preference for bilateralism in managing external 
trade relations. In contrast, differences range from the type of actors involved 
and their degree of involvement, decisionmaking model, negotiation model, and 
whether flexible participation and parallel negotiations outside of their regional 
scheme are allowed or not. What connects all of these differences is the fact that 
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they all stem from two internal determinants: the existence of a trade-focused 
supranational institution in the EU and the absence of one in ASEAN, and 
differences in the EU and ASEAN’s choice of economic integration type relating 
to their decision of being a customs union or not. On the contrary, the single 
similarity between EU and ASEAN can be attributed to external determinants, 
where changes in the global trading structure have forced the EU and ASEAN to 
adapt and, thus, opt for bilateralism since it offers the best outcome for them.   
In explaining these arguments, this chapter is structured into five main 
sections. Following the introduction, two comparative sub-sections on the EU 
and ASEAN’s trade decisionmaking and trade negotiation are presented to 
identify differences and similarities, followed by an analysis of what causes these 
differences and similarities. The final section concludes with a discussion linking 
this chapter’s main finding to the overall result of this research.    
5.2. Trade Decisionmaking in the EU and ASEAN 
In explaining trade decisionmaking of regional organisations, this research 
defines it as the internal process of formulation and implementation of decisions 
taken by regional organisations or by member states relating to external trade, 
conducted within the confinement of regional organisations. Using this definition, 
then trade actions taken by member state(s) on behalf of the regional 
organisation, such as in the case of ASEAN, can also be considered as regional 
trade decisions.  
5.2.1. Trade Decisionmaking in the EU  
As a general rule, decisionmaking in the EU’s trade diplomacy follows the 
community method where supranational institutions take the lead, and in this 
case, the European Commission (EC) has the right of initiative (Woolcock, 
2012a). The EU trade decisionmaking can be classified into three types: 
decisionmaking regarding international trade negotiations, decisionmaking on 
unilateral actions such as giving preferential trade measures to least developed 
countries, and decisionmaking regarding trade defence measures like anti-
dumping or anti-subsidy policies (Woolcock 2012). However, this chapter only 
focuses on the first decisionmaking process since ASEAN, as a comparison, 
does not engage in decisionmaking at the second and third types. In making 
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decisions regarding the EU trade negotiations, the three core EU institutions (the 
Council, the Commission, and the Parliament) are all involved, with the 
Commission being the most influential in shaping the EU’s trade strategy and 
possessing the most considerable de facto competence (Woolcock, 2012a).  
The legal basis for the EU’s trade competence can be found in Article 207 
of the Treaty of the Functioning of European Union (previously the Treaty of 
Rome Article 133), and with trade being the exclusive competence of the EU, 
most of the EU’s trade decisionmaking process occurs at the regional level. 
Within this level, several EU actors are involved in the process, including the 
European Council, the European Commission, the Council of the European 
Union, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, business groups, and civil society groups.  
 
Table 5.1 Actors in the EU Trade Decisionmaking Process 
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government’s position 
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Source: Garcia (2018)   
 
Within these groups, several actors have a higher degree of involvement and 
influence compared to others due to differences in authority. In practice, three 
EU institutions are central to the trade policymaking process: the European 
Commission via the Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade), the Council of the 
European Union via the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC),31 and the European 
Parliament via the Committee for International Trade (INTA). These actors are 
crucial on both trade policy formulation and trade negotiations that the EU 
undertakes. 
 One actor, who is central in the EU’s diplomatic process, but tends to be 
absent in its trade diplomacy is the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
There are two main reasons why EEAS, as the main diplomatic wing of the EU, 
tends to be excluded from the trade diplomatic process. First, in practice, EEAS 
functions more as an assistant whose main task is to support DG Trade in 
preparing for meetings and coordinating with external partners and has no real 
power to undertake strategic actions in trade.32 EEAS focuses more on high 
politics and public diplomacy, with no authority in trade issues. Second, EEAS 
personnel in charge of coordinating trade negotiations with external partners are 
all staff of DG Trade who are on loan and must return to DG Trade once their 
tenure is over.33 This means that, effectively, EEAS has no ‘real’ staff managing 
trade since only DG Trade personnel oversee all trade-related issues. In 
 
31 The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) is supported by two main bodies: the Trade Policy 
Committee/TPC which is in charge of monitoring the progress of trade negotiations and 
Coreper II who is in charge of preparing trade and development agenda for FAC’s meeting 
(Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2011). 
32 Anonymous interview with EEAS staff in charge of external trade relations 
33 Anonymous interview with EEAS staff in charge of external trade relations 
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fairness, this is a standard practice in diplomacy, especially if the Ministry of 
Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are separated.34 If we equate the EEAS 
as the EU’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the DG Trade as the EU’s Ministry of 
Trade, then like most countries in the world, the Ministry of Trade is the core 
actor in trade issues while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs usually only has a 
coordinating role.        
For the process, trade decisionmaking in the EU generally starts with the 
Commission assessing the impact of the agreement, doing public consultation, 
and engaging in informal scoping exercise,35 before making a recommendation 
to the Council to formally start negotiations (European Commission, 2018e). The 
objective of trade impact assessments is to identify possible problems arising 
from agreements and to provide solutions for these, as well as assessing likely 
impacts on the economic, social, and environmental structure of the EU. Once 
the commission finishes an assessment and agrees on a position, it will be 
submitted to the Council to be considered and decided upon by member states 
through the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) and COREPER II of the Committee 
of the Permanent Representatives (COREPER). TPC usually works based on 
consensus, and if the commission’s proposal does not gain enough support, the 
Commission will usually withdraw it and propose a new one. During this process, 
the Commission and Council also need to inform and consult with the Parliament 
(via INTA) on the progress of the proposal. Once the proposal is agreed on, the 
Council adopts a formal position and authorises a negotiation mandate (or 
‘negotiating directives’) to the Commission, consisting of general objectives to be 
achieved in the negotiation. The Commission then sets up a negotiating team, 
consisting of experts from across the commission on the topic/area being 
discussed and proceeds to start negotiations (European Commission, 2018e).      
Once agreements are reached between the EU and the third party, the 
EU still needs to go through several stages before member states can fully 
implement it. This involves a co-decisionmaking process by the EU Council and 
the EU Parliament, including the decision to provisionally implement the 
 
34 Several countries such as Australia and Canada merged their Ministry of Trade and Foreign 
Affairs and thus, only has one ministry overseeing these two issues.   
35 A scoping exercise is an informal dialogue between the EU and the third party/parties 
regarding the possible content of trade negotiation    
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agreement either partially or fully (European Commission, 2018). Since 
decisions by the EU parliament require a yes/no vote, there are always 
possibilities that the parliament may reject FTAs proposed by the commission 
and may request a re-negotiation with external parties. In making this decision, 
the parliament also consults with industries, trade unions, environmental groups 
and other outside experts (European Commission, 2013b). If the parliament 
agrees with the proposed FTAs, then it is ready to be implemented, depending 
on the cooperation area. Cooperation area refers to the multiple types of trade 
cooperation agreements that the EU can engage in such as trade in goods, trade 
in services, public procurement, audio-visual, foreign direct investments, and 
others. For cooperation areas that fall within the EU’s exclusive trade 
competence, agreements are considered binding (entry into force) once the EU 
notifies its implementation to the third party while for cooperation areas which fall 
under mixed competence, implementation will require ratification by individual 
member states’ parliaments before an agreement is legally binding.36  
Throughout the years, the EU trade competence has evolved due to 
systemic changes, and while it is generally accepted that the EC can act on 
behalf of member states, it is the scope of what they can act upon that created a 
problem. Since being granted the trade competence, the Commission has 
negotiated on behalf of member states for several decades before problems 
emerge in the 1980-1990s. Two issues were central to this problem: the 
emergence of ‘new issues’ in the global trade agenda, most notably regarding 
the liberalisation of services which previously was not included in the EC’s trade 
competence,37 and the change from GATT to the WTO which put the 
membership (and trade authority) of the EU/EC member states and the 
Commission into questions (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011). The issue regarding 
membership poses problems because the EU/EC has never formally substituted 
member states in GATT and replacing member states with the EC/EU means 
that individual states would lose their votes and will be replaced by a single 
 
36 Within the current arrangement, the EU’s exclusive competence in trade includes policy areas 
including: trade in goods and services, the commercial aspects of intellectual property, public 
procurement, and foreign direct investment (European Commission, 2020f)       
37 Initially, the EU competence only covered trade in goods   
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EC/EU vote.38 At the global level, trade issues also started to shift from traditional 
trade policies located ‘at the border’ (e.g. tariffs and quotas) to issues within 
domestic borders or ‘within the state’, such as national laws and domestic 
economic regulations (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011). This resulted in hesitations 
among the EU member states who were reluctant to delegate further trade 
competence to the Commission outside of what was stated in the Treaty of 
Rome.39  
Following the WTO’s Uruguay Round in 1994 where the Commission 
concluded agreements relating to services and intellectual property rights, 
member states contested this action seeing that this was beyond the 
Commission’s scope of competence. This conflict resulted in a European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) ruling Opinion 1/94, stating that trade competence in goods is 
the exclusive domain of the Commission and trade in services and intellectual 
property rights is a shared competence between the Commission and member 
states. This meant that these agreements needed to be ratified individually by 
each member state, rather than just by the EU. However, this ruling was deemed 
unsatisfactory from the Commission’s point of view since it limited the 
Commission’s competence on new trade issues (Devuyst, 2011). At the 1996 
intergovernmental conference, the Commission and the EU member states tried 
to rectify this issue by agreeing to an amendment in the Rome Treaty, allowing 
an expansion of the EU’s exclusive trade competence through a unanimous vote 
of the Council (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011). This solution, nevertheless, also 
proved to be unsustainable and the EU member states once again brought this 
issue to the Nice conference in December 2000. This resulted in the expansion 
of the EU competence to include services and intellectual property rights, based 
on qualified majority voting, with exceptions for provisions that requires unanimity 
in the adoption of internal rules and in areas where the EU had not yet exercised 
its power. It was not until the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (implemented in 2009) that 
issues on the Commission’s trade competence were resolved or at least, 
deemed satisfactory enough.  
 
38 It should be noted though, since WTO uses a consensus-based decisionmaking process, loss 
of vote is more of a political issue rather than a technical one (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011).      
39 The Treaty of Rome only grants competence for trade in goods to the EU 
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The 2007 Lisbon Treaty introduced three major changes with regards to 
the EU’s trade policy. First, the increased & clarified powers for the EU; second, 
greater power for the EU Parliament (relative to other EU institutions); and third, 
the use of qualified majority voting for most trade issues (European Commission, 
2011). Increased and clarified power to the EU means that the Commission was 
given larger competence in trade, which covers trade in services, commercial 
aspects of intellectual property, public procurement, and foreign direct 
investments. By far, the most important change has been in the inclusion of FDI 
as an EU competence where previously, individual member states negotiated 
investment treaties on a bilateral basis. This change means that the EU needed 
to take into consideration the legal-political aspect of bilateral investment 
treaties, signed by individual member states before the Lisbon Treaty (Woolcock, 
2010). With this added area of competence, it seemed as if the EU had resolved 
its competence issues vis-à-vis its member states.  
However, as it turns out, these competence issues were once again 
tested in 2017 when the Commission finalised its FTA negotiations with 
Singapore, namely for investment provisions, when member states perceived 
that the EU’s competence only covered specific aspects of FDI while the 
Commission believed that it covered all aspects of FDI (Titievskaia, 2019). This 
resulted in another ECJ ruling, Opinion 2/15, which ruled that only FDI belongs 
to the EU’s exclusive competence, while portfolio investment & settlement of 
investment disputes are of mixed competence and hence, must be ratified 
individually by member states (Titievskaia, 2019). This decision also led to the 
separation of the FTA ratification process where the Commission sought to ‘fast-
track’ ratification through separate procedures for exclusive competence and 
shared competence policy areas (Wąsiński and Wnukowski, 2019). Prior to this, 
ratification of FTA agreements is done in order, where any FTAs that has a mixed 
competence component can be implemented only after all member states have 
ratified it. This meant that even if an FTA only has a small ‘mixed competence’ 
component in it, the whole FTA can only be put into force after all member states 
have ratified it, which may take some time to do. Since its introduction in 2018, 
this ‘dual-track’ ratification procedure has been implemented in three EU FTAs: 
the EU-Singapore, EU-Vietnam, and EU-Japan FTA agreements (Titievskaia, 
2019).        
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For institutions and policymaking, the EU Parliament now acts as a co-
legislator to the EU Council on trade matters and should routinely be reported to 
on the progress of trade negotiations. Furthermore, all trade regulations and 
trade agreements must pass through, and be approved by, the Parliament to be 
adopted, amended, or ratified by Council and member states. Prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty, trade policymaking authority was mostly an executive domain, shared 
between the Commission and the Council. The main reason for this is because 
trade is often considered to be a complex and technical policy area that requires 
actors with high levels of specialisation, such as technocrats, yet the parliament 
is often seen as merely ‘politicians’ who pay less attention to details and are more 
concerned with general aspects (Rosen, 2018). Furthermore, the Commission 
sees the Parliament as lacking the sufficient technical expertise to understand 
trade policy and is easily influenced by interest groups and lobbyists (Ellinas and 
Suleiman, 2012). Likewise, the Council has also been reluctant to let the 
Parliament into their bilateral trade policy ‘games’ with the Commission for 
various reasons (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2011).  
Since the implementation of Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament’s power has 
expanded and, in several occasions, the Parliament has exercised their power 
by rejecting or threatening to reject trade agreements proposed by the 
Commission. In 2012, the Parliament rejected the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) due to increased pressures from EU citizens, making it the 
first-ever rejection of international trade agreements by the EU parliament 
(European Parliament, 2012). As several scholars have argued, public opinion 
and interest groups have increasingly played an important role in the EU’s trade 
policymaking, and the EU Parliament is an important part of this (Dür and Mateo, 
2014; Dür et al., 2015). In fact, the EU parliament of the post-Lisbon era is 
considered to be more open and receptive to societal demands and has 
established itself as the ‘guardian of vulnerable groups’ who are negatively 
affected by FTAs (Richardson, 2012). Interviews conducted during this research 
also confirms this assertion, and a member of a trade-focused CSO affirms that 
the EU parliament is the most ‘responsive’ EU institution when it comes to public 
demands.40 Indeed, the increased role of the EU Parliament has introduced an 
 
40 Anonymous interview with representative from trade-focused civil society organisation in EU 
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interesting dynamic between the EU institutions as it incorporates the previously 
less-acknowledged public interests into the equation. 
For decision-making procedures, the Lisbon Treaty has also shifted 
decisionmaking procedures to mostly QMV with unanimity being used in specific 
circumstances. In practice, though, the Council generally works based on 
consensus, especially if the trade policy area is of mixed competence (Puccio, 
2016). However, in April 2019, the first incident of non-unanimous trade 
decisionmaking occurred when France and Belgium openly opposed the 
granting of a negotiation mandate to the Commission to re-open trade talks with 
the United States and yet, a mandate was still given (Walker, 2019). Other 
member states outvoted France and Belgium, and this is the first-ever QMV 
decision on trade taken by the Council, and can set a precedent for future trade 
decisionmaking procedures. 
Aside from member states and the EU institutions, trade decisionmaking 
in the EU also involves non-state actors such as CSOs and business entities. 
Since 1998, the Commission engages in Civil Society Dialogue on Trade (CSD), 
which is a multi-stakeholder platform used to discuss issues and progress 
relating to the EU’s trade policies and negotiations. Activities under this scheme 
include meetings on general trade policy, trade negotiations, Sustainability 
Impact Assessment (SIA), and CSD seminars (Directorate-General for Trade, 
2011). The Commission also sets up an Expert Group on Trade Agreements, 
consisting of multiple stakeholders including employers’ organisations, trade 
unions, representative associations, consumers groups, and other civil society 
organisations (European Commission, 2017b). In their 2015 Trade for All policy 
communication paper, the Commission lists transparency and a value-based 
approach as two of their core pillars in managing the EU’s trade, allowing 
increased involvement of civil society groups in order to increase the 
transparency and accountability of the trade negotiation process. The 
Commission also reports that in 2017, they held more than 20 meetings with civil 
society groups, mostly regarding trade negotiations that they are currently 
involved in (European Commission, 2018e). Due to the EU’s institutional set-up, 
non-state actors have the option to engage with the EU at either the national or 
regional level since they can lobby their national governments (who will channel 
this concern through the Council) or directly lobby the EU institutions. However, 
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this option will mostly depend on the CSOs’ resources and strategic choices. A 
study on business lobbying indicates that the largest spenders for business 
lobbying are Brussels-based lobbyists, accounting for around €427 million per 
year (Cooper et al., 2017), indicating that regional-level business players mostly 
dominate the EU’s trade decisionmaking process.         
In summary, the EU trade policymaking process has gradually shifted 
from the national capitals to the EU capital (the so-called ‘Brusselisation 
process’) where trade policy is mostly formulated at the EU level, and member 
states commit fewer resources to trade policymaking (Woolcock, 2012a). The 
increased role of the EU Parliament in trade policymaking also means that 
legislative scrutiny on trade deals has shifted from national parliaments to the 
EU parliament, which further strengthens the EU institutions. From a managerial 
point of view, this process has indeed simplified and centralised the EU’s trade 
decisionmaking throughout the years, making it more efficient over time 
although, from a political point of view, these changes have weakened member 
states’ power vis-à-vis the EU.   
5.2.2. Trade Decisionmaking in ASEAN 
With the absence of a supranational institution in the region, ASEAN’s 
decisions and policies are the results of collective compromise between its 
member states, and hence its trade decisionmaking authority still lies at the 
national level. While ASEAN countries do have a regional-level organisation, it 
is hardly a supranational one like the EU. In terms of trade authority, ASEAN 
Secretariat is in charge of supporting and facilitating ASEAN’s external economic 
relations, including assisting in preparing for meetings, formulating agendas, 
giving technical inputs and providing resource persons, if required.41 As one 
interviewee from the ASEAN Secretariat suggests, the name ASEAN Secretariat 
itself already indicates its role which is a secretary and thus, is not granted any 
authority to negotiate or undertake policies relating to trade since this is a 
national authority/competence.42 At the national level, trade authority belongs to 
the corresponding sectoral ministries, usually the Ministry of Trade, Industry, or 
Commerce. ASEAN member state’s Ministry of Trade and Industry acts as the 
 
41 Anonymous interview with official from ASEAN Secretariat  
42 Anonymous interview with official from ASEAN Secretariat 
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focal point for all trade negotiations on behalf of ASEAN and is in charge of 
coordinating with other sectoral ministries which are likely to be affected by FTA 
negotiations, such as the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Labour. 
However, the authority of ASEAN trade ministers is only limited to conducting 
actual negotiations rather than strategic policymaking in ASEAN’s external trade. 
The strategic authority to select negotiating partners and commence negotiations 
still relies on policies made by the head of states/governments with the help of 
their respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs.     
In ASEAN’s organisational and policymaking structure, the Ministers of 
Trade, Industry and/or Commerce are a part of the ASEAN Economic 
Community Council (AECC) which reports and coordinates with ASEAN 
Coordinating Council (composed of ASEAN’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs). 
ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) then prepares the relevant agenda and 
provides reports for the ASEAN Summit, which is a bi-annual meeting attended 
by ASEAN’s head of states/governments. Decisionmaking in ASEAN is also 
unidirectional, where the head of states direct, guide, and make decisions to be 
followed by other bodies. A graphical representation of ASEAN’s policymaking 
can be seen below:   
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Figure 5.1 ASEAN Policymaking Structure 
Source: Reproduced from Feraru (2015) 
 
Under this policymaking structure, strategic decisions can only be made 
and agreed on by head of states through the ASEAN Summit, while other bodies 
only have a reporting or coordinating function, as symbolised by the dashed line 
in the above figure. Trade issues which fall under the purview of the ASEAN 
Economic Community Council are merely an extension of decisions made by the 
head of states, with the corresponding ministries acting as executors. This type 
of decisionmaking significantly limits the authority of individual trade ministries to 
take initiatives and make strategic decisions in trade. Hence, while an individual 
ASEAN trade ministry has the authority to negotiate, they do not have the 
authority to make external trade commitments via ASEAN or to change what has 
been (externally) agreed on at the head-of-state level.  
With no central authority to determine the course of their trade relations, 
strategic decisions on trade are taken by the head of states during the ASEAN 
Summit. Relevant information, technical details, and general considerations 
regarding these decisions are usually prepared by relevant ministries and the 
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ASEAN Secretariat, before being finalised in the summit by the head of states. 
For their day-to-day trade decisionmaking, ASEAN relies on individual member 
states who each take turns to coordinate and manage external trade relations. 
In doing so, ASEAN assigns one country coordinator for each FTA partner who 
is in charge of handling communications, scheduling meetings and leading 
negotiations between ASEAN and their respective dialogue partners.43 However, 
as one interviewee states, the position of an FTA coordinator can sometimes be 
difficult as it also functions as a ‘middleman’ between ASEAN and external 
parties’.44 Since ASEAN’s decisionmaking practice tends to be top-down, where 
the head of states instruct technical ministries, not all ASEAN technical ministries 
are content with these arrangements and may sometimes postpone making real 
commitments.  
One interviewee from the ASEAN Ministry of Trade recalls a situation 
when the internal team needed to make multiple phone calls to their ASEAN 
counterparts because they felt that their counterparts were not responding well 
or fast enough. As a member of the FTA coordinator, the team needs to 
communicate the progress to external partners but at the same time, must 
maintain the impression that ASEAN is internally united which is difficult to do 
when other technical ministries are not fully on board.45  
Another example is during the initial stage of the ASEAN-Canada FTA in 
2018, when ASEAN member states’ trade officials were quite reluctant to follow 
it up since they were still focused on the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. Interviewees assert that communications and 
coordination between ASEAN trade officials became difficult because several 
trade officials seemed to slow the process down deliberately.46 While this ‘silent’ 
rejection never leads to anything major, it portrays a good picture of the mismatch 
between what ASEAN leaders aim for and what sectoral ministries can cope with. 
In the words of an ASEAN member states’ trade official:  
 
43 Anonymous interview with ASEAN Member state trade official  
44 Anonymous interview with ASEAN member state trade official 
45 Anonymous interview with ASEAN member state trade official 
46 Anonymous interview with ASEAN member state trade official  
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“I understand the reason why they (other member states’ trade officials) are 
reluctant to follow-up this trade agreement, but it has been agreed at the 
head of states’ meeting so what can we do but go on with it?”47  
 
This statement perfectly sums up ASEAN’s arrangement of trade authority, 
which is split between the head of states, who makes external commitments, and 
the technical ministries who actually negotiates the trade agreements. It also 
hints at the exclusion of non-state actors in ASEAN’s trade decisionmaking since 
it is mostly a unidirectional process which is typical of authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian states. 
Within ASEAN, regional-level CSOs and business associations that focus 
on trade are scarce, and even when they do exist, they are mostly an 
organisation set up by member states to play a specific role rather than a pure 
bottom-up entity. ASEAN provides an official guideline entitled ‘ASEAN 
Engagement with Entities’ that lists five types of entities that ASEAN engages 
with: parliamentarians & judiciary, business organisations, civil society 
organisations, think tanks & academic institutions, and other stakeholders in 
ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020). For trade issues, business institutions and 
trade-related CSOs are among the most important. ASEAN currently 
acknowledges 15 business organisations, two of which are business councils 
concerned with ASEAN’s economic relations with other states or group of 
states.48 Within the remaining 13, most of them were formed within 1976-1978 
to accompany the increased initiative of ASEAN economic integration (e.g. 
ASEAN Automotive Federation, ASEAN Bankers Association, ASEAN Insurance 
Council). Moreover, several of these organisations were formed by member 
states as a way to link government efforts with the private sectors (i.e. ASEAN 
Business Advisory Council, ASEAN Insurance Council). An online check on 
these business associations also shows that many of their listed websites are no 
longer available or has been inactive for at least two years, which makes it 
difficult to conclude whether these organisations still exist. This suggests that 
business entities who are associated with ASEAN are often created by or with 
 
47 Anonymous interview with ASEAN member state trade official 
48 These two business entities are the EU-ASEAN Business Advisory Council (EU-ASEAN BAC) 
and the US-ASEAN Business Advisory Council (US-ASEAN BAC) 
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governments and are not pure initiatives from the private sectors, which signals 
a low level of independent involvement by ASEAN private sectors.  
Further interviews with private sectors in ASEAN also confirm this low or 
near-absence level of involvement in trade decisionmaking. For example, 
interviews with business representatives in Indonesia and Vietnam suggest that 
the private sectors of these countries are only called when needed by the 
government or requested by negotiating partners and are mostly kept in the dark 
regarding the progress of trade negotiations.49 The only exception is Singapore, 
where an official from Singapore business association asserts that private 
sectors are regularly involved and updated on the progress of economic 
negotiations. In Singapore, private sectors are usually distributed with online 
questionnaires before any FTA negotiations. The government will then 
communicate their plans and ask for any concerns or suggestions from the 
private sectors, and this whole process alone can sometimes take up to six 
months in total.50 Nevertheless, Singapore may be an outlier here, given its 
historically strong and unique business-government relationship which may not 
be present in other ASEAN member states.51    
Like private sectors, CSOs’ involvement in trade decisionmaking of 
ASEAN is also practically non-existent since the presence of trade-related CSOs 
itself is rare in ASEAN. Trade-related CSOs are only available in several ASEAN 
countries, such as in Indonesia and the Philippines, and even in Indonesia only 
one CSO focuses specifically on trade. The interview with a representative from 
this CSO also confirms the limited involvement of CSOs in ASEAN’s trade 
decisionmaking although there is one exception.52 During two ASEAN FTA 
negotiations (e.g. ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA and RCEP), civil society 
organisations were invited and called in for opinions since ASEAN’s external 
partners request for their involvement. However, this is more of a one-off rather 
 
49 Anonymous interview with representatives from Indonesia and Vietnam business association 
50 Anonymous interview with representative from Singapore business association  
51 It should be noted that several ASEAN member states also have strong business-government 
relationships such as Indonesia, Malaysia or Thailand. However, the nature of these 
relationships tends to vary from one country to another with many of them leaning towards 
the oligarchic or oligopolistic relationship which limits the kind of business and personnels 
involved in the economy        
52 Anonymous interview with member of trade related CSO in ASEAN member state 
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than a regular process.53 Moreover, CSOs also rely significantly on who the lead 
negotiator is since different negotiators will have a different approach to CSO 
involvement. Due to this, CSOs have pushed for the creation of formalised 
mechanisms and regulations which can guarantee a larger degree of 
involvement for them. However, despite the constant requests from CSOs to 
amend the regulation, no substantial changes have been made so far.54  
Another interesting feature of ASEAN’s trade decisionmaking process is 
its strong linkage with the political and strategic decisionmaking structure. For 
example, ASEAN only negotiates FTA agreements with its dialogue partners 
who are chosen based on historical, political, and strategic considerations. All of 
ASEAN’s external partners are granted specific statuses based on the degree of 
relationships which includes: dialogue partner, sectoral dialogue partner, 
development partner, special observer and guest (ASEAN Secretariat, 2018b). 
Conferment of status by ASEAN, especially the dialogue partner, is based on 
long historical interactions, often dating back to decades of bilateral 
relationships. Historically, the conferment of even the least binding statuses, 
such as observer or guest, by ASEAN has always been a strategic or practical 
move and, in fact, since 1999, ASEAN has imposed a moratorium on dialogue 
partnerships with external partners (Thuzar, 2017). Up to date, ASEAN has listed 
ten countries as dialogue partners, four countries as sectoral dialogue partners, 
one country as a development partner, and one country as an observer (Thuzar, 
2017; ASEAN Secretariat, 2018a). Since all of ASEAN’s FTA partners are also 
dialogue partners, it is merely an extension of the existing cooperation 
frameworks already in place, meaning that in reality, ASEAN FTAs are ‘political-
economic agreements’, rather than pure FTAs.55 Furthermore, since ASEAN has 
imposed a moratorium on the status of ‘dialogue partner’ since 1999 (Thuzar, 
2017; Haacke and Breen, 2018), it seems that no further FTA negotiations can 
be conducted outside of those currently listed, thus limiting the FTA partners that 
ASEAN member states can have.  
 
53 Anonymous interview with member of trade related CSO in ASEAN member state 
54 Anonymous interview with member of trade related CSO in ASEAN member state 
55 Due to this, ASEAN FTAs are also referred to as ASEAN-plus FTAs since they link to the 
‘ASEAN-plus’ type political cooperation  
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Regarding its decisionmaking model, most scholars agree that ASEAN’s 
decision-making model is rooted in the ‘ASEAN Way’, a distinctive decision-
making practice of Southeast Asia, which combines a high degree of consultation 
(musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat). The ASEAN Way can be understood 
as the ‘process of regional interaction and cooperation based on discreetness, 
informality, consensus-building and non-confrontational bargaining’ which differs 
from the legalistic western model (Acharya, 2001). Legally, ASEAN Charter 
Article 20 states that: 
 
1. As a basic principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on 
consultation and consensus.  
2. Where consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN Summit may decide 
how a specific decision can be made.  
3. Nothing in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall affect the modes of 
decisionmaking as contained in the relevant ASEAN legal instruments.  
4. In the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the 
matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit decision. 
 
As the main method of decisionmaking, consensus is often considered to 
be both a blessing, since it manages to keep the organisation intact for more 
than five decades, and a curse, since it often leads to deadlocks when discussing 
crucial issues (Luqman, 2015). As a result, decisionmaking in ASEAN is often 
slow and time-consuming as all decisions require having a common position. As 
a subset of its external policies, trade policymaking in ASEAN also follows this 
model despite several adjustments. In Article 21 of the ASEAN Charter:  
 
1. Each ASEAN Community Council shall prescribe its own rules of 
procedure. 
2. In the implementation of economic commitments, a formula for flexible 
participation, including the ASEAN Minus X formula, may be applied 
where there is a consensus to do so.    
 
Under this regulation, ASEAN allows flexible participation in economic 
commitments or the ASEAN minus X formula, as long as all member states agree 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2007b). Flexible participation is 
implemented in both internal and external economic agreements of ASEAN and 
is generally the only exception that differentiates economic cooperation with 
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other areas of external cooperation. The logic behind this approach is in the high 
economic disparity between ASEAN member states and the need to 
accommodate different levels of economic development. However, from the 
perspective of external parties, flexible participation often adds extra problems 
to economic cooperation since they could be faced with ten different situations 
and positions, compared to just one. In 2006, ASEAN utilised the ASEAN-minus-
X principle during the ASEAN-Korea FTA, when other member states allowed 
Thailand to opt out of the agreement, due to South Korea’s refusal to include rice 
in the exclusion list (Associated Press, 2007). Thailand later joined in 2009 after 
further negotiations with South Korea (Bangkok Post, 2008). In 2017, Philippines 
also suggested to implement this principle to fast-track the RCEP negotiations, 
seeing that the parties involved were having difficulties to reach agreements 
(Pillas, 2017).            
This decisionmaking model, coupled with ASEAN’s institutional structure, 
means that trade decisionmaking in ASEAN is generally complex and time-
consuming.  Consensus is, by design, more time-consuming compared to other 
decisionmaking models such as voting. Even more so, a consensus in economic 
issues tends to be more complex due to the various sectors, codes, details, and 
schedules56 that need to be synchronised between ASEAN member states 
themselves, and between ASEAN and its external parties. Furthermore, the use 
of FTA coordinators in managing ASEAN’s external economic relations means 
that the quality of management will be dependent on the country that is in charge 
and may differ from one partner to another. As one research interviewee 
observes, it is evident that several ASEAN member states are more capable of 
organising meetings, convening panels and leading discussions towards 
consensus compared to others, which inevitably, affects trade negotiations.57  
In short, ASEAN decisionmaking in trade is mostly a state-driven process 
where national players play dominant roles, and although several ASEAN 
member states are considered semi-democratic countries, trade decisionmaking 
 
56 For example, in negotiations on tariff reductions for goods, countries classify commodities 
based on a harmonized system (HS) code composed of six-digit numbers that corresponds 
to the commodity.     
57 Anonymous interview with former EU negotiator involved in EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations 
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in ASEAN still follows a rigid top-down structure, with a minimum role for non-
state actors.   
5.3. Trade Negotiations in the EU and ASEAN  
Negotiation here is defined as both internal negotiations within the EU and 
ASEAN’s member states and external negotiations between the EU/ASEAN and 
its external partners.                
5.3.1. Trade Negotiations in the EU  
In managing trade relations with external parties, the EU lists three types 
of trade agreements: (a) customs unions (CU) which seeks to eliminate customs 
duties and create joint custom; (b) association agreements (AA),  stabilisation 
agreements (SA), FTAs & economic partnership agreements (EPA) which aim 
to reduce or remove customs tariffs in bilateral trade and; (c) partnership and 
cooperation agreements (PCA) that focus on developing a general framework 
for bilateral economic relations without changing any tariffs or customs duties 
(European Commission, 2018f). As the names and definitions suggest, these 
agreements play a different role in trade and economic cooperation, with 
Association Agreements and FTAs being the most common one (Ahearn, 2011). 
However, since the EU has no ‘model FTA’ in negotiations, the content of FTAs 
is likely to vary from one partner to another (Woolcock, 2007). 
As the EU’s sole negotiator, the Commission via DG Trade leads all of the 
EU’s trade negotiations except for agricultural issues where DG Agriculture takes 
the lead (Woolcock, 2012a). In managing these negotiations, the Commission 
usually undergoes various steps, often consisting of more than 30 stages 
including preparing, negotiating, finalising, signing, decisionmaking, application, 
conclusion, and entry into force (European Commission, 2018e). The 
preparation stage involves impact assessment, public consultation, and getting 
authorisation from the Council before entering the actual negotiation stage. The 
finalising and signing stages consist of legal tasks such as legal review, text 
translation and obtaining relevant signatures. The next stage is the co-
decisionmaking process by the Council and the Parliament to approve/reject the 
agreement before deciding on the application process of the agreements 
(whether it is a full or provisional application and if it includes ‘mixed agreement’ 
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components). Conclusion and entry into force is the final stage where the EU 
publishes the final agreement and puts it into force. The overall negotiation 
process may take several years to complete and DG Trade is required to consult 
and update on the progress of the negotiations to the Council and the Parliament, 
and at the same time, receive inputs from other stakeholders such as business 
and civil society organisations.      
 
Table 5.2 Stages of Activities in the EU’s Trade Negotiations 
Stage Types of Activities Involved 
Preparing - Analysing a deal’s likely impact 
- Consulting the public 
- Setting out areas to negotiate 
- Getting the Council authorization 
Negotiating - Holding trade talks 
- Reporting to the Council & the Parliament  
- Publishing texts online 
Finalising - Signing the negotiation text 
- Legal review and formatting  
Signing - Translating the text 
- Checking by the Commission departments 
- Formally asking for EU signature  
Decision-making The Council & the Parliament jointly deciding whether 
to approve 
Full or provisional application Depending on whether responsibility for the deal’s 
content lies solely with EU institutions or jointly with 
EU states 
For ‘mixed’ agreements only Ratifying in EU countries, using their own procedure   
Conclusion Signing by partner country(ies); Publishing in the 
EU’s Official Journal  
Entry into force  
 Source: European Commission, 2018a 
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During these negotiations, the team is led by a chief negotiator (usually 
from DG Trade), who sets up negotiation schedules and determines the location 
of negotiations, typically alternating between the EU and the third party’s 
location. As an ‘agent’ of its member states, the EU is required to speak with a 
single voice and defend the position of its ‘principals’ without straying too far from 
the agreed line since the EU negotiators work based on the negotiation mandate 
given by the Council which sets out the specific authority allowed by its member 
states. However, there have been instances where the Commission is deemed 
to have either strayed or gone beyond their competence, such as during the 1990 
Brussels GATT Ministerial Meeting where the Commission was considered to 
have given more concessions on agricultural issues than the member states 
were willing to accept (Bayne and Woolcock, 2012). Furthermore, due to several 
preference divergences between member states, the Commission has been able 
to increase their agency power and autonomous capacity to act (Elsig, 2007), 
which illustrates a classic problem in agent-principal relationships.58 This 
situation can happen since, in actual negotiations, member state representatives 
are usually not present, and the Commission is expected to coordinate their 
position and provide updates to the member states representatives before 
starting another negotiation session. However, national representatives are likely 
to be present when the issues being discussed are considered important and 
during final negotiating sessions where key bargaining and issue linkages are 
most likely to happen (Woolcock, 2012a). 
For FTA negotiations, the duration will vary according to the partner and 
content of negotiation, but can generally take 2-3 years or longer (Nilsson, 2018).  
Comparing the EU and the US on similar partners and negotiations, the EU took 
an average of 2,5 to 3 years to complete negotiations whereas the US took 1,5 
to 2 years. Moreover, the signing of negotiations took 1,5 years for the EU and 
six months for the US, while the ‘entry into force’ took about two years for both 
the EU and the US (Nilsson, 2018). Generally, the EU’s duration of signing is 
three times that of the US due to its institutional set-up which requires 
authorisation from both the Council and the Parliament, in addition to member 
states’ national parliaments if it includes a mixed agreement component. 
 
58 Agent-principal problem refers to the probability of an agent to act on their own interest which 
may be different from its principal’s interest     
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However, the EU’s dual-track ratification process, which started in 2018 is likely 
to speed up this process and put agreements into force at a faster rate than 
before.          
In terms of the levels of engagement, the EU engages in various ‘venues’ 
or levels which includes doing negotiations bilaterally, plurilaterally, and 
multilaterally. EU bilateral negotiations include concluding trade agreements with 
individual third countries or group of countries through region-to-region 
arrangements, such as with ASEAN or Mercosur, while plurilateral negotiations 
are exclusive negotiations (limited membership) with like-minded countries on 
specific topics, such as the WTO’s Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and 
Agreement on Government Procurement. Multilateral negotiations are non-
exclusive (open membership) negotiations done under the auspices of the WTO 
and each of this venue offers different benefits, and thus, players often need to 
choose which best fits their interests. 
Generally speaking, plurilateral agreements are never a priority for the EU 
since its policy areas and membership are rather limited and offers little 
commercial benefits compared to bilateral and multilateral ones. This position is 
stated in several of their official documents, including in their latest trade 
communication paper. In the 2017 trade communication paper: A Balanced and 
Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalisation, the EU states that it is 
‘committed to open trade anchored in the rules-based multilateral trading system’ 
and that ‘the EU seeks out partners who want to team up to build open and 
progressive rules for the realities of 21st-century trade, and thereby strengthen 
global governance’ (European Commission, 2017a). At the same time, the EU 
also seeks to open up new markets by pursuing ‘a comprehensive negotiating 
agenda at both multilateral and bilateral levels to secure reciprocal market 
access’ (European Commission, 2017a).  
On paper, this ambition is a well-intended one, where multiple bilateral 
trade agreements may function as the ‘building blocks’ for a final multilateral 
trade agreement through the WTO. However, this may be different in practice 
since not all bilateral agreements are similar, and thus, may be difficult to be 
brought up to the multilateral level. Also, since the EU only chooses specific 
countries or regions for its negotiation partners, it will likely take an extended 
amount of time before a global agreement can be reached. In the communication 
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paper, the EU lists ‘future growth engines’ in Asia and South America as its 
targeted partners, specifically for several countries and two regional 
organisations: ASEAN and Mercosur, which reflect the EU’s larger commercial 
goals and not merely its support for the multilateral trading regime.   
In a way, the EU is caught between two of its goals in trade diplomatic 
relations: the need to uphold its ‘obligation’ to the WTO and at the same time, to 
maintain its global competitiveness relative to other partners. Initially, bilateralism 
was not the EU’s preferred choice since the EU sees itself as a supporter of the 
multilateral trading system. In 1999, the EU even imposed a moratorium on 
bilateral trade negotiations, choosing to prioritise  the multilateral venue and 
considering the region-to-region approach as the second-best option (Elsig, 
2007). However, it soon became evident that this option was not sustainable 
since, despite the EU’s focus on WTO negotiations, it was struggling to influence 
WTO’s negotiation. At the same time, its existing FTAs did not bring enough 
commercial gains and more importantly, other countries were pursuing FTAs 
while the EU was restraining itself (Woolcock, 2009). There were also growing 
pressures from the EU’s domestic economic players, who felt that they were 
losing out to their competitors (Woll, 2007; Elsig and Dupont, 2012), leading to 
the abolishment of this moratorium. As a result, in October 2006, the EU 
launched the ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’ strategy paper, where it 
once again welcomed the bilateral channel in their trade negotiations, stating that 
both multilateralism and bilateralism are crucial in ensuring the EU’s economic 
competitiveness (Commission of the European Communities, 2006). 
Under this new trade strategy, the EU adopted a more aggressive stance 
on bilateral trade policy and introduced the EU’s ‘new generation’ FTAs, covering 
deeper and more comprehensive FTAs that targeted several specific 
countries/regions including South Korea, ASEAN, Mercosur, India, Russia and 
Gulf Cooperation Council (Commission of the European Communities, 2006). 
While the EU’s ‘first generation’ FTAs focused more on tariff elimination, its new 
generation FTAs covered newer trade issues including trade in services, public 
procurement, and intellectual property rights. Following this, the EU switched 
more to bilateral agreements, especially with Asian countries (Elsig, 2007; 
Heydon and Woolcock, 2009). Since the EU revitalised its bilateral trade strategy 
in 2006, it has completed at least ten FTAs under this scheme and is currently 
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under negotiations with at least nine other partners (European Commission, 
2019j). In total, the EU currently has 41 free trade agreements, covering 75 
partner countries (European Commission, 2019c), which shows the EU’s 
aggressive approach in trade bilateralism.      
 
 
Figure 5.2 The State of the EU Trade (as of 2019) 
Source: European Commission (2019b)  
 
In contrast to the EU’s bilateral stance, its position on trade multilateralism 
seems to have been weakening in recent years, and despite the EU’s continued 
support for trade multilateralism through the WTO, the progress and future of 
trade multilateralism remain bleak. Since the stagnation of the Doha Round, the 
EU has been active in promoting the modernisation of the WTO, centred around 
three key issues: updating the international trading rules to capture the current 
global economy, strengthening WTO’s monitoring role, and overcoming the 
deadlock in the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism (European Commission, 
2018b). In taking these objectives into actions, the EU has developed 
partnerships with other countries such as Japan, China, the US, and the G-20 
countries. The EU also presented a concept paper on the WTO’s modernisation 
in 2018, where it listed actions needed to reform the WTO, including creating 
rules that ‘rebalance the system and levels the playing field’, establishing new 
rules to address service and investment barriers, and lastly, including 
P a g e  | 136 
 
sustainability in the WTO’s trade agenda (European Commission, 2018a). 
However, these efforts remain rather fruitless considering that no major changes 
occurred in the WTO, and in fact, the WTO is currently facing one of its largest 
crises after its Appellate Body came to a halt in December 2019 having  not met 
the minimum quorum required for reviewing appeals.59 This happened after the 
US blocked the appointment of new Appellate Body members, stating that the 
Appellate Body has often overstepped its power and thus, puts the US at a 
disadvantage (Beattie, 2019). Since Donald Trump came into power, the US has 
effectively rejected every single nomination for Appellate body member since he 
believes that ‘the United States loses cases because other countries have most 
of the judges’ (Miles, 2018). 
Considering the stagnation of the Doha Round, the US’s unilateral action 
that has crippled the Appellate Body, and the fact that this body is currently the 
largest global trade dispute mechanism, it is safe to assume that trade 
multilateralism is currently at its lowest point despite the EU’s continued support 
for it. The point is that although the EU may legally state its continued support 
for the WTO in its documents, the reality is that trade multilateralism is not the 
EU’s best choice for trade engagement level which explains why the EU 
aggressively pursues trade bilateralism. Furthermore, since there is no evidence 
that trade bilateralism may eventually lead to larger multilateralism, it is safe to 
assume that the EU has favoured bilateralism over multilateralism since the mid-
2000s as demonstrated by its numerous FTA agreements.   
5.3.2. Trade Negotiations in ASEAN 
As the previous section on ASEAN’s trade decisionmaking process has 
elaborated, ASEAN’s FTAs are closely linked to its political/strategic ties, and 
thus, political cooperation is the starting point for all ASEAN FTAs. Following an 
informal agreement by the head of states to engage in FTA negotiations, further 
instructions will be given to the member states’ senior economic ministers and 
the ASEAN Secretariat for a follow-up and a joint feasibility study.60 The result of 
 
59 The WTO Appellate Body requires a minimum of three members to review an appeal and 
since two of the member’s tenure ended in December 2019 and no new members have been 
appointed, it effectively halted the WTO’s dispute settlement system.   
60 It should be noted though that the joint feasibility study is more of a formality rather than an 
actual one since it always generates positive results and even if it does generate negative 
ones, this is unlikely to change the initial commitment to start FTA negotiations.   
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this study will then be presented to the head of states, and the formal start date 
of negotiation will be officially announced, usually during the ASEAN Summit. 
Once it is agreed that the negotiations will proceed, ASEAN member states will 
create a Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC), consisting of the representatives 
from the ten member states. Once the TNC is formed, they will develop 
guidelines for negotiations which they will submit to their respective technical 
ministers and after these guidelines are approved, TNCs will start creating 
working groups to discuss specific issues of the negotiation.61  
During the actual negotiation, ASEAN is represented by ten individual 
member states with one representative from the country coordinator, leading the 
delegation. Negotiations by ASEAN are generally more complex than the EU 
since they require having a common regional position before every negotiation. 
It means that in every stage of negotiations, ASEAN member states need to 
simultaneously consider and consult their domestic, regional, and extra-regional 
stakeholders which significantly limits their choices and increases negotiation 
times and complexities. At the domestic level, ASEAN member states need to 
consider the position of domestic stakeholders particularly other technical 
ministries such as Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Small-
Medium Enterprise etc. and must ensure that agreements are in line with their 
interests. Internal ministries are perhaps the most important domestic 
stakeholders since ASEAN’s trade negotiations rarely include non-state actors. 
Although there were special cases where third parties requested the involvement 
of business or civil society organisations, such as during AANZFTA and RCEP 
negotiations, these businesses and CSOs were never notified on the progress 
of negotiations, meaning that the impact and follow-ups of their involvement were 
never clear.62  
Adding to the challenges of always needing to have a common regional 
position in every negotiation, is the fact that ASEAN member states also often 
engage in parallel negotiations, or state-to-state trade agreements, with a similar 
partner(s) outside of the ASEAN framework. For example, Japan currently has 
an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with ASEAN as a region and at the 
 
61 Anonymous interview with ASEAN Member States’ trade official  
62 Anonymous interview with representatives from business associations and CSO in ASEAN 
member states 
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same time has seven bilateral EPAs with individual ASEAN member states. 
India, Australia, and China also display similar patterns and the EU are likely to 
follow this trend having concluded negotiations with Singapore and Vietnam, and 
at the same time, having started negotiations with the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
re-opening one with ASEAN. In total, almost all ASEAN member states, except 
for Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, have at least one state-to-state agreement 
with their external partners, in addition to those initiated by ASEAN (Asia 
Regional Integration Center, 2018).     
 
 
Figure 5.3 ASEAN and ASEAN Member States’ FTAs with External Partners 
Source: Compiled from Asia Regional Integration Center (2018) 
 
 The main problem with these parallel negotiations is that it is inefficient for 
ASEAN member states since they need to negotiate twice with a similar 
partner(s) and agree on two different legal texts. Although the governments see 
this as a positive thing since it provides multiple instruments for private sectors 
to choose from and gain trade preferences,63 these multiple FTA are deemed 
unnecessary by private sectors since what they prefer is a single comprehensive 
 
63 Anonymous interview with ASEAN Member States’ trade official 
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FTA with each partner, rather than having to choose between multiple FTAs for 
one partner.64 Furthermore, parallel negotiations provide leeway for ASEAN 
member states to have an alternative negotiation avenue outside of the ASEAN 
scheme, thus jeopardizing ASEAN’s coherence in trade negotiations. Since 
member states will always have the option to negotiate further issues individually 
with an external partner(s), they will have fewer incentives to agree collectively 
through ASEAN. The only exception to this will be if any ASEAN member state 
negotiates individual FTAs prior to negotiating collective ASEAN FTAs, thus 
limiting the probability of gaining additional benefits outside of the ASEAN 
scheme. However, early individual negotiations may also be problematic since if 
individual FTAs already offer comprehensive agreements, member states would 
have even fewer incentives to start any collective negotiations through ASEAN.      
In terms of agreement ratification, ASEAN also differs with the EU since 
ASEAN FTAs require ratification by each member states individually. Differences 
in the law and system of governance mean that ASEAN member states will differ 
on how they adopt international agreements, including free trade agreements, 
into their domestic law. Depending on their legal system, several countries may 
require ratification of FTAs by their parliaments such as in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines, while other countries require no ratification at all like 
Singapore. On average, the ratification process in individual ASEAN countries 
will roughly take around five months or up to one year, depending on the 
agreement (Malaysia Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 2009), which 
can be considered relatively short compared to the EU.65 In part, this is also due 
to ASEAN member states’ political systems where many of them adopt 
authoritarianism, and thus, do not face any significant challenges from their 
legislative bodies.     
For trade negotiation levels, ASEAN currently only engages in two venues 
of negotiations: the bilateral and plurilateral level. Bilateral negotiations have 
been completed with China, Japan, India, South Korea, Hongkong and Australia-
 
64 Anonymous interview with representative from business association in ASEAN member state 
65 The shortest time required for full ratification by all ASEAN member states is the ASEAN-India 
FTA which takes around five months, while the longest one is ASEAN-China FTA and 
ASEAN-Republic of Korea FTA which takes roughly about a year.   
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New Zealand.66 Plurilateral negotiation is conducted under the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) framework, which is currently 
under progress and is expected to be completed by the end of 2020. Looking at 
this number, all of ASEAN’s current FTAs were completed under the bilateral 
frameworks with plurilateral scheme still in progress. The RCEP negotiation itself 
may also prove to be problematic after India’s withdrawal from the negotiation 
during the RCEP Summit in November 2019. Although this does not mean that 
RCEP negotiations are likely to stop, India’s withdrawal from the negotiation was 
a major blow since it is currently the world’s second-largest market after China. 
With India’s withdrawal, RCEP now only accounts for around 30% of the world 
population (from previously over 50%) and less than 30% of the world economy 
(from previously 39%) (Ribka and Yulisman, 2016; Tani, 2020). Nevertheless, 
RCEP will still be ASEAN’s biggest test in plurilateral negotiations since it is the 
first and the only plurilateral FTA that ASEAN has so far.   
For multilateral negotiations, ASEAN does not engage in collective 
negotiation at any trade multilateral forums since its member states still negotiate 
individually in the WTO. The main reason for this is the large economic 
differences between ASEAN member states which makes it ineffective for them 
to negotiate as a group, and hence, ASEAN member states opt to form trade 
coalitions with other countries rather than with their ASEAN counterparts.67 For 
example, the positions of ASEAN member states differ greatly on agricultural 
sectors since it is a sensitive commodity for several ASEAN countries like 
Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam but are irrelevant for 
Singapore who does not own any agricultural land. Furthermore, since ASEAN 
has no common external tariff, engaging in collective negotiation in the WTO 
makes little sense for its member states, especially since ASEAN requires 
achieving a common position for every negotiation.  
In sum, similar to its trade decisionmaking process, ASEAN’s negotiation 
process is a state-driven process involving multiple levels of negotiations 
(domestic, regional, and extra-regional) coupled with multiple parallel 
negotiations outside of the ASEAN scheme. ASEAN also uses a country 
 
66 Although Australia-New Zealand (ANZ) are two countries, the negotiation is done collectively 
and simultaneously, so is more appropriate to be classified as bilateral negotiation   
67 Anonymous interview with ASEAN member state’s trade official 
P a g e  | 141 
 
coordinator system to manage its relationship with external partners, and like the 
EU, ASEAN also prefers bilateralism over other levels of engagement.   
5.4. Comparing the EU and ASEAN’s Processes in Trade Diplomacy 
Looking at the EU and ASEAN’s processes in trade diplomacy, a 
comparison between the two organisations’ can be summarised below:  
Table 5.3 Comparison of the EU and ASEAN’s Processes in Trade Diplomacy 
Main Component EU ASEAN 
Decisionmaking 
Decisionmaking model Led by EU institutions; 
Unanimity & QMV  
Led by member states; 
Unanimity only 
Involvement of non-state 
actors 
Availability of formal 
mechanism 





Allows flexible participation 
in external trade relations 
No Yes 
Negotiation 
Lead Negotiator DG Trade  Country coordinator  
Negotiation model  Two-level game Three-level game 
Allows parallel 
negotiations outside of RO 
No Yes 
Negotiation levels Preference for bilateralism Preference for bilateralism 
 
As the table shows, the EU and ASEAN are different in almost all aspects of their 
trade diplomatic process and only similar in one: their preference for bilateralism 
in managing external trade relations.   
5.4.1. Explaining Differences in the EU and ASEAN’s Trade Diplomatic Process 
In explaining differences in the EU and ASEAN’s processes in trade 
diplomacy, two main causes can be identified. First, the existence of a trade-
focused supranational institution in the EU and the absence of one in ASEAN 
and second, differences in their depth of economic integration. Each of these 
determinants will be discussed below.  
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5.4.1.1. Effects of Trade-Focused SNI on Trade Decisionmaking and 
Negotiation 
Debates on the origins, practicalities, and limitations of supranational 
institutions were concerns of the first wave regionalism theorists. The first wave 
of regionalism theory or ‘old regionalism’ is mostly sceptical of the nation-state 
and views the state as the problem rather than the solution, and hence, posits 
that the best way is to ‘go beyond the state’ (Hettne, 2005). Central to the debate 
is the role of state and sovereignty, thus establishing a distinction between the 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism schools of thought in the old 
regionalism debate (Wunderlich, 2012a). Supranationalism aims at limiting the 
state’s sovereignty through the creation of regional institutions which supersede 
nation-states while intergovernmentalism tends to emphasise and centralise the 
nation state’s sovereignty in regionalism projects. While critics have pointed out 
that regional projects will often incorporate both models rather than just one 
(Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001) and that an oversimplification of supranationalism 
versus intergovernmentalism debate should be avoided, several aspects of 
regionalism projects can still be explained through the supranationalism versus 
intergovernmental lens, such as in the case of trade diplomacy.  
In explaining the differences between the EU and ASEAN’s processes in 
trade diplomacy, this research finds that the design of regional integration 
significantly affects how the EU and ASEAN behave, particularly in managing 
their external trade relations. The most noticeable difference between a 
supranational and an intergovernmental model of integration is clearly in the 
presence of a supranational institution (SNI), in which the EU is a clear example 
of one and ASEAN is not. When applied to processes in trade diplomacy, 
supranationalism means that the EU has an institution beyond the state that is 
in charge of managing external trade and member states surrender parts of its 
sovereignty and authoritative power to this institution. For member states, having 
an institution like the EU means that they must give up their authority to make 
independent trade policy and surrender this power to the EU, albeit with several 
exceptions.68 For the EU, DG Trade plays this role, with the continuous 
 
68 Exceptions here refers to trade policy areas which fall within the mixed competence of the EU 
such as audio-visual and education services.   
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monitoring process from its member states through the Council and the 
Parliament. The EU’s choice to create a supranational institution in trade was a 
deliberate one, which separates them from ASEAN’s institutional design. 
Contrary to the EU, ASEAN opts for an intergovernmental model, 
meaning that its trade diplomacy is driven by individual member states, acting 
together to manage their collective external trade relations. While ASEAN 
Secretariat does exist, it is in no way influential in affecting its trade diplomacy. 
In other words, a trade-focused supranational institution is present in the EU and 
is absent in ASEAN, which affects how trade authority is distributed between 





Figure 5.4 Illustration of the EU and ASEAN’s Distribution of Authority in Trade 
Diplomacy 
 
One major consequence of establishing a trade-focused supranational 
institution is that regional players will be more dominant compared to national-
level ones since they hold more, or at least equal power, vis-à-vis member states. 
As Section 5.2.1. shows, the EU’s trade policymaking process has shifted to 
become more centralised throughout the years, leading to the “Brusselisation’ of 
the EU trade policy. Alongside the EU’s centralisation of trade policy is the ‘fast-
tracking’ process of its trade agreements, where the Commission introduced a 
dual-track approval procedure to speed-up the EU’s FTA ratification process to 
prevent individual member states from blocking the EU’s trade agreements 
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(Wąsiński and Wnukowski, 2019). This decision further weakens the centrality of 
member states in the EU’s trade decisionmaking process. While there are, 
indeed, several channels for national players to affect the EU’s trade diplomatic 
process, their influence is limited compared to regional-level players.  
Furthermore, multiple levels of trade governance, such as in the EU, tend 
to open up more opportunities for players to be involved since they have multiple 
channels to influence policy outcomes. As Section 5.2.1. illustrates, private 
sectors and CSOs in the EU can lobby both the EU and their national 
governments since member states can still exert power over the EU through the 
Council, although this may not be the most effective method for them. Regional 
players in the EU also have the option to form business coalitions among 
themselves (i.e. Business Europe or Eurochambres), adding weight to their 
demands, which is unlikely to happen in ASEAN. 
Contrary to the EU, ASEAN’s choice of intergovernmental model means 
that regional players are practically irrelevant in their trade diplomacy since 
member states take centre stage. Technical ministries represent member states 
externally and negotiate on behalf of their respective states, meaning that 
discrepancies are more likely to happen between individual member states 
rather than between regional institution vis-à-vis member states such as in the 
EU. Furthermore, domination by member states also means that non-
governmental players can only have one channel to influence trade policy, which 
is through their national governments and this may not work well if their 
respective country adopts an authoritarian regime which is the case for many 
ASEAN countries. Section 5.2.2. highlights this by drawing examples of the 
limited participation by private sectors and CSOs in ASEAN’s decisionmaking 
process, and that even when they are involved, it is due to requests by the third 
party and within a monitored participation. For all ASEAN member states except 
Singapore, no formal mechanism of trade interest articulation is present, and 
even if there are some forms of communication, it is mostly an informal one or 
on an ad hoc basis. From a private sector and civil society perspective, it makes 
no sense for them to lobby regional bodies such as ASEAN Secretariat, since it 
adds no value to their cause which explains why no regional level lobby groups 
or trade-focused CSOs can be found in ASEAN.  
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Another consequence of having a trade-focused supranational institution 
in trade diplomacy is in their role during trade negotiations, where they are likely 
to be in charge of external trade negotiations. For the EU, the existence of DG 
Trade means that first, DG Trade will initiate any decisionmaking process relating 
to external trade and second it will take the lead in any trade negotiations with 
third parties, as mandated by Article 207 of TFEU. In contrast, since a trade-
focused supranational institution is not present in ASEAN, any trade 
decisionmaking in ASEAN will generally be initiated by the head of states, and a 
designated country coordinator will act as a lead negotiator in every external 
trade negotiation by ASEAN. Furthermore, since no external trade authority is 
being transferred to a higher institution in ASEAN, trade decisionmaking tends 
to follow the generally accepted model of the ASEAN Way, where consensus 
and consultation between member states prevail and thus tends to slow the 
negotiation. Although the EU’s overall trade negotiation process can be lengthy 
as well, the organization has managed to cut several processes down, 
particularly in national interest aggregation since DG Trade functions as an 
aggregator for multiple national interests. Perhaps, the most important 
consequence of trade-focused SNI for trade negotiation is on how trade-focused 
SNIs can simplify the level of negotiations by collating multiple countries’ win-
sets and present them as one to external parties.  
The EU is an example of a national interest ‘aggregator’ where DG Trade 
represents member states’ collective trade interests after taking into account the 
multiple national interests in trade affairs. Although in practice, internal 
bargaining within the EU may happen simultaneously at national, regional, extra-
regional, and even sub-national level, once DG Trade received a negotiation 
mandate/directive from the Council, the national-level win-sets are eliminated (or 
shifted) into regional win-sets which  are used as the basis for negotiations with 
external parties (Woolcock, 2012a). Even in situations where adjustments are 
needed, these can only be made to regional win-sets rather than national ones 
in order to be able to have real effects for external negotiations with a third party. 
Changes in the EU’s executive process relating to trade, which have resulted in 
a shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting, also strengthen this ‘regional 
win-sets’ formulation, where it becomes more difficult for one or two countries to 
block the signing or granting of negotiation directives to the Commission. 
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Moreover, the EU’s introduction of the ‘fast-track’ ratification process further 
reduces the influence of national players in FTA implementation since only trade 
policy areas of mixed competence require national-level ratification, meaning 
that for everything else, only approval and ratification by the EU-level institutions 
are required.  
Considering that a larger portion of EU FTAs is of exclusive competence 
rather than mixed, this decision practically strengthens the nature of the EU’s 
two-level game in negotiation. This means that for the EU, once negotiation 
mandate is received, it is set to engage in a two-level game of negotiations 
(except for a small percentage of FTA content which falls under the area of mixed 
competence), which  from an external point of view, minimises negotiation 
complexities and increases the likelihood to achieve agreements since only two 
win-sets need to overlap. Although during negotiations, the Commission also 
needs to consider the likelihood of refusal to ratify by the EU parliament, these 
still counts as ‘regional win-sets’ since for it to be applicable, more than half of 
the EU parliamentarians need to agree. Put differently, for the EU’s regional win-
sets to be affected by any national win-sets, the respective member state(s) must 
gain at least 55% of support from the EU’s total member states, representing at 
least 65% of the EU’s population, or obtain more than 50% of votes in 
parliament.69     
On the other hand, intergovernmental organisations like ASEAN will 
always engage in three-level game negotiations since no supranational 
institution or formal mechanism is present to simplify the process of formulating 
regional win-sets. Contrary to the EU, where the granting of a negotiation 
mandate ‘authorises’ the merge of multiple national win-sets into one regional 
win-sets, ASEAN does not have any mechanisms of this sort, meaning that its 
regional win-sets will always remain adjustable and fluid depending on individual 
member states’ national win-sets. In every FTA negotiation, representatives from 
ten ASEAN member states are always present, and need to achieve a common 
position before engaging in (or continuing) negotiations with external partners.70 
This means that in every FTA negotiation, ASEAN negotiators are dealing with 
 
69 This calculation is based on the EU’s standard qualified majority voting rules for decisions 
taken in the Council and simple majority rule for decisions taken in the EU parliament.   
70 Anonymous interview with ASEAN Member States’ trade official   
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three sets of win-sets simultaneously. In other words, if, during a negotiation, 
even just one ASEAN member state feels that the external FTA agreement falls 
outside of their national win-sets, they may cancel their engagement directly, and 
the whole agreement can collapse.  
This is unlikely to happen in the EU since refusal by one EU member state 
can only have an impact only if it happens either before the negotiation mandate 
is given or after external negotiation is completed (through a refusal of ratification 
by the EU or national parliament). Although in practice EU member states can 
request a suspension or withdrawal of ongoing trade negotiations, they still need 
to acquire a majority of approval from other member states, as stipulated by 
Article 218 of TFEU.71      
From an external parties’ point of view, ASEAN’s negotiation procedures 
are more complicated since more wins-sets (and levels) are involved meaning 
that it is more difficult to reach agreements. For example, during the initial EU-
ASEAN FTA negotiations, one EU negotiator highlighted the difficulties in 
reaching agreements with ASEAN due to the multiple different positions between 





71 Article 218 TFEU states that “The Council shall act by a qualified majority throughout the 
procedure”  
72 Anonymous interview with former EU negotiator involved in EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations    











Figure 5.5 Illustration of the EU and ASEAN’s Multi-Level-Game in Trade Negotiations 
 
As per the illustration above, the existence of a trade-focused SNI in the 
EU eliminates one level of negotiation since the granting of a negotiation 
mandate to DG Trade from member states shifts Level I (regional negotiation 
between internal member states) to Level II negotiations (regional negotiations 
between DG Trade and member states) which means that, effectively, DG Trade 
only engages with member states and third parties simultaneously. Although DG 
Trade often also needs to negotiate with other DGs (Larsén, 2007), this is more 
of an intra-level negotiation, rather than inter-level negotiation, and thus, does 
not add any new level of negotiation. For ASEAN, however, negotiators 
simultaneously need to negotiate on three levels (as illustrated) therefore making 
negotiations more complex. 
5.4.1.2. Effects of Depth of Economic Integration on Trade Decisionmaking 
and Negotiation 
The second determinant relating to differences in the EU and ASEAN’s 
processes in trade diplomacy is their differences in the depth or degree of 
economic integration, specifically on whether that regionalism project forms a 
customs union or not. Balassa (1961) defines economic integration as a process 
consisting of ‘measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic 
units belonging to different national states’, viewed as a state of affairs 
represented by ‘the absence of various forms of discrimination between national 
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economies’ (pg. 1). In his book, Balassa offers five categories or levels of 
economic integration, ranging from free trade area to total economic integration, 
each being more economically integrated than the previous one. Although not all 
regional integration strictly follows this category,73 and there have been various 
critiques regarding it, Balassa’s category is the most widely used model to 
explain and measure the depth of economic integration. Within this 
categorisation, of main importance to the EU and ASEAN’s external trade 
diplomacy is the second category, customs union, which separates between 
economic integration arrangement that imposes a common external tariff (CET) 
to non-members and ones that do not. Having a CET means that member states 
can no longer apply individual tariff rate outside of those that were collectively 
agreed on and when applied to trade diplomacy, this means that no parallel 
negotiations by individual member states are allowed. Since a large portion of 
FTA negotiations involve tariffs, being in a customs union or not highly affects 
how ROs conduct FTA negotiation.    
In fairness, ASEAN’s avoidance of a CET may not be a deliberate one 
since there have been several internal attempts to consolidate their external 
tariffs but always came short. During the research interview, a high-ranking trade 
official from an ASEAN member state recalled that in 2010, ASEAN  trade 
ministers tried discussing the possibility of having a CET but failed to reach a 
consensus.74 This statement was also confirmed by an ASEAN scholar who was 
familiar with the process. The interviewee also added that later on, in 2015, 
Malaysia, who held ASEAN’s chairmanship that year, also conducted an internal 
exercise to see whether it was possible to achieve an ASEAN CET yet the study 
failed to achieve satisfactory results.75 The cause of this issue lies in the high 
tariff discrepancies between ASEAN member states, making it difficult to reach 
agreements on this front. The measurement of tariffs is usually computed using 
the weighted average tariff rate, defined as “the average of effectively applied 
rates weighted by the product import shares corresponding to each partner 
country” (The World Bank, 2019) and is a good indicator of how open or 
 
73 For example, under Balassa’s category, ASEAN would be considered as an ambiguous entity 
since it is moving towards becoming a common market (which is a higher level than a customs 
union) but has no intention of creating a customs union yet.  
74 Anonymous interview with ASEAN Member States’ trade official 
75 Anonymous interview with an ASEAN-based researcher  
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protectionist countries are. Comparing ASEAN member states weighted average 
tariff rates:       
 
Table 5.4 ASEAN Member States’ Weighted Mean Tariff Rate (%) & GDP Per Capita 
Country Year Tariff Rate (%) GDP Per Capita - PPP  
(US$,2018) 
Brunei Darussalam 2017 0.03 79,530 
Cambodia 2016 9.77 4,335 
Indonesia 2017 2.06 13,230 
Lao, PDR 2017 1.47 7,925 
Malaysia 2016 4.02 30,860 
Myanmar 2015 4.56 6,511 
Philippines 2017 1.66 8,936 
Singapore 2017 0.07 100,345 
Thailand 2015 3.52 19,476 
Vietnam 2017 2.69 7,510 
Source: The World Bank (2019) and International Monetary Fund (2019)  
 
Looking at these tariff rates, ASEAN member states differ greatly ranging 
from countries who impose a near-zero tariff rate, such as Brunei and Singapore, 
to high tariff-imposing countries such as Cambodia (close to 10%). In 2017, the 
global average tariff rate was 2.59%, meaning that within ASEAN itself, half of 
its member states record a higher than global tariff rate and the other half impose 
a lower than global tariff rate. This contrasts with the EU, which recorded an 
average tariff rate below the world average of 1.79% in 2017. A large discrepancy 
in tariffs is ultimately one of the most crucial factors contributing to ASEAN’s 
inability to apply a CET and also makes it difficult for it to become a customs 
union.  
Another interesting insight from the data is that countries with higher GDP 
do not necessarily have lower tariff rates (e.g. Malaysia and Thailand) and also 
lower GDP countries do not always have higher tariff rates (e.g. Lao PDR, 
Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam). This distinction between GDP per capita 
and tariff rate is important since, for internal economic integration, level of 
economic development (as measured by GDP per capita) is often seen as one 
the most important indicator in determining the likelihood of success in economic 
integration. However, with regards to external trade diplomacy, having 
similarities in external tariff is more important since it increases the likelihood of 
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achieving a customs union. The larger the gap in tariff rate between member 
states, the less likely they are to form a customs union and thus are less likely to 
achieve cohesiveness in their external trade diplomacy.     
These two determinants (the existence of trade-focused SNI and depth of 
economic integration) are central in explaining differences in the EU and 
ASEAN’s processes in trade diplomacy and are inherent within the region 
making them unlikely to be replicated by other ROs. However, despite all their 
differences, the EU and ASEAN display one common trait in their trade 
diplomatic process, their preference for trade bilateralism, which, unlike their 
differences, is best explained by looking at the external factors outside of the 
region.  
5.4.2. Explaining Similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s Trade Diplomatic Process 
Within the last three decades, globalisation of trade has grown at a faster 
rate than the production rate itself (World Trade Organization, 2013). Before 
1980, international trade and global output both grew at a relatively similar rate 
of roughly 3% annually, but since 1985 international trade has been almost twice 
as high as global output at an annual growth rate of 5.6% and 3.1% respectively 
(World Trade Organization, 2013). Although trade tensions in recent years have 
slightly hampered global trade growth (World Trade Organization, 2019a), the 
average global trade growth has increased significantly since the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. While many factors can explain this increase including the 
expansion of technology and newer methods of production and transportation, 
one of the most important factors is the continuously decreasing barriers to trade, 
as a result of larger cooperation efforts between states. Barriers to trade can 
include high transportation costs or policy barriers such as tariff and non-tariff 
measures and domestic transaction costs like customs clearance and 
administrative red tapes (World Trade Organization, 2013). In order to eliminate 
these barriers, countries work at the global level through multilateral cooperation, 
centralised at the WTO or previously, GATT.   
The need for a better functioning trading system led to the transformation 
of GATT forum to the WTO, which added several main features, including the 
existence of a dispute settlement body. Prior to the WTO, member states 
negotiated through GATT where trade rounds were held, and specific issue(s) 
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were discussed. However, within each round, trade issues became more 
complicated. At the 8th GATT round in Uruguay, member states agreed that a 
forum is no longer adequate to accommodate the growing demands of trade 
issues and must transform GATT into a fully functioning international 
organisation in the form of the WTO. However, after the WTO’s creation in 1993, 
multilateral trade talks ironically became more difficult, and until now, the WTO 
has only ever had one trade round, the Doha Round, which has been ongoing 
ever since. 
  Table 5.5 List of GATT and WTO Trade Rounds 
Year Name Subjects Covered Number of 
Countries 
1947 Geneva Tariffs 23 
1949 Annecy Tariffs 34 
1951 Torquay Tariffs 34 
1956 Geneva II Tariffs 22 
1960-1961 Dillon Tariffs 45 
1964-1967 Kennedy Tariffs and anti-dumping 
measures 
48 
1973-1979 Tokyo Tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
framework agreements  
102 
1986-1994 Uruguay Tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
rules, services, intellectual 
property, dispute settlement, 





Doha Tariffs, non-tariff measures, 





  Source: World Trade Organisation (2019)    
 
Compared to only having 23 states in 1947, the WTO now has more than 
160 member states which complicate negotiation processes and consensus-
building. Furthermore, despite initially starting with only tariffs, WTO trade 
negotiations now cover numerous issues such as services, labour standards, 
environment, competition, and transparency, which as a result, adds to the 
complexity of trade negotiations. These complexities can partly explain the 
stagnation of the Doha Round, which has been in motion for almost 20 years. As 
a result, countries now realise that it is more difficult to advance their interests 
and achieve global trade agreements via the WTO, making them resort to other 
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options available outside of the multilateral trading system, and this is precisely 
where trade diplomacy comes into play. Initially, regional trade agreements were 
considered as complementary (or ‘building blocks’) to revive and rebuild 
multilateralism (De Melo et al., 1992).  
However, despite increased regionalism and PTA/FTA projects 
worldwide, trade multilateralism regimes have grown at a slower rate than 
expected with the only substantial progress in the Doha Round being the Bali 
Conference (2013) and Nairobi Conference (2015), where several concessions 
were made on bureaucratic red tapes and safeguard mechanisms for developing 
& least-developing countries (World Trade Organization, 2019c). Furthermore, 
trade barriers have also shifted from tariff and quota barriers (the so-called ‘at 
the border’ issues) to the more complicated ‘inside the states’ issues, such as 
national policies and regulations (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011), making WTO 
negotiations more difficult. 
For ROs like the EU and ASEAN, where most member states are either 
liberal-oriented or export-oriented, stagnation in multilateralism means that they 
need to acquire new channels to maintain their economic advantages, and as a 
result, have resorted to bilateralism as their preferred method. One major 
consequence of the WTO’s stagnation for the EU is the increased competition 
from main economic rivals such as the US, China, and India, who started to 
pursue bilateral channels once it became apparent that trade multilateralism was 
no longer viable. However, since the EU initially favoured multilateralism and 
even imposed a moratorium on bilateral FTAs, it was seen that the EU had lost 
‘precious time’ and missed out on opportunities since it has lost several key 
markets to their global competitors.76  
During the EU’s moratorium, EU competitors signed bilateral FTAs with 
other countries, benefitting  their private sectors, while the EU’s private sectors 
were left behind.77 In a way, the EU’s aggressive stance on bilateralism can be 
seen as an effort to catch up and jumpstart the EU’s overall competitiveness after 
the moratorium. The EU’s renewed interest in region-to-region FTA was also 
shaped by fear of losing strategic markets to its competitors, such as in the case 
 
76 Anonymous interview with DG Trade official  
77 Anonymous interview with representative from business association in the EU  
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of the EU-ASEAN and the EU-Mercosur agreements.78 Specifically for the EU-
ASEAN FTA, the EU’s interests were mostly driven by the presence of several 
major players within the region, including US, Japan, China, India, and the 
possibility of the EU’s economic interests being threatened (Cuyvers, 2007). 
Thus, the EU’s bilateral FTA ambitions, especially for a deep and comprehensive 
one, are often ‘systemic’ (Meissner, 2016).   
Like the EU, ASEAN’s preference for bilateralism is also linked to shifts in 
global trade issues and stagnation in WTO negotiations, however, ASEAN’s 
response has been less far-reaching compared to the EU. Due to its institutional 
settings and economic discrepancies, ASEAN member states always negotiate 
individually in the WTO and often form separate alliances with different WTO 
members. Negotiation coalitions in the WTO can be classified based on regional 
or specific interests (e.g. non-agricultural market access economies, agricultural 
producers’ countries, group of least developing countries etc.), where individual 
ASEAN member states can choose any coalitions they want. This contrasts with 
the EU, where due to its customs union, all member states will always be in the 
same coalition at all times. As a result, ASEAN member states often have 
opposing views regarding specific trade issues (Tsai, 2007), and thus, find it 
difficult to negotiate as a group. For example, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam 
are members of the Cairns group which seeks to liberalise agricultural products, 
Laos is a member of G-33 who advocates for special safeguards in the 
liberalisation of sensitive agricultural products, and interestingly, Indonesia and 
the Philippines are members of both groups.79 Consequently, multilateralism is 
never the preferred method for ASEAN, and with WTO’s stagnation, ASEAN 
found more impetus to pursue other levels of trade diplomacy.  
In resorting to bilateralism, ASEAN can be considered reactive rather than 
proactive, although this in no way implies that ASEAN is passive and has no 
overall strategy. In general, ASEAN’s choice to engage in bilateral relations is 
always in response to the requests of external parties rather than by internal 
motivation. The first country to engage in FTA with ASEAN was China, doing so 
not purely on economic reasonings but also based on a ‘political, strategic and 
 
78 Anonymous interview with DG Trade official 
79 In fairness, Indonesia and the Philippines inclusion in both groups can be explained by their 
agricultural trading profile since they are both exporters and importers of agricultural products   
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intellectual basis’ (Lijun, 2003). China’s accession into the WTO in 2001 was 
considered to have posed a threat to ASEAN member states ultimately leading 
to diverted trade and investment from ASEAN to China, and thus, the ASEAN-
China FTA was perceived as a way to minimise ASEAN member states’ negative 
perception of the ‘China threat’ and improve China’s relations with its 
neighbouring countries (Cheng, 2004). From ASEAN’s perspective, collective 
engagement through ASEAN was the best option to counterbalance China’s 
growing power and economic influence within the region, which explains ASEAN 
member states’ acceptance of China’s offer.  
As one ASEAN member states’ diplomat points out during the interview, 
collective negotiation is considered good for ASEAN since it provides more 
economic power for its member states considering that they can ‘offer more’ and 
‘ask for more’ in negotiations.80 However, due to China’s economic weight and 
political position, its actions often have consequences for other countries. 
China’s decision to engage in FTA with ASEANs also led Japan and India to 
establish FTAs with ASEAN in the same week as China’s agreement (Cheng, 
2004). This agreement was subsequently followed by requests from other 
ASEAN dialogue partners, including South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the 
EU, Canada, and Russia.81 As a result, ASEAN is always in the position of 
accepting, rejecting or postponing bilateral requests from its dialogue partners 
rather than pursuing them meaning that it needs to selectively prioritise requests. 
Therefore, it can be said, that ASEAN’s preference for bilateralism was driven by 
regional systemic competition between its dialogue partners, who feared missing 
out ASEAN’s market to other competitors.  
While the EU’s bilateralism is driven by stagnation in the WTO and the 
need to secure key market areas by actively engaging in systemic competition, 
ASEAN’s bilateralism is a by-product of systemic competitions between its 
dialogue partners and ASEAN’s inability to pursue any meaningful results 
through the WTO collectively. Due to their internal differences, the EU and 
ASEAN are differently affected by systemic competitions, although their actions 
and results are rather similar. To put this in context with trade diplomacy, when 
 
80 Anonymous interview with official from ASEAN member state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
81 Anonymous interview with official from ASEAN Secretariat  
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global trade games change, it is ‘all hands on deck, a red-alert phase for 
economic diplomacy’ that lasts until new rules are agreed upon by the world’s 
most significant players’ (Coolsaet, 2004). Extending this to trade, it can be 
argued that when the WTO cannot provide certainty for countries, those 
countries resort to the safest option available to them, the bilateral channel. 
In conclusion, the EU and ASEAN’s similar preference for bilateralism is 
a strategic move in their trade diplomacy used to offset the negative impact of 
the WTO’s stagnation, coupled with increased systemic competitions from other 
countries.     
5.5. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain and compare one component 
of the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, the process. This consists of trade 
decisionmaking and trade negotiations, which relates to the second and third 
research questions. Based on the findings and discussions, it can be argued that 
the EU and ASEAN are strikingly different in almost all components, except for 
their preference for trade bilateralism. The EU and ASEAN’s differences in trade 
decisionmaking include variations in their decisionmaking model, the 
involvement of non-state actors, ratification, implementation process, and 
whether the EU and ASEAN allow flexible participation in their external trade 
relations or not.  
Dissimilarities in the EU and ASEAN’s trade negotiations include who acts 
as negotiators throughout the process, how their negotiation model works, and 
whether the EU and ASEAN allows parallel negotiations outside of the regional 
scheme. For trade negotiations, since the EU has a trade-focused supranational 
institution in place, the EU institution (through DG Trade) handles all of the EU’s 
trade negotiations, whereas for ASEAN, the absence of a trade-focused SNI 
means that individual member states handle negotiations. Under this 
arrangement, the EU institution acts as an agent of the member states, while for 
ASEAN, no agent is present since member states are represented by their 
technical ministries. Furthermore, ASEAN also allows its member states to have 
other trade agreements outside of the ASEAN framework resulting in multiple 
parallel negotiations involving individual member states which is in contrasts to 
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the EU where no individual member state can make commitments with external 
partners outside of the EU framework.  
Assessing the causes of these differences, two main internal determinants 
can be identified. First, the existence of a trade-focused supranational institution 
in the EU and the absence of one in ASEAN and second, variations in the EU 
and ASEAN’s choice of economic integration where the EU opt for a customs 
union and ASEAN does not. Considering all the differences between the EU and 
ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, the contrast between their processes is perhaps the 
most striking since this relates mostly to their internal mechanisms and 
conditions. In explaining the EU and ASEAN’s similarities in trade negotiation, 
external factors play a dominant role where both the EU and ASEAN’s 
preference for bilateralism is shaped by changes in their external environment, 
specifically due to stagnation in WTO negotiations and the increase of global 
economic competition. Despite their various internal differences, the EU and 
ASEAN operate in a similar environment and are affected by similar pressures, 
and thus, may respond similarly, as the discussion shows.   
So far, this chapter and the previous one (Chapter 4) have answered the 
who and how questions of the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, forming two of 
the three core elements in trade diplomacy. The next chapter elaborates on the 
final question – why – by examining the last component of the EU and ASEAN’s 
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Chapter 6 – Goals in the EU and ASEAN Trade Diplomacy 
 
6.1.  Introduction  
The previous two chapters have elaborated on the first two questions of 
trade diplomacy – the who and how questions. This chapter focuses on the last 
question – the why question – and elaborates on the final component of the 
framework: goals of trade diplomacy. Goals in trade diplomacy refer to the 
ultimate objectives being pursued, either pure commercial/economic goals or 
non-commercial goals resulting from trade agreements. Commercial 
goals are the tangible advantages of trade agreements such as the increase in 
exports or market shares, GDP growth, and rise in employment levels resulting 
from trade. Non-commercial gains refer to the non-economic impact of trade 
agreements such as stronger bilateral/multilateral ties, larger global/regional 
presence, and power or norm projection to other parties. As this thesis asserts, 
trade relations are integral to ROs’ external relations, and thus, the inclusion 
of both commercial and non-commercial goals in the analysis is necessary. The 
choice to separate between commercial and non-commercial goals stems from 
the research findings which suggest that the EU and ASEAN differ in their 
emphasis on commercial and non-commercial goals, and that one goal tends to 
be more dominant than the other.  
As with the previous two chapters, this chapter focuses on answering the 
second research question regarding differences and similarities of the EU and 
ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, and to a certain degree, the third research question 
pertaining to the determinants of these differences and similarities. The data for 
this chapter is derived from multiple sources including the EU and ASEAN’s legal 
documents (e.g. treaties and charters), publications (e.g. action plans, 
communique, press releases, leaders’ statements), trade data and interviews 
with multiple trade officials, business representatives, and NGO members. Like 
the previous chapter, interview data is also integral here, particularly for ASEAN, 
since several secondary data were not readily available. Furthermore, 
information and opinions from trade and foreign policy officials and non-state 
actors assist in explaining several actions (or inactions) within both regional 
organisations, which would not be evident without the interviews.    
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Deducing from this data, the central idea of this chapter is that although 
the EU and ASEAN both seek to achieve commercial and non-commercial goals 
through their trade diplomacy, the EU is more invested in achieving commercial 
goals compared to ASEAN. This is due to the structure of the EU’s economic 
integration where the customs union limits the possibility of member states to 
acquire commercial goals from other avenues, hence creating the need for 
member states to maximise their gains from the EU’s trade agreements. Contrary 
to the EU, ASEAN is more invested in acquiring non-commercial goals since, 
first, its member states can still attain commercial goals through individual trade 
relations outside of the ASEAN scheme, and second, because ASEAN links its 
external trade with political-strategic relations where it positions its external trade 
as a way to support ASEAN’s internal integration project and to ‘reward’ its 
external partners.  
The trade diplomacy-regional integration linkage in ASEAN is apparent 
through ASEAN’s choice to negotiate trade agreements only with its dialogue 
partners, who are by default, countries with the highest level of political and 
strategic importance to ASEAN. Since most of ASEAN’s dialogues partners are 
either global or regional major powers, ASEAN member states’ collective choice 
to grant larger market access can also be interpreted as a way to ensure that so 
long as these global/regional powers support ASEAN’s integration project – 
either financially or through political acknowledgement – they will have exclusive 
access to ASEAN economies. It is not a coincidence that these dialogue partners 
are also ASEAN’s largest donors and main proponents of its integration project, 
which illustrates how ASEAN utilises its trade agreements strategically.      
In comparing and explaining these goals, this chapter is divided into five 
main sections. The next section identifies and compares the EU and ASEAN’s 
general trade goals by examining their legal documents, followed by a section 
on the comparison of the EU and ASEAN’s commercial goals in trade. The third 
section compares the EU and ASEAN’s non-commercial goals in trade, while the 
fourth section explains the determinants of differences and similarities in the EU 
and ASEAN’s trade diplomatic goals. Finally, the last section concludes the 
discussion and highlights what this chapter’s findings mean for the overall 
research.   
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6.2. Identifying the Trade Diplomatic Goals of the EU and ASEAN  
In identifying the trade diplomatic goals of the EU and ASEAN, this research 
looks at the formal documents outlining each organisation’s specific aims, 
objectives, targets and milestones directly relating to external trading activities. 
For the EU, this is specified in DG Trade’s Strategic Plan 2016-2020 while for 
ASEAN, the defining document is the 2025 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
Blueprint and its Consolidated Strategic Plan. Both of these documents are 
derived from larger priorities/goals of their respective organisations which for the 
EU, is derived from the ten political priorities of the Juncker Commission,82 and 
for ASEAN, is translated from the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 
2025.83 In setting out the EU’s specific trade goals, DG Trade follows the Juncker 
Commission’s priorities, number 1 (boosting jobs, growth and investment), 
number 6 (a reasonable and balanced free trade agreement with the US) and 
number 9 (a stronger global actor).84 These general priorities are then 
operationalised through DG Trade’s Strategic Plan 2016-2020 and broken down 
into specific objectives, interim milestones, and targets to be achieved by 2020 











82 The Juncker Commission refers to the EU Commission under the Presidentship of Jean-Paul 
Juncker. Based on the EU’s regulations, every serving President and their cabinet members 
are required to have a political strategy, guidelines, and priorities during their tenure which 
will serve as EU’s direction for the following five years.      
83 The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint is the core document which sets out the 
objectives, directions, and strategies for ASEAN’s economic integration from 2015 to 2025.   
84 It should be noted that on November 2019, a change in the Commission’s leadership from 
Jean Paul Juncker to Ursula von der Leyen occurred which resulted in new priorities within 
the Commission. However, the DG Trade’s Strategic Plan still runs until 2020 and the priorities 
of the new Commission have been rightfully reflected within the Plan (European Commission, 
2016c). 
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Table 6.1 DG Trade’s Specific Objectives in Trade 
 
Source: European Commission (2016) 
 
Among these three objectives, two are directly linked to commercial goals 
(number 1 and 6), while objective 9 is more general and places the EU as a 
stronger global actor through trade. Under priority number 9 and Specific 
Objective 4: A Sustainable Approach to Trade, DG Trade lists ‘improved 
sustainable economic, social and environmental conditions for consumers, 
workers, citizens and businesses in the EU and non-EU countries (personal 
emphasis) and a special focus on human rights, responsible management of 
supply chains and good governance’ as one of its goals, which indicates the EU’s 
external ambition. Under this objective, the EU believes that its approach and 
guidelines on trade must be implemented both internally and externally, which 
hints the inclusion of non-commercial goals in the EU’s strategic trade plan.        
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Translating these general trade objectives into actions, DG Trade publishes 
a communication paper which lists specific trade policy strategy that it will follow 
during a course of time. Since 2006, the EU has published four communication 
papers: Global Europe: Competing in the World in 2006; Trade, Growth and 
World Affairs in 2010; Trade for All Strategy in 2015; and most recently, A 
Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalisation in 2017. Each 
of this communication papers introduces a new aspect, approach, or strategy in 
the EU’s external trade. This includes the 2006 communication paper which 
signifies the end of EU’s self-imposed ban on bilateral trade agreements and 
sets out the basis of the EU’s ‘new generation FTAs. Also, the Trade for All 
communication paper which introduces three new principles of the EU’s trade 
strategy: effectiveness, transparency, and values (Commission, 2015).  
This communication paper is often seen as the EU’s response to the 
growing criticism of its trade policy from other stakeholders, particularly from 
business sectors and civil society groups. For example, the effectiveness 
strategy, refers to the EU’s targeted approach in tackling modern trade issues, 
and is expected to answer the main concern of business groups, particularly 
SMEs, while transparency is designed to increase stakeholder’s involvement and 
is primarily about larger scrutiny and public involvement in the EU’s trade 
negotiations.  
Looking at the frequency and content of the multiple DG Trade’s documents 
on external trade, it can be seen that the EU’s approach to external trade is rather 
dynamic and responsive to internal and external shifts. For example, the 
inclusion of ‘EU values’ and increased transparency in FTA negotiations was the 
EU’s response to internal demands by CSOs, while the lift on the EU’s bilateral 
FTA moratorium in 2006 was due to stagnation in multilateralism and internal 
pressures from private sectors since the EU was losing international markets to 
its competitors.85 This was also the cases for the inclusion of new trading 
partners and revitalisation of existing FTAs, which were shaped by both internal 
demands and the pressure of global competition. On average, the EU is likely to 
publish a communication paper and set a new direction for its external trade 
every 2-3 years, which can be considered quite frequent compared to ASEAN.      
 
85 Anonymous interview with official from DG Trade  
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Contrary to the EU, ASEAN’s trade goals and strategy tend to be long-term, 
and thus, often less responsive. As a general rule, ASEAN’s overarching 
guidelines for its external economic relations is the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025. It is then operationalised through the 
Consolidated Strategic Action Plan (CSAP) which runs from 2016-2025 or is set 
up in a 10-year increment which contrasts to the EU’s President political priority 
which runs for five years. This action plan consists of strategic measures and 
key actions lines to be pursued by different ASEAN sectoral bodies and sectoral 
work plans (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017). Sectoral bodies refer to the different 
ASEAN institutions involved, while sectoral work plans refer to the different 
activities such as dialogues, meetings, and forums held by ASEAN member 
states to undertake strategic decisions that cannot be done independently by the 
ASEAN Secretariat. This may involve meeting with senior economic/technical 
ministers of ASEAN MS or with country coordinator representatives. With 
regards to ASEAN’s external trade, several key action lines are to be pursued 
within the 2016-2025 time frame, these includes: concluding ongoing FTA 
negotiations, continuing and reviewing current FTAs, and implementing several 
trade and investment agreements with ASEAN’s non-FTA partners (i.e. EU, 
Russia, Canada and USA).   
The CSAP is designed to complement the ASEAN Economic Community 
Blueprint and thus, follows similar goals as stated in the AEC Blueprint which 
reinforce ASEAN’s five main characteristics: (i) a highly integrated and cohesive 
economy; (ii) competitive, innovative and dynamic ASEAN; (iii) enhanced 
connectivity and sectoral cooperation; (iv) a resilient, inclusive, people-oriented 
and people-centred ASEAN; and (v) a global ASEAN. Of these five 
characteristics, four are related only to internal objectives, and one characteristic 
relates to ASEAN’s external relations (A Global ASEAN). In operationalising ‘A 
Global ASEAN’, ASEAN positions its external FTAs as one of the building blocks 
where ASEAN seeks to:  
 
a. Develop a more strategic and coherent approach towards external 
economic relations with a view to adopting a common position in 
regional and global economic fora; 
b. Continue to review and improve ASEAN FTAs and CEPs to ensure that 
they remain modern, comprehensive, of high-quality and more 
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responsive to the needs of businesses operating the production 
networks in ASEAN;  
c. Enhance economic partnerships with non-FTA Dialogue Partners by 
upgrading and strengthening trade and investment work 
programmes/plans;  
d. Engage with regional and global partners to explore strategic 
engagement to pursue economic partnerships with emerging 
economies and/or regional groupings that share the same values and 
principles on improving the lives of their people through economic 
integration;  
e. Continue strongly supporting the multilateral trading system and 
actively participating in regional fora; and 
f. Continue to promote engagement with global and regional institutions 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2017)                     
 
Reflecting on these six objectives, one objective is aimed at building 
internal cohesion (goal A), two goals focus on improving ASEAN FTAs and CEPs 
(goals B & C), and three objectives are targeted towards wider global 
engagements (goals D, E & F). As a whole these objectives show an interesting 
sketch of ASEAN’s trade diplomatic directions. The first important point is on how 
ASEAN places internal cohesion (or ‘adopting a common position’) as the first 
objective in their external economic relations which is an indication of the 
shortcomings in their internal mechanisms. As many research interviewees have 
confirmed, in many cases, ASEAN is struggling to achieve a common position in 
economic issues due to the wide economic differences between its member 
states, and hence, achieving this should be their priority before any further 
external economic relations can take place.86 Another important point is in 
ASEAN’s emphasis on the wider global engagements, taking three out of its six 
objectives, which is a testament to ASEAN’s interest in being globally active. 
These objectives are the most telling aspect of ASEAN’s strong emphasis on 
non-commercial goals in trade diplomacy, where they affirm the use of multiple 
venues (bilateral, inter-regional and multilateral), not necessarily as a way to gain 
tangible commercial benefits, but mostly as a way to ‘explore strategic 
engagement’, ‘strongly support’ and ‘promote engagement’ which, together, are 
more of a political statement rather than carrying any economic weightings. This 
observation also relates to the last and most important point in ASEAN’s trade 
 
86 Anonymous interview with several ASEAN member states’ trade officials 
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diplomacy goals: the lack of any tangible or measurable commercial goals in its 
external trade objectives.                  
Unlike the EU, ASEAN’s external trade objectives do not mention any 
specific commercial goals such as market expansion, export growth, job creation 
or anything specifically connected to tangible commercial goals. In contrast, the 
EU’s documents regarding trade goals are filled with detailed descriptions of how 
and when to achieve a specific objective and include quantitative measurements 
for each milestone. For example, under Specific Objective 1: Trade Negotiations, 
the EU lists its targets for ‘percentage of trade covered by applied bi-lateral and 
regional agreements’ from 26% (total) in 2015 to 33% in 2018 and 58% in 2020. 
This is the general pattern for most of the EU’s strategic plan, with several 
qualitative indicators such as the quality of web platforms and positive 
developments in dispute settlement cases. For ASEAN, however, the closest 
commercial goal is perhaps in ensuring that ASEAN FTAs are ‘modern, 
comprehensive, of high-quality and more responsive to the needs of businesses 
operating the production networks in ASEAN’ which is more of a description on 
what an FTA should look like and not on what it should bring to the economy.  
Contrasting this with the EU, ASEAN tends to be more abstract on what 
commercial goals they are aiming for. For the EU, the fulfilment of targets and 
achievement of goals are measured numerically through careful calculations of 
market/export share, the number of jobs created, and the number of FTAs signed 
that have incorporated the EU values. DG Trade’s mantra of ‘the more ambitious 
the agreement, the larger the gain’ is translated into measurable outcomes which 
set directions on how to achieve the EU’s specific trade goals. To put it short, 
while ASEAN lists specific commercial goals in its trade diplomacy, these are not 
adequately translated or quantified, making them difficult to measure and 
achieve.   
ASEAN’s lukewarm attitude towards achieving commercial goals is also 
apparent in their overall approach to external trade. While the EU is relatively 
proactive in designing its trade goals with the general aim of expanding its FTA 
scope and market share, ASEAN tends to be reactive, where its trade goals are 
mostly designed as a response to external parties actions, rather than  being 
based on its internal conditions. In its strategic plan, the EU lists specific target 
countries for FTA negotiation partners, complete with how many increases are 
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expected each year. ASEAN, on the other hand, works based on requests from 
external partners rather than proactively deciding which FTA partners to pursue. 
In their documents, ASEAN’s objectives for its external trade are directed 
towards ‘signing’, ‘finalising’, concluding’ and ‘implementing’ existing 
negotiations or agreements rather than exploring new ones (ASEAN Economic 
Community 2025 - Consolidated Strategic Action Plan pg. 47). While ASEAN 
does list ‘exploring strategic engagements’ with regional groupings like the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), it 
is unclear on what kind of strategic engagement this entails.  
Interviews with officials also confirm ASEAN’s less proactive stance on 
trade diplomacy, where for all of its trade agreements, ASEAN is always in the 
position of accepting, postponing, or rejecting offers and has never initiated 
one.87 Currently, ASEAN is also juggling requests from several countries and 
other regional organisations and is struggling to respond to these requests due 
to limited resources.88 
Comparing the EU and ASEAN’s official documents, it can be observed that 
while the EU and ASEAN identify both commercial and non-commercial goals in 
their external trade relations, the EU tends to be more invested in acquiring 
commercial goals while ASEAN leans more toward achieving non-commercial 
goals. However, despite these differences, one major similarity in their 
documents prevails, the need to strengthen their position in the global arena. In 
their documents, both the EU and ASEAN explicitly state their intentions of being 
global players, with the EU listing A Stronger Global Actor as one of its main 
objectives and ASEAN asserting A Global ASEAN as one of its main 
characteristics. For the EU, a stronger global actor is presented through multiple 
actions including reinforcing the EU’s position as a global trade player; increasing 
market share & effective implementation of trade deals; and implementing a 
sustainable approach to trade (European Commission, 2016c). Rather similarly, 
ASEAN also aims to strengthen its global presence through multiple external 
trade agreements, active contribution to trade regime formation, and continued 
 
87 Anonymous interviews with official from ASEAN Secretariat and several ASEAN Member 
States’ trade officials  
88 Anonymous interviews with official from ASEAN Secretariat and several ASEAN Member 
States’ trade officials 
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engagements with multiple regional organisations and economic institutions 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2017). In a way, external trade can be seen as a mean for 
both the EU and ASEAN to reassert their presence and reinforce their power in 
global relations. This statement was, in fact, one of the most identifiable and 
explicit non-commercial goals in their documents.  
Nevertheless, while official documents may provide a good initial picture of 
the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomatic goals, it is crucial to analyse how these 
trade objectives are translated into actions which is the focus of the following 
sub-sections.   
6.3. Commercial Goals in the EU and ASEAN’s Trade Diplomacy 
By default, trade diplomacy is generally aimed towards acquiring 
commercial gains in order to maximise overall economic outcomes. Since Adam 
Smith, many trade theorists have long advocated the benefits of having barrier-
free trade on the grounds that free trade minimises efficiency loss and thus, 
produces better outcomes for the overall economy. Other arguments in support 
of free trade include gaining additional external economies of scale resulting from 
trade, increasing domestic firms productivity through external competition, and 
removing rent-seeking behaviour resulting from the imposition of import quotas 
(Krugman et al., 2015).  
However, while there are many perceived benefits from free trade, only a 
few countries in the world have approached a truly free trade condition (one 
notably being Hongkong, which is technically a part of China but maintains a 
separate economic policy). The main reason for this is that free trade requires 
national policy to implement and policymaking itself is a political process which 
involves multiple players and interests. For example, many countries have 
maintained protectionist trade policies in fear of losing popular support from their 
constituents, and others have opted for selective protectionist policy to benefit 
domestic key players who are central for maintaining power. However, due to 
global competition and the need to acquire wealth, most countries tend to 
balance between obtaining advantages from free trade and at the same, 
minimise conflicts with domestic stakeholders. This has resulted in a mix of 
different trade policies between countries, depending on their domestic situations 
and international preferences.  
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Taking this mix into the regional level, regional organisations’ choices on 
trade policies, particularly on deciding whether to engage or not in free trade 
agreements, are a compromise between different countries’ positions on trade, 
where RO’s member states may not benefit equally. However, from a rationalist 
point of view, all FTAs agreed to by ROs should ensure the delivery of maximum 
gains for all or most of member states, and at the same time, the losses of not 
engaging in FTAs should be minimised. It is also the case for the EU and ASEAN 
where logically, commercial goals should be present in their trade diplomacy, 
although with different weightings.     
From a purely economic standpoint, the most direct way to compare the EU 
and ASEAN’s commercial goals in trade diplomacy would be to look at the 
quantifiable benefits resulting from the elimination of trade barriers. However, 
this may be unfitting to do considering the EU and ASEAN’s differing 
circumstances since first, these indicators only measure outputs and pay little 
attention to actions and processes leading to these outputs and second, since 
ASEAN member states can still negotiate FTAs individually, any gain from free 
trade by ASEAN may be a result of individual member states’ actions rather than 
a collective one. Looking at these limitations, a more appropriate way to compare 
the EU and ASEAN’s commercial goals would be to look at the likelihood of 
acquiring commercial benefits resulting from collective actions, rather than 
individual ones. For this research, we look at two sets of data: the trade 
preference utilisation rate (PUR) which is the value of trade that takes place 
under preferences as a share of the total value of trade that is preference-eligible 
in an FTA (The Federation of German Industries, 2018) and distribution of 
organisational capacity allocated for acquiring commercial goals.  
The trade PUR is a measurement of how likely it is for private sectors to 
utilise the FTA agreements completed by their respective regional organisations. 
Calculations of trade PUR can be done at either the firm-level by asking firms 
whether they use specific FTAs or at the national-level by looking at the official 
Certificates of Origin (CoO). Each of these calculations has its advantages & 
disadvantages, and although this number may not always accurately represent 
the actual rate, it is a good approximation of how often businesses use these 
FTAs. This data is a measurement of how effective an FTA is in fulfilling the 
needs of the private sectors, meaning that the higher the trade PUR is, the more 
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effective the FTAs are and vice versa. Distribution of organisational capacity 
refers to the choice by regional organisations to allocate their resources to a 
specific task(s), which in this research refers to the task of acquiring commercial 
gains through external trade. The general understanding is that the larger the 
resources allocated for that specific task/purpose, the more invested the 
organisation is in obtaining that purpose and vice versa. With this definition in 
mind, the following two sections compare these two indicators.   
6.3.1. Collective Versus Individual Commercial Goals in the EU and ASEAN 
Trade Diplomacy  
As previously discussed, one of the major distinctions between the EU 
and ASEAN is that the EU is a customs union and ASEAN is not, which means 
that ASEAN member state can still negotiate individually while EU members 
states cannot. As a result, ASEAN member states are often involved in multiple 
FTA arrangements outside of the ASEAN scheme (see Figure 5.2. in Chapter 5) 
which makes it difficult to precisely calculate whether the specific trade benefit 
comes from ASEAN or individual member states’ FTAs. In contrast, since the EU 
must always negotiate collectively, it is easier to calculate the overall benefit from 
its FTAs. Each year, the EU publishes a report on the implementation of the EU’s 
FTAs covering updates on each FTA, including the progress achieved, 
implementation of the TSD chapters, and dispute settlement processes (if any). 
This report also contains the trade preference utilisation rate of the EU’s exports, 
which measures the percentage of EU’s private sectors that utilise FTAs. The 
EU’s trade PUR (export)89 based on the latest report (published in October 2019) 





89 Data on PUR is divided into two groups: export PUR which measures the percentage of 
exporters utilising the FTA and import PUR which measures the percentage of importers 
utilising the FTA. For this research, the more relevant group would be export PUR since it 
captures the internal private sectors’ usage of the FTA      
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Table 6.2 Preference Utilisation Rate of the EU’s Exports 
  
Source: European Commission (2019d) 
 
Based on the data, it can be seen that on average there is an increase on 
the PUR of the EU’s export from 2015 to 2018 meaning that more businesses 
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are using the EU’s FTAs for their exporting activities. There are, of course, 
several exceptions where decreases or stagnancies occur such as for Turkey, 
Israel, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Mexico, and Switzerland 
although on average, the rate is still more than 50%. Looking at these numbers, 
the lowest PUR for the EU in 2018 is at 28% (Mauritius), the highest is at 90% 
(Turkey and Serbia), and the overall average is at 66% (own calculation), 
meaning that in 2018, more than half of the EU’s private sector utilised FTAs in 
their exporting activities to these countries. Although this number may seem 
‘average’, this is a relatively high number compared to ASEAN.     
Within the ASEAN member states themselves, Singapore leads in terms 
of the numbers of FTAs signed, launched, or proposed with a total of 43 FTAs, 
29 of which are signed outside of the ASEAN scheme (Asia Regional Integration 
Center, 2019). Within these 29 agreements, eight are proposed, negotiated, or 
signed in addition to the already existing ASEAN FTAs with dialogue partners. 
Aside from Singapore, every other ASEAN member state (except for Cambodia, 
Laos, and Myanmar) also have at least one FTA in place with their dialogue 
partners, in addition to the already existing ASEAN FTAs. As a result, ASEAN 
private sectors have several options in utilising FTAs, in addition to the existing 
trade preferences offered by the WTO through the Most-Favoured Nations 
(MFN) tariff rate which ASEAN member states can also access. Unfortunately, 
ASEAN does not publish any specific reports on their trade PUR, and thus, 
estimates can only be made by outside entities. There are also limitations on the 
availability of data since only a few ASEAN countries have a complete record of 
their certificate of origin issuance, which is the instrument used to measure trade 
PUR (Ing et al., 2015).   
In a 2015 report, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East 
Asia (ERIA) estimated that the preference utilisation rate of ASEAN-led FTAs 
averaged at around 21.4%, with the ASEAN-China FTA and ASEAN-Korea FTA 
being the highest, estimated at 25.6% and 20%, respectively (Ing et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, this rate is skewed towards large and multinational corporations 
with micro, small, and medium enterprises not utilising much of the agreements 
(Tambunan and Chandra, 2014). The high utilisation rate of the ASEAN-China 
FTA is perhaps not a coincidence, given the fact that China is ASEAN’s largest 
trading partner and only two ASEAN member states have a national-level FTA 
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with the country. In comparison, the ASEAN-Japan FTA only recorded a PUR of 
6.6% (Ing et al., 2015) despite Japan’s status as one of ASEAN’s top trading 
partners. The most probable explanation for this is the high number of national-
level FTAs that individual ASEAN member states have with Japan (Ing et al., 
2015), where currently seven ASEAN member states have individual FTAs with 
Japan outside of the ASEAN scheme. Although this number may not be fully 
accurate, an interview with trade official in one ASEAN member state confirms 
that ASEAN-led FTAs tend to have a lower PUR compared to the national-led 
ones.90 These data suggest that for ASEAN, individual FTAs are often used as 
a substitute rather than a complement to ASEAN-led ones, which suggests a 
middle-ground between ASEAN member states strong nationalistic stance and 
the need to utilise regional organisations as an external trade diplomatic tools.   
There are several plausible reasons as to why private sectors prefer 
national-level FTAs than ASEAN-level FTAs. First, national-level FTAs are by 
default, deeper and more comprehensive than ASEAN-led ones and thus, can 
offer more advantages to private sectors. Second, if the cost of shifting from 
national-level FTAs or other types of trade preferences (e.g. MFN rate)91 to 
regional-level FTAs outweighs the benefits, then businesses are less likely to 
change the type of FTAs or preferences that they currently use. Ing, Urata and 
Fukunaga (2015) refer to this situation as the ‘benefit margin’, defined as ‘the 
difference between the benefits arising from, and costs of, using FTAs. For 
private sectors, benefits arise from the margin between the MFN rate (or in this 
case, national-level FTA’s preference rates) and ASEAN FTA’s preference rates, 
while costs refer to the cost of obtaining CoO for ASEAN-led FTAs.  
In their firm-level survey, Ing, Urata and Fukunaga (2015) find that the 
initial MFN rate for most ASEAN member states is already low due to unilateral 
tariff reductions from international commitments in the 2000s, meaning that FTAs 
that offer tariff preferences only (such as ASEAN-led FTAs) are less attractive 
for private sectors since the tariff rate is already low. In other words, ASEAN 
private sectors see that the cost of shifting from MFN rate (or national-level FTAs) 
 
90 Anonymous interview with ASEAN Member State trade official  
91 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rate is the tariff rate that countries promise to impose on 
imports from other members of the WTO (unless the country is part of a preferential trade 
agreement such as a free trade area or customs union). In other words, MFN rates are the 
highest tariff rate that WTO members can charge to one another  
P a g e  | 173 
 
to ASEAN FTAs does not offer sufficient benefits compared to the costs of 
obtaining CoO, or in the words of one interviewee: ‘the benefits of ASEAN FTAs 
are not even worth the paper it was written on’.92  
Third, ASEAN private sectors are often not fully aware of the trade 
preferences that they can utilise since there are only limited efforts to inform 
them. Ing, Urata and Fukunaga (2015) suggest that more than 60 per cent of 
businesses in ASEAN’s manufacturing sector claimed that the information about 
FTAs and how to use them are still limited or very limited. This is also confirmed 
by interviews with several representatives from ASEAN member states’ business 
associations who claimed that they often did not receive complete information 
regarding FTAs from the government.93 Other business associations, such as in 
Indonesia, even mentioned that they often conduct information sharing session 
regarding FTAs within themselves since no adequate information was given to 
them by the government.94  
Adding to these problems is the lack of consensus (or discourse, to the 
least) on economic viewpoints between ASEAN member states, meaning that 
ASEAN’s external trade relations are driven by many ideas and viewpoints on 
how to best approach external trade. While neoliberal ideas generally guide the 
EU’s approach to external trade (Bossuyt et al., 2020), ASEAN does not have 
this since each member state has its own views on external trade. While there 
are highly liberal and open economies like Singapore and Vietnam, there are 
also semi-protectionist countries like Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.95 This 
makes discussion and compromise on collectively pure commercial goals difficult 
to achieve in ASEAN since member states are more interested in pursuing 
individual commercial goals. As a region, ASEAN lack a common economic idea 
which affects their trade diplomatic process, making it difficult to achieve 
common positions on trade issues and in deciding which commercial goals would 
best serve the region.  
 
92 Anonymous interview with representative from business association in ASEAN member state  
93 Anonymous interview with representative from business association in ASEAN member states 
94 Anonymous interview with representative from business association in Indonesia 
95 By many accounts and measurements, Singapore always sit at the top 3 most open countries 
in the world, Vietnam is also considered relatively open, while Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Indonesia usually sit on the moderately open economies (see for example World Bank’s data 
on Trade Openness Index and International Chamber of Commerce’s rankings on Open 
Market Index).      
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Therefore, it is difficult to assert that ASEAN-led FTAs bring large 
commercial gain for member states, and even when it does, it is still at a minimum 
scale compared to national-level FTAs (or MFN rate). What this finding suggests 
then, is that for the EU, FTAs are well utilised and can bring considerable 
economic benefit for member states while for ASEAN, FTAs are often not fully 
utilised since they are either in competition with national-level FTAs or that the 
benefits are too low that private sectors prefer to use the MFN rate instead. This 
means that for ASEAN member states, there is still a high incentive to pursue 
individual commercial goals rather than collective ones agreed through ASEAN, 
while for EU, member states must always collectively pursue trade gains via the 
regional channel, making them highly invested in acquiring commercial goals 
through trade compared. Although this is in no way arguing that the ASEAN FTAs 
do not offer any commercial benefits, it does stress that, compared to the EU, 
ASEAN FTAs lack the commercial usefulness and regional collectivity that EU 
FTAs possess.    
6.3.2. Distribution of Institutional Resources in the Pursuit of Commercial Goals 
Within the EU and ASEAN 
In creating and putting written goals into actions, institutions, and the 
multiple players within them play a central role. For both the EU and ASEAN, a 
designated unit within the institution has been allocated for the specific tasks of 
managing external trade and the central proposition is that the larger the 
resources allocated to its external trade, the more devoted the institution is at 
attaining commercial goals through trade.         
For the governance of external trade relations, the EU member states 
have delegated this function to Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade), which 
is currently staffed by 686 personnel or around 2.1% of the total European 
Commission’s workforce (European Commission, 2019g). This is an increase 
from the previous year’s number of 682 personnel, although the overall 
percentage remains the same (European Commission, 2018d). In 2019, the 
distribution of EU personnel was as follows:  
 




Figure 6.1 Distribution of the EU Staff Members (2019) 
Source: European Commission (2019) 
 
Out of the 45 directorates, offices and services, DG Trade (labelled as 
TRADE in the diagram) is in 17th position for the number of staff, which may seem 
average compared to other DGs, offices, and services. In comparison, the 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG Devco) 
employs the highest number of staff each year with its current staff totalling at 
3227 or around 10% of the total EU Commission's workforce, and the 
Directorate-General for Translation (DG DGT) employs 2189 personnel or 
around 6.8% of the total EU staff. However, when non-quantitative factors are 
taken into consideration, DG Trade may be considered as one of the most 
powerful and influential DGs in the EU.  
For starters, DG Trade is the most politically independent DG in the 
Commission since external trade has always been the exclusive competence of 
the EU. For example, although DG Devco may employ the most staff which 
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correlates to the largest human resources allocated, development is technically 
an area of mixed competence, meaning that member states also have power 
over this affair. Thus, while it is technically larger in numbers compared to DG 
Trade, its institutional independence is smaller.  
Over  time, DG Trade has also been considered to be among the most 
powerful DGs in the Commission having amassed considerable power vis-à-vis 
EU member states or its ‘principals’ (Elsig, 2007; Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011; 
Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2011; Bossuyt et al., 2020). There are several 
explanations on why this is the case. First, trade has historically played an 
important role in the EU’s regionalism project, and DG Trade has benefitted from 
this inclination. Since the very beginning, the Common Commercial Policy was 
the EU’s most prominent policy area, and the commission was granted exclusive 
competence since early on. As a result, trade policy within the EU is a highly self-
contained policy area (Bossuyt et al., 2020), making DG Trade a rather 
independent directorate compared to others. Second, external changes have 
greatly assisted in justifying DG Trade’s increasing competence over time.  
As discussed in earlier chapters, global trade issues have shifted over 
time from negotiating ‘border issues’ like tariffs and quotas to within border issues 
like national laws and domestic regulations (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011), 
creating problems for the scope of the EU’s competence. Over time, member 
states have agreed to widen the EU’s trade competence, and despite changes 
in the Lisbon Treaty to include the EU parliament in balancing the trade 
policymaking process, the Commission and the Council have a massive 
historical advantage over the Parliament for any substantial changes to take 
place. This means that as the grantee of the EU’s trade competence, DG Trade 
is becoming more powerful and resourceful over time.    
Third, ideological debate within the EU tends to favour a neoliberal and 
free-trade paradigm, which is a departure from its protectionist trade policy in the 
1980s, and partly fuels DG Trade’s growing power overtime. Since the mid-
1990s, the Commission has embraced a neoliberal trade strategy, starting from 
the Commission’s ‘new market access strategy’ in 1996, and has reinforced this 
position through the 2006 communication paper: Global Europe, and the 2010 
communication paper: Trade, Growth and World Affairs strategy (Bossuyt et al., 
2020). Within this worldview, external trade relations should only be used to 
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defend and further the EU’s commercial interest, and inclusion of other 
dimensions (security, foreign policy or social) may impede this. Advocates of this 
view are often dubbed as the ‘trade purists’ as opposed to the ‘foreign policy 
specialists’ who see external trade as part of the EU’s foreign policy (Peterson, 
2007). Echoing these neoliberal views are the EU’s private sectors who believe 
that while EU trade agreements should consider environmental, labour, and 
other social dimensions, it should also be noted that trade agreement is a 
‘business-first’ activity since there is no point in forwarding a non-trade agenda if 
it means losing the whole trade agreement.96 Given their line of work, DG Trade 
will naturally tend to favour and advocate a neoliberal viewpoint, which furthers 
their institutional supremacy and power. Consequently, not only has DG Trade 
accumulated greater influence and power over time, but it also managed to bring 
‘real’ commercial interests back to the EU’s trade diplomacy.                  
What this means is that while, effectively, other DGs may have more 
tangible resources in the form of staff personnel compared to DG Trade,97 DG 
Trade possesses more in terms of intangible resources, most notably in the 
ability to undertake independent actions, rally private sectors’ support, and 
influence the EU’s trade and economic discourse. This means that within the EU, 
the institutions in charge of managing external trade are equipped with ‘average’ 
tangible resources and powerful intangible resources, making them relatively 
more well-equipped. In contrast, ASEAN institutions in charge of external trade 
lack both the tangible resources, capabilities, and ideological underpinnings to 
be able to take any meaningful actions.  
In practice, there are two main institutions in charge of ASEAN trade 
diplomacy: the ASEAN Secretariat as the regional body and national ministries 
as the executor of regional commitments. Another powerful and yet, less 
practical actor, is the head of states who are in charge of finalising and signing 
 
96 Anonymous interview with representative from business association in the EU  
97 Another appropriate indicator for tangible resources would be the overall budget, more 
precisely by looking at the budget distribution within the Commission’s DGs, offices and 
services. However, no specific data can be found regarding this since the EU’s budget is 
allocated and reported based on policy and cooperation area with different DG’s expenditure 
simply stated as ‘administrative purposes’ (refer to Section 4.3.2 for the different posts on the 
EU’s budget).      
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commitments agreed at the regional level.98 The ASEAN Secretariat is headed 
by a secretary-general and is supported by four departments which are clustered 
based on the three pillars of the ASEAN Community: ASEAN Political-Security 
Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community (ASCC). Within this structure, external trade falls under the 
dominion of the ASEAN Economic Community Department, more specifically 
under the external market integration directorate and the External Economic 
















98 A more detailed explanation on the different actors and roles within ASEAN’s trade diplomacy 
is discussed in Chapter 4.    
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Figure 6.2 ASEAN Secretariat Organisational Structure 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2018)  
 
If we compare the APSC and AEC structure, external relations under the 
APSC are at a higher level of authority (directorate), whereas in AEC, External 
Economic Relations are at a lower level of authority (division). Under this 
structure, the political-security affairs of ASEAN are mostly geared towards ‘real’ 
external relations while ASEAN’s economic affairs are only geared to strengthen 
internal relations, with external economic relations merely acting as a support for 
further internal integration. Furthermore, the APSC Department has three 
divisions focusing on external relations in contrast to the AEC Department’s 
single division on external economic relations. This itself can explain the direction 
of external relations and the role that external trade play in ASEAN. 
Unfortunately, no exact data regarding the distribution of ASEAN staff can be 
found, although it is estimated that the ASEAN Secretariat currently employs 
more than 300 personnel (The Insider Stories, 2018).    
The EER Division itself is a relatively small division with no more than five 
personnel overseeing all of ASEAN’s external trade relations,99 which is 
 
99 Anonymous interview with official from ASEAN Secretariat  
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miniscule compared to the EU’s gigantic DG Trade. This number of staff equates 
to less than 1% of ASEAN Secretariat’s workforce (more precisely to around 
0,01%) and barely covers the day-to-day activity of the division, let alone be able 
to take any decisive actions in ASEAN’s external trade relations.100 Moreover, 
within the institutions that can take strategic actions, such as national technical 
ministries, there is a strict hierarchy that limits the role and independence of 
these institutions.  
As Chapter 5 illustrates, strategic decisions in ASEAN’s external trade can 
only be made by Heads of State with input from the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council, consisting of Member States’ Foreign Ministers who then transfers 
regionally agreed decisions to corresponding ministries, including the Ministry of 
Trade. This is a top-down hierarchical structure meaning that technical ministries 
have no or little room to manoeuvre and are generally expected to follow 
decisions made at higher levels. Although trade ministries may be allocated 
substantial resources, without the independence and freedom to utilise these 
resources, they are practically useless. In conclusion, due to the limited human 
resources of the ASEAN Secretariat and the top-down hierarchical 
decisionmaking structure, the institutional resources and capacity of ASEAN to 
pursue commercial goals are highly limited compared to the EU.  
Summarising the last two sections (6.3.1. & 6.3.2), it can be concluded 
that for the EU, trade diplomacy is aimed towards acquiring the largest 
commercial benefits possible as evidenced by the organisation’s unified regional 
trade goals and strong presence of DG Trade. In comparison, ASEAN’s trade 
diplomacy is characterised by little regards on the commercial benefits of trade 
diplomacy as suggested by less unified regional trade goals and the relatively 
weak ASEAN institutions involved in external trade. Differing from the EU, the 
ASEAN Secretariat’s organisational structure is more concerned with its external 
relations in political-security affairs rather than economic ones. With this in mind, 
the next section focuses on this aspect by elaborating on the non-commercial 
goals of the EU and ASEAN trade diplomacy. 
 
 
100 Anonymous interview with official from ASEAN Secretariat 
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6.4. Non-Commercial Goals in the EU and ASEAN’s Trade Diplomacy 
As Section 6.2 illustrates, both the EU and ASEAN have outlined non-
commercial, trade diplomatic goals, with the EU stating a Stronger Global Actor 
as its core objective and ASEAN aiming for a Global ASEAN. For the EU, this 
objective is implemented through several actions including reinforcing its position 
as a global trade player; increasing market share & effective implementation of 
trade deals; and implementing a sustainable approach to trade (European 
Commission, 2016c). For ASEAN, this ambition is operationalised through 
several mechanisms including engagements in multiple external trade 
agreements, active contribution to trade regime formation, and continued 
participation in multiple regional organisations and economic institutions (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2017). 
In explaining these non-commercial goals, this research identifies two 
central goals which are in line with these stated objectives and one additional 
goal which is not explicitly stated but is present in both the EU and ASEAN’s 
trade diplomatic practices. These three non-commercial goals include 
maintaining strategic position, sustaining key relationship/alliances and 
strengthening regionalism and regionalist values through external trade. The first 
two are manifestations of the ‘global player’ ambitions that both the EU and 
ASEAN strive for while the latter is a rather implicit goal, shaped mostly by their 
unique characteristics as non-traditional actors in international relations.      
6.4.1. Maintaining Strategic Position & Sustaining Key Relationships Through 
External Trade  
As discussed in section 6.2, both the EU and ASEAN list being a global 
player as one of their goals in managing their external trade relations and is by 
far the most telling aspect of their non-commercial goals. The extent to which the 
EU and ASEAN aim to become global players can be broken down and analysed 
within two distinct geographical classifications: the intent of becoming an 
influential regional and global player through external trade. Essentially, the EU 
and ASEAN operate in vastly different regional environments, which affects the 
way they respond to this. The most apparent difference between the two is in the 
EU’s central and hegemonic role in the region, while in contrast, ASEAN has 
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vulnerable regional position due to threat of domination by many great regional 
powers.  
For the EU, the need to become an influential regional player is no longer 
among its main political goal since the EU has achieved regional domination in 
Europe due to its size and collective resources. Regional hegemons such as 
Germany are already members of the EU so collectively speaking, the EU does 
not face any significant regional challengers. Although there is, of course, 
Russia, but Russia operates more in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, while 
historically, the EU operates more in Western Europe. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Map of the EU and its Neighbouring Countries 
Source: Google Maps (2020) 
 
At present, the EU is more concerned about maintaining regional stability 
since it is surrounded by several unstable regions, such as the Middle East and 
Eastern Europe, and has done so through external cooperations and peaceful 
means including trade preferences. Smith (2018) identifies four key relationships 
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that the EU has, which link its trade policy with foreign policy goals: (a) the EU’s 
relationship with strategic partners and rising powers, (b) relationships with 
developing countries, (c) connections through interregional & multilateral 
relationships, and (d) the EU’s enlargement & relationships with its Eastern and 
Southern Neighbourhoods. Among these four relationships, three are targeted 
toward global relations, and one is focused on maintaining regional relationships 
(relationship d). Obviously, the EU’s enlargement process means that any 
eligible neighbouring countries who are willing to join the EU will need to fulfil the 
minimum standards and are required to accept the EU’s rules and regulations, 
including the EU’s exclusive trade competence.  
This goes without saying then, that in order to gain trade and other 
economic preferences from the EU (among others), EU-eligible countries can 
choose to join the EU and surrender some parts of their political and economic 
sovereignty. Although this can be considered as the obvious consequences of 
joining a regional integration project, the EU’s enlargement process can also be 
seen as one of its most effective foreign policy tools (Smith, 2018), which 
highlight the political-economic linkage.    
For non-eligible, neighbouring countries, the EU uses its European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which, in itself, is not a pure trade instrument but 
comprises of a substantial trade component. The ENP’s trade component is 
utilised through several agreements including Association Agreements (AA), 
Partnership and Cooperation agreements (PCA), and Deep & Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (DCFTA), where third countries can gain market access and 
trade preferences to the EU in exchange for several political, social, and security 
conditionalities. Under these agreements, trade preferences are treated as a 
reward to the EU’s neighbouring countries for behaving in a way that is in line 
with the EU’s external goals and are used as political instruments to achieve 
regional stability and maintain the EU’s strategic position in the region. In 2010, 
the EU introduced the ‘more-for-more’ principle in its neighbourhood program, 
where for every progress in democratic reform made by neighbouring countries, 
the EU will develop stronger partnerships with them (European Commission, 
2013a). In other words, a clear tit-for-tat strategy is exhibited by the EU in the 
form of market access and further economic integration rewarded in exchange 
for the ‘good behaviour’ of neighbouring countries.  
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There are also instances where the EU’s actions relating to external trade 
are interpreted as bold political and security moves such as in the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) initiative, which is a part of ENP. Russia perceived this 
initiative as a geopolitical move from the EU, seeing it as an effort to rival the 
Russia-backed Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and so, pressured several 
Eastern European states to reject the EU’s DCFTA under the EaP scheme 
(Smith, 2017). This shows that while the EU may or may not deliberately use its 
external trade relations for political goals, other actors may perceive it that way 
and thus is impossible to disregard the EU’s non-commercial goals in its trade 
diplomacy. So far, these external instruments have been the cornerstone of the 
EU’s continued presence and domination in the region. In addition to these 
regional ambitions, the EU has also utilised its external trade to fulfil its global 
ambitions.     
For the EU, the aim to be globally influential tends to be focused and 
targeted towards two (group of) countries: the US and developing countries. In 
the EU’s priority programs, ‘a reasonable and balanced trade agreement with the 
US’ is one of the Commission’s priorities, with the EU expecting to achieve this 
through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement. 
Although President Trump’s rise to power has halted TTIP and the negotiations 
were deemed obsolete and no longer relevant by the EU Council (Council of the 
European Union, 2019),101 TTIP was initially designed to combine two main 
global players in the world’s largest-ever free trade agreements. While on the 
surface this may look like a regular trade agreement, the EU’s trade agreement 
with the US has larger political and strategic importance, closely related to their 
global positioning. Globally, the EU and the US are not only intertwined in 
multiple trade, investment, and institutional commitments but also embody the 
‘western alliance’ (Smith, 2018), which shapes many global outcomes. The TTIP 
is envisioned to reinvigorate the transatlantic alliance, with former US Secretary 
of State, Hillary Clinton, labelling the TTIP as the ‘economic NATO’ (De Ville and 
Siles-Brugge, 2016) and thus securing this agreement would undoubtedly mean, 
a better EU-US diplomatic relation.  
 
101 It should be noted that on April 2019, the Council granted a new negotiation mandate to the 
Commission to once again open the EU-US FTA negotiation although with less ambitious 
trade targets compared to the TTIP.      
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In addition to the US, the EU also seeks to maintain influential 
relationships with the so-called ‘rising powers’ and developing countries, often 
linking its development policy with trade preferences. The EU’s relationship with 
rising powers is usually formalised through ‘strategic partnership’ agreements, 
covering multiple areas of cooperation such as in the EU-Brazil, EU-South 
Korea, and EU-Russia Strategic Partnerships. While the content of these 
agreements may differ from one to another, the common thread between them 
is that they include a considerable component of trade preferences.  
For developing countries, the EU adopts a rather similar approach with its 
neighbouring countries, where trade preferences can be suspended or cut if 
target countries misbehave politically. Examples of this would be the EU’s 
Generalised Scheme of Preference (GSP), GSP+ and Everything but Arms 
(EBA) mechanism where around 70 least-developed and developing countries 
are granted preferential trading access to the EU market, conditional on effective 
implementation of the 27 international conventions on human rights, 
environmental protection and good governance by these countries (European 
Commission, 2019a). This means that the EU can withhold its trade preferences 
to more than a third of the total countries in the world if these countries 
‘misbehave’. The EU also monitors participating countries’ performance on these 
issues and may suspend trade preferences if required, such as in the case of 
Cambodia.  
On February 2019, the EU initiated an investigation on Cambodia, 
believing that the Cambodian government had seriously violated the UN’s core 
conventions on human and labour rights. This includes systematic harassment 
targeted at trade unions and employees, land grabbing and the shutdown of 
several media outlets. After almost a year of investigation, the Commission 
decided to partially withdraw Cambodia’s trade preferences starting from August 
2020, pending approval from the Council and the Parliament (Russell, 2019; 
European Commission, 2020a). This withdrawal of trade preferences amounts 
to around €1 billion or one-fifth of Cambodia’s yearly exports to the EU covering 
various goods such as garments, footwear products, travel goods, and sugar 
(European Commission, 2020a). Other countries that are currently under the 
EU’s watch are Bangladesh and Myanmar due to their treatment of the Rohingya 
minority, which is considered as genocide (Russell, 2019).  
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In many ways, the EU has used its trade preferences as instruments to 
enhance (or limit) ties with strategic partners and maximise its influence and 
position, which is also similar to ASEAN, although ASEAN tends to be more 
subtle in its approach.  
Unlike the EU, ASEAN was and is still trying to achieve and maintain 
regional positioning, due to its geographical location which sits between multiple 
regional hegemons. Geographically, ASEAN sits between Northeast Asia, South 
Asia, and Oceania which are home to multiple regional hegemons like China, 
India and Japan, while also being relatively close to several middle power 
countries like South Korea and Australia. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Map of ASEAN and its Neighbouring Countries 
Source: Google Maps (2020) 
 
Historically, ASEAN was also home to several proxy wars, leading to 
regional divide and, in fact, ASEAN was initially formed to contain ideological 
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divide within the region.102 Individually, ASEAN member states are either small 
or medium-sized countries with limited political and economic power which 
makes them vulnerable to domination by other regional hegemons. By 
strengthening ASEAN, its member states expect to play the stabilising role within 
the region, so, in essence, ASEAN is ‘an association of weak states created to 
achieve the limited purpose of maintaining regional order’ (Jones, 2015).  
However, despite their limited power, ASEAN is the only regional 
organisation which has successfully combined three regional powers (China, 
Japan, and India) within the same forum and managed to initiate cooperation 
between East Asian states, which previously seemed impossible to do. Despite 
several debates on whether ASEAN’s role and relevance have had any 
considerable impact on the wider region (see for example Beeson, 2019; 
Jetschke and Theiner, 2019; Stubbs, 2019), it is undeniable that for ASEAN, 
being globally, and more importantly, regionally relevant is crucial in order to 
maintain a stable Southeast Asia. To do this, ASEAN uses regional political 
medium such as the ASEAN Regional Forum to stay relevant (Ba, 1997), and 
this is also what ASEAN is trying to achieve through its external trade.   
Section 6.3 shows that ASEAN’s external trade bore little commercial 
goals which begs the question of why ASEAN insists on continuing their practice 
of collective trade negotiations. One assertion is that ASEAN member states 
need to continuously maintain a cohesive front to external partners, including in 
trade, in order to remain politically significant. During the research interviews, 
one pressing question was regarding why liberal ASEAN economies like 
Singapore and more recently, Vietnam still choose to negotiate a more shallow 
FTA through ASEAN although they already have individual FTAs in place with 
similar countries.103 While collective ASEAN negotiations have certain 
advantages such as a larger market size, wider coverage of rules/country of 
origin, and greater negotiating leverage, the depth and degree of these 
agreements are often too shallow to offer any real benefits, especially 
considering that these FTAs are also minimally utilised. Economically speaking, 
there is very little added-value in securing an ASEAN-led FTA after an individual 
 
102 A detailed explanation on ASEAN’s historical origin will be discussed in the following chapter.  
103 This include the EU-Vietnam, EU-Singapore and the more recent EU-ASEAN FTA   
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FTA is signed, making ASEAN-led negotiations rather inefficient and ineffective 
for several ASEAN member states. However, when questioned regarding this 
choice, a trade official from the corresponding country mentioned that since 
ASEAN is their country’s ‘inner circle’ in foreign policy, it is important to follow 
what ASEAN does to maintain the unity of the organisation and forward the 
country’s foreign policy goals.104 The interviewee went further to conclude that, 
in essence, ASEAN FTAs should also be perceived as symbolic region-to-region 
political gestures rather than purely economic ones, and since ASEAN works on 
the basis of ‘brotherhood’, being supportive of other ASEAN countries, including 
in external trade, is important.105    
For ASEAN, the ‘appearance of unity’ is crucial in maintaining the 
impression that they are a functioning regional organisation that is capable of 
keeping order within the region. One example of ASEAN maintaining the 
‘regional order’ in trade cooperation is through the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), where ASEAN seeks to unite the FTAs of its 
dialogue partners through a single framework. Historically, RCEP was not the 
framework that ASEAN dialogue partners suggested, since initially, the proposed 
framework was either the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) or Japan’s-backed 
ASEAN+6 Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA), which 
would also include non-East Asian states like Australia and New Zealand.  
However, in November 2011, ASEAN proposed its own model of ASEAN-
centred FTA – the RCEP – which was later accepted by its dialogue partners 
and launched in 2012 (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 2020). Currently, RCEP is high on ASEAN’s FTA agenda, with several 
ASEAN member states postponing other FTA negotiations to give way for the 
finalisation of the RCEP.106 Although India’s withdrawal from this negotiation may 
have hindered ASEAN’s ambition in securing one of the largest FTAs in the 
world, RCEP has nonetheless been central to ASEAN’s desire in being the 
central player in Asia-Pacific’s trade architecture. Interestingly, several 
interviewees noted that RCEP actually benefits non-ASEAN states more than 
 
104 Anonymous interview with official from ASEAN Member State’s Ministry of Trade 
105 Anonymous interviews with official from ASEAN Member State’s Ministry of Trade and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
106 Anonymous interviews with official from ASEAN Member State’s Ministry of Trade and 
ASEAN Secretariat 
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ASEAN member states since ASEAN member states already have FTAs in place 
with these partners and thus, RCEP functions more to connect non-ASEAN 
members with one another, rather than with ASEAN itself.107 What can be 
inferred then, is that for ASEAN, its collective FTAs and accompanying economic 
agreements are tools to both uphold its ‘unity of appearance’ and maintain its 
central position within the region.           
In addition to using its external trade to maintain a strategic position, 
ASEAN also uses its external trade to maintain close or strategic relationships 
with several key countries. For many Asia-Pacific countries, including ASEAN, 
the need to secure FTAs has more to do with ‘strengthening diplomatic relations’ 
with key partners than for any other reasons (Dent, 2006). For ASEAN, this works 
both externally and internally where collective FTA negotiation is a way to 
strengthen ASEAN’s internal diplomatic relations and to further external 
diplomatic ties with its strategic partners. One interesting feature of ASEAN’s 
external trade is in the careful choice of negotiating partners, where ASEAN 
chooses trade cooperation partners based on their ‘closeness’ meaning that 
requests from countries who are long time partners of ASEAN (the so-called 
dialogue or sectoral partners) are more likely to be prioritised.108  
Research interviews also confirm this practice where several interviewees 
acknowledge that for FTA requests from countries who are considered less 
close, ASEAN will suggest to first engage in deeper bilateral relations before 
discussing deeper trade cooperation.109 This choice can be explained both 
politically and culturally, where deeper trade relations with ASEAN can be viewed 
as a ‘reward’ to third-parties for their continued support in ASEAN’s region-
building process,110 and at the same time reflect ASEAN’s corporate culture 
which sometimes emphasises long-lasting relationships over substance. Since 
all of ASEAN’s FTA partners are also their dialogue partners, and the granting of 
dialogue partners is based on long-term relationships & support of ASEAN’s 
 
107 Anonymous interviews with researchers in ASEAN economic relation  
108 Anonymous interviews with official from ASEAN Member State’s Ministry of Trade and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
109 Anonymous interviews with official from ASEAN Member State’s Ministry of Trade and 
ASEAN Secretariat 
110 Anonymous interview with researcher in ASEAN economic relations  
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integration (both financially and technically), these FTAs are in many ways, a 
highly transactional process.  
For example, the signing of ACFTA in 2002 served several purposes for 
both China and ASEAN. For China, it serves as a way to minimise Southeast 
Asian countries’ perception of the China threat and provide the external image 
of China as a responsible great power who focuses more on cooperation, rather 
than coercion (Goh, 2007). China's less threatening image was instrumental for 
gaining larger access to individual ASEAN member states’ since it can ensure a 
more sustainable economic and political cooperation. Following ACFTA, China 
signed FTAs with Thailand in 2003 and with Singapore in 2008 and continuously 
increased its export and investment share in Southeast Asia. Although China still 
lacks behind Japan for inward investment to Southeast Asia, there has been a 
threefold increase in China’s investment to Southeast Asia from 2010 to 2018 
(Lim and Camba, 2020).111  
ACFTA was also unique, in the sense that it was negotiated using a 
sequential approach, meaning that additional points of agreements can be 
discussed and added later on. In August 2014, ASEAN and China decided to 
upgrade ACFTA and trade negotiations have been ongoing up until the time of 
the research interviews in 2018. From the ASEAN side, the timing of ACFTA was 
also strategic, considering that ASEAN’s centrality was being questioned during 
the early 2000s and ACFTA assisted in reinstating ASEAN’s relevance back, 
which eventually led to the signing of other ASEAN-plus FTAs (Ravenhill, 2006). 
ACFTA, thus, can be interpreted as a transactional process between ASEAN 
and China, where both parties seek political and economic gains through FTA.   
External FTAs can also be seen as ASEAN’s way of strengthening existing 
relationships with its dialogue partners. Currently, the RCEP is ASEAN’s top 
priority for external FTAs since it aims to bind together ASEAN’s FTA with 
multiple partners and in fact, ASEAN has chosen to postpone other requests 
from external parties to focus on RCEP.112 RCEP is an ASEAN-led negotiation 
which started in 2012 and included six of ASEAN’s dialogue partners including 
 
111 Although the ACFTA framework was signed in 2000, the Investment Agreement 
Chapter was not signed until August 2009.  
112 Anonymous interviews with officials from ASEAN Member State’s Ministry of Trade and ASEAN 
Secretariat 
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China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and New Zealand. Economically 
speaking, RCEP itself has little added-value for ASEAN, considering that the 
organisation has already secured FTAs with all these partners and several 
ASEAN countries even have additional arrangements in place.113  
In a way, RCEP is more beneficial for non-ASEAN member states rather 
than for ASEAN, since several of these non-ASEAN states have no FTAs with 
one another. Politically, however, RCEP makes much more sense since it 
creates a forum for several regional hegemons to discuss regional economic 
issues, with ASEAN being the manager and norm-setter. ASEAN has the 
authority to lead the negotiation, set the content of the proposed FTAs, and at 
the same time, enhance its political and economic ties with these partners. RCEP 
also adds to the list of ASEAN-led initiatives, such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum and East Asia Summit, where regional hegemons discuss various issues 
under ASEAN’s ‘management’, meaning that ASEAN will remain central in Asia-
Pacific affairs. This also closely links to ASEAN’s desire to be a relevant regional 
player because, in order to do so, it requires support and close ties from the 
regional hegemons. Assuming that ASEAN remains united (even though only at 
the surface level), it can use its external trade strategically to maintain close ties 
with regional powers and retain its central position in Asia-Pacific.  
Frankly speaking, ASEAN strategically uses its FTAs as a ‘reward’ for other 
countries in exchange for either their continued support in the organisation’s 
regionalism project or acknowledgement of its central position within the region.     
6.4.2. Strengthening Regionalism and Regional Values Through External Trade 
The second non-commercial goal in the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy 
is the inherent need to strengthen their regionalism project, including their 
regionalist ideologies and regional values via external trade. Regionalist ideology 
refers to the belief that pooling resources through regional cooperation will 
eventually lead to better outcomes for those involved, and this is basically the 
justification for why regionalism should exist. Without the explicit advantage and 
 
113 It should be noted though that RCEP can also bring economic benefits for ASEAN as a group 
since it may offer deeper and more comprehensive FTAs compared to existing ASEAN-led 
ones, although it seems unlikely that it will exceed the national-level FTAs.     
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implicit belief that ROs will do more good than harm, ROs are unlikely to have 
achieved so much until now.  
Although the EU and ASEAN have been thriving for more than 50 years, 
one crucial issue remains central to their regional integration – legitimacy as an 
organisation – especially on whether they genuinely represent the people’s need 
or not. The EU, for example, has long been criticised for its ‘democratic deficit’ 
(Featherstone, 1994; Koenig-Archibugi, 2008; Decker, 2011) and ASEAN has 
always been considered as an ‘elitist club’ (Nesadurai, 2008; Gerard, 2014; 
Benny et al., 2015), with limited accountability and relevance to their community. 
Against this backdrop, the EU and ASEAN are challenged, both internally and 
externally, to validate that regionalism, regional organisations and regionalist 
ideas are still relevant, and this is precisely where external trade plays an 
important role. 
For the EU, trade is one of the most reliable and tangible results that 
regionalism can offer since the internal economic gain from the EU common 
market is tremendous, and this advantage is replicated externally through the 
collective negotiation of FTAs. From January 2016 to April 2019, DG Trade 
reported an average of 4.4.% export growth to non-EU countries, with the EU 
recording a positive growth rate in export share in 2017-2018 with most of its 
FTA partners (European Commission, 2019b).114 The preference utilisation rate 
of EU FTAs also remain high for both EU exports and imports, ranging at around 
21-90% and 49-97%, respectively (European Commission, 2019b), meaning that 
private sectors are largely benefitting from EU FTAs. These positive results were 
also felt by the EU consumers and the larger citizens in general, which is 
reflected in their satisfaction with the EU’s trade performance. A 2019 survey on 
the public attitudes regarding the EU’s trade policy reported a positive overall 
outlook, with a majority of respondent (71%) believing that the EU is collectively 
more effective in defending their countries’ trade interests rather than if their 
countries were to act on their own (European Commission, 2019e). Furthermore, 
more than half of respondents (60%) agree that they are benefitting more from 
the EU’s trade, which is a 16% increase from the last survey in 2010.     
 
114 EU only recorded negative export growth rates with three of its FTA partners: Peru-Colombia-
Ecuador, South Korea and Euro-Mediterranean (Euromed).   






Figure 6.5 Europeans’ Attitudes Regarding the EU’s Trade Policy 
Source: Eurobarometer (2019)  
 
The percentage of respondents who believe that the EU is more effective 
collectively rather than individually in trade is a good indicator of how trade 
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functions positively in enhancing the collective and regionalist ideology within the 
EU. Also, since trade benefits are directly felt by citizens (as the first figure has 
shown), as long as the EU can keep providing net positive results from its trade, 
regionalist ideology (at least in economic terms) will always have its place within 
the EU. Closely linked to the EU’s regionalist ideology is its regional values and 
norms which are often embedded in the EU’s FTAs with external parties. These 
‘social dimensions’ of the EU FTAs have been well documented in the EU’s trade 
literature and have achieved considerable discussions (see for example Orbie, 
Vos and Taverniers, 2005; Orbie and Babarinde, 2008; Orbie, Gistelinck and 
Kerremans, 2009; Van Den Putte et al., 2015).  
In practice, all EU FTAs will include a trade and sustainable development 
chapter, listing several non-commercial components (yet considered as trade-
related) deemed crucial by the EU, and must be agreed to by third party/parties 
as an integral part of FTAs. Scholars have also identified the EU’s practise of 
using TSD chapters not only as a way to export its regional values but also to 
achieve global power – mostly a normative one – and to formulate global norms, 
creating the so-called notion of the ‘EU as a power in trade and through trade’ 
(Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011). Comparing this to ASEAN, ASEAN clearly has 
limited global trade power compared to the EU, although just like the EU, ASEAN 
also uses its external trade to strengthen its internal regionalism projects.       
For ASEAN, one of its main non-commercial goals in trade diplomacy is 
to reinforce its regionalist perspective, particularly in deepening and 
strengthening its internal integration. Looking at Figure 6.2 which depicts 
ASEAN’s organisational structure, it can be seen that ASEAN’s External 
Economic Relations division, which is in charge of external trade, is a part of the 
Market Integration Directorate, under the ASEAN Economic Community 
Department, which focuses more on internal integration, rather than on pure 
external relations. Under this structure, external trade is positioned to support 
ASEAN’s internal economic integration and not purely to advance ASEAN’s 
overall external relations. This can also be linked back to ASEAN’s political use 
of FTAs as ‘rewards’ for its dialogue partners where based on the discussion in 
Section 4.3.2 in Chapter 4, more than half of ASEAN’s budget (around US$ 60 
million) originated from external donors, illustrating that ASEAN’s regionalism 
project is strongly tied – and perhaps, dependent on – its external partners. This 
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means that as long as ASEAN can continue offering its external FTAs as 
rewards, its internal economic integration project will survive (at least in financial 
terms). Research interviews also confirm this external trade-internal integration 
linkage, with several ASEAN member states’ trade officials believing that 
external trade and conducting collective negotiations are good practice for 
ASEAN to achieve a common position in order to advance their economic 
integration project.115        
To put it differently, while the EU uses external trade to strengthen its 
regionalist ideology and values, ASEAN uses external trade to strengthen its 
regionalism project, and although this may seem different on the surface, both 
interests encapsulate the basic belief on the primacy of having a regionalism 
project. For ASEAN, internally promoting a regionalist perspective is not a major 
concern for its member states since many of them are either authoritarian or 
semi-democratic states, meaning that central government can undertake any 
regionalist policy without necessarily having to go through rigid public scrutiny, 
and thus, can focus more on gaining material and tangible benefits.         
 In terms of regional values and ideology, ASEAN does not fromally exhibit 
any efforts in ‘promoting’ their values externally (in comparison to the EU which 
actively promotes its values), but rather it ‘invites’ external partners to understand 
the internal workings of ASEAN. Third-parties have often complained about 
ASEAN’s slow and time-consuming decisionmaking processes but are incapable 
of changing things since they must accept that this is how ASEAN works.116 
While this is not an ‘active’ way of promoting norms, this can be understood as 
ASEAN’s ‘soft’ approach in projecting its internal norms: not necessarily forcing 
others to follow it but expecting others to behave in accordance with ASEAN’s 
rule book if they were to be included. This is a standard practice in many of 
ASEAN’s FTA negotiations where external parties are expected to understand 
ASEAN’s commitment to consultation and consensus-building that are also 
apparent in forums where ASEAN takes the lead (i.e. RCEP, ARF). Interestingly, 
these norms can also be seen as one of ASEAN’s appeals to non-members, 
attracting countries such as China, Russia, and India who are all intent in 
 
115 Anonymous interviews with several ASEAN Member State’strade officials  
116 Anonymous interviews with several officials from DG Trade 
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protecting their sovereignty and policy autonomy, but at the same time feel the 
need to participate in interstate organisations (Nesadurai, 2008).   
 In short, the EU and ASEAN both pursue commercial and non-commercial 
goals through their external trade, although the EU is more invested in achieving 
commercial goals and ASEAN leans more toward accomplishing non-
commercial ones.       
6.5. Comparing the EU and ASEAN’s Goals in Trade Diplomacy  
Based on the discussion, a summary of the differences and similarities in 
the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomatic goals can be outlined below:   
 
 
Table 6.3 Comparison of the EU and ASEAN’s Goals in Trade Diplomacy 
Main Component EU ASEAN 
Commercial Goals Regionally driven Nationally driven 





Use of trade/market access 
to maintain strategic 
position & strategic relations 
Use of trade/market access 
to maintain strategic position 
& strategic relations 
Use of external trade to 
strengthen regionalism & 
regionalist values 
Use of external trade to 
strengthen regionalism & 
regionalist values 
 
As the table illustrates, the EU and ASEAN are different in their commercial goals 
where the EU is more invested and regionally coherent compared to ASEAN. On 
the other hand, both the EU and ASEAN display similarities in their non-
commercial goals where FTAs and market access are used to maintain strategic 
position and relations as well as instruments for validation and consolidation of 
the organisation’s regionalism projects and values.    
6.5.1. Explaining Differences in the EU and ASEAN’s Trade Diplomatic Goals 
In explaining differences between the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, 
this research identifies three main determinants: differences in the depth of their 
economic integration & degree of liberalisation, the availability of a regional 
mechanism to minimise economic divergences, and the differing roles of 
political-economic players within the region.  
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As a customs union, EU member states are expected to have a regionally 
coherent trade outlook towards external parties compared to ASEAN, which 
Section 5.4.1.2 in Chapter 5 has clearly illustrated. Since the absence of a 
customs union generally means that individual member state can impose an 
individual tariff, the likelihood to achieve common commercial goals is decreased 
since member states are more likely to pursue individual commercial goals. 
Furthermore, ASEAN’s divergences in external tariff rates (Table 5.4.) and the 
multiple failed efforts to consolidate this have indicated that within the short and 
medium-run, ASEAN may still face difficulties in formulating and maintaining 
regional commercial goals due to discrepancies in their degree of liberalisation.  
While several ASEAN countries may pursue full trade liberalisation, others 
may be reluctant to do so and will prefer protectionism for several areas of their 
economies. In addition to this, the difference in the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
decisionmaking structure, which allows flexible participation in external trade 
agreements, means that convergence in ASEAN is less likely to be achieved. 
While the internal economic gap can partly explain ASEAN’s difficulty in 
maintaining a regionally cohesive trade position, it is the lack of regional 
mechanisms to unify these differences that matters the most (Section 4.3.3 in 
Chapter 4).  
In comparison, although the EU also faces large economic gaps, the 
availability of mechanisms such as Copenhagen criteria, Euro convergence 
criteria, and the accession assistance have helped mitigate and reduce the 
likelihood of economic divergences between member states. In sum, 
explanations on why the EU is regionally driven in its commercial goals while 
ASEAN is not have been extensively discussed in previous chapters and hence, 
will not be discussed in detail here. The more interesting explanation here would 
be on why the EU is more invested in commercial goals compared to ASEAN, 
considering that external trade relations should, by default, be more about 
bringing commercial gains to the region. One reason for this is due to differences 
in the EU and ASEAN’s socio-economic and political players where the EU’s 
trade diplomatic goals are mostly shaped by economic players and liberal 
ideologies while for ASEAN, political players with less-liberal ideologies tend to 
dominate.  
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For starters, private sectors and the EU’s trade policymakers are relatively 
close and often engaged in a mutualistic relationship where businesses provide 
first-hand information, expertise, and strategic insights to EU policymakers in 
exchange of direct access to policymaking (Bouwen, 2002). During the research 
interview, one of the two interviewees representing business associations in the 
EU was a former staff in DG Trade, which seems to be a common occurrence in 
the EU-private sector relations. One interviewee from the civil society groups 
also suggests that private sectors, especially business lobbyists, often have 
special relationships with trade policymakers where other stakeholders are often 
excluded. The interviewee showed an email invitation to several business 
associations from one EU negotiator who wanted to discuss the progress of an 
ongoing negotiation, but this invitation was not extended to civil society groups. 
Furthermore, the interviewee added that despite the regulation that EU officials 
need to disclose meetings with private sectors or other entities, several meetings 
between DG Trade and business lobbyists are sometimes not documented.117 
The practice of private sectors’ lobbying in the EU’s trade policymaking is also 
well-documented in the literature,118 and given the private sectors’ historical 
advantage in lobbying over other stakeholders such as CSOs, it is no surprise 
that businesses mostly shape the EU’s trade diplomatic goals.  
Generally speaking, CSOs are more successful in lobbying the EU 
parliament with regards to trade issues, compared to other EU institutions and is 
perhaps the only situation where CSO lobbying is more effective than business 
lobbying (Dür et al., 2015). However, before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 
parliament’s involvement in trade policymaking was limited, where the 
Commission and the Council took prominent roles and even when the parliament 
were involved through Lisbon Treaty, FTAs were still considered a bilateral policy 
game between the Commission and Council (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 
2011). This has put other actors at a disadvantaged position compared to private 
sectors, and given that the main goal of businesses is to make a profit, it is no 
surprise that the EU’s trade diplomacy is geared towards commercial purposes. 
Furthermore, ideologically speaking, businesses have advantages over other 
 
117 Anonymous interview with representative from an EU-based CSO.  
118 See for example Bouwen (2002, 2011); Ehrlich and Jones (2016); Cooper et al. (2017) 
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actors since neoliberalism, and free-market capitalism are the preferred 
ideologies in the EU, and most businesses operate and thrive by these ideas.  
Private sectors are at the core of neoliberalism and are considered the 
natural allies of government officials working under this ideology. Within the EU 
itself, businesses can be classified as either favouring protectionism or 
liberalism, where liberal-minded businesses tend to dominate. Upon completing 
the EU internal market in 1992, the EU shifted from being a defensive and 
protectionist trading bloc to an offensive and free-trade oriented one, mostly 
resulting from the side effects of regulation where national economies could no 
longer enact trade barriers, creating a liberal bias in the EU (Winters, 1998).   
In contrast to the EU, ASEAN’s external trade diplomacy is a state-led, 
top-down process where political players hold dominant roles, aided by coalitions 
with large corporations. Ruland (2016) describes ASEAN’s economic interest 
representation as a form of ‘regional corporatism’, where state-level corporatism 
is exported to the regional level. State corporatism itself can be understood as 
an arrangement where few articulate interest groups demand participatory rights, 
resulting in an ‘institutionalised participation’, strongly controlled by governments 
(Ruland, 2016). For ASEAN, asymmetries occur between interest groups, where 
businesses gain better access to policymakers, compared to CSOs and labour 
organisations. However, political access is also skewed towards large and 
foreign corporations since they have better access to governments. An 
interviewee from a business association in ASEAN pointed out that large 
corporations often bypass business associations since they have the resources 
to directly lobby national governments while small and medium enterprises need 
to pool their resources together and can only rely on collective voices through 
business associations.119  
However, the interviewee also explained that, ironically, many leaders and 
key officials of business associations in ASEAN also hold strategic positions in 
large companies, meaning that one way or another, large companies will always 
have access to the government. For example, the head of Indonesia’s business 
association is an active chairman of a large financial company while the head of 
Malaysia’s business association is the chairman of a real estate company. Also, 
 
119 Anonymous interview with representative from ASEAN member state’s business association 
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the head of the Philippines business association is an executive at a retail & 
publishing company, and the head of Singapore’s business association is a 
managing director at a multinational shipping company. 
‘Institutionalised participation’ in ASEAN also means that governments 
get to choose which actors they want to include in the policymaking process, 
inevitably shifting economic and societal actors to become agents of 
governments, and thus, become political players. This means that for any 
economic or social actors to be included in the policymaking process of ASEAN, 
they must at least adhere to the political rules, play the political games, and thus, 
either advertently or inadvertently, shift to become political players. An example 
of this is the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ABAC), where its members are 
appointed by individual ASEAN member states, delegated with the task of 
‘providing private sector feedback on the implementation of ASEAN economic 
cooperation’ and ‘identifying priority areas for consideration of the ASEAN 
leaders’ (ASEAN Business Advisory Council, 2019).  
On its website, ABAC states that one of its mission is to ‘assist relevant 
ASEAN bodies to institutionalise within each body, a consultative process with 
lead private sector entities’ (ASEAN Business Advisory Council, 2019), which 
begs the question on whether ABAC represents private sectors or, paradoxically, 
ASEAN. Institutionalised participation in ASEAN is also evident in CSOs, where 
involvement is only possible through a ‘created space’, where governments limit 
the kind of societal actors who can participate and the type of participation that 
they can do (Gerard, 2014). Regionally, CSOs focusing on ASEAN trade are 
very limited, with several of these only involved and called upon if third-party 
requests it, with close monitoring from the government.120        
With political players taking the lead, ASEAN trade diplomacy is also 
geared towards political outcomes, rather than economic ones. In explaining 
ASEAN’s pursuit of multiple FTAs, Ravenhill (2010) pointed out that ASEAN’s 
tendency to engage in multiple FTAs is a result of a ‘political domino’ effect, 
rather than economic ones since this behaviour is not due to economic 
calculations, but in member states’ political-strategic considerations. ASEAN 
member states engage in various FTAs in fear of ‘potential exclusion from a new 
 
120 Anonymous interview with member of ASEAN-based civil society organisation 
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dimension of regional economic diplomacy’ (pg. 199-120), which explains more 
about political players’ strategic choices, rather than economic ones. While there 
are indeed economic motives, such as the deepening of the regional production 
network and widening of market access, these is rather minimal compared to 
political ones (Ravenhill, 2010). Domination of strong, political players also 
means that liberal economic ideologies can only thrive if permitted by the political 
players, which seems rather unlikely for ASEAN.  
Looking at ASEAN’s average tariff rate which stood at around 2.98% 
(based on Table 5.4 in Chapter 5), which is slightly higher than the average 
global tariff rate of 2.59%, it can be assumed that on average, ASEAN member 
states are more protectionist compared to other countries/regions. On an 
individual level, more than half of ASEAN member states have a tariff rate above 
the global level with Cambodia recording the highest rate at 9.77% (The World 
Bank, 2019). ASEAN’s higher-than-average tariff rate is in contrast to the EU’s 
rate of 1.79% which, once again, is a testament to the EU’s strong trade 
liberalism ideology and ASEAN’s slight resistance to full-liberalism in trade.  
In sum, regional socio-political and economic actors play a decisive role 
in explaining variations in the EU and ASEAN’s emphasis (or non-emphasis) on 
commercial goals. However, despite their discrepancies in this area, both the EU 
and ASEAN display similarities on how they use external trade to pursue non-
commercial goals.        
6.5.2. Explaining Similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s Trade Diplomatic Goals 
Similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s non-commercial goals can be 
attributed to several factors outside of the region, including geopolitical concerns 
and regional positioning in global relations. Although the EU and ASEAN operate 
in different regional spaces, both are affected by a rather similar security 
pressure, and thus, have strategically used trade relations to mitigate this. For 
the EU, their main security problem lies in their proximity to several conflict-prone 
countries/regions while for ASEAN, domination by regional hegemons and 
rivalries between these hegemons are of main concern. These external security 
threats (either in the traditional or non-traditional sense) are what drives the EU 
and ASEAN to use their trade relations for non-commercial purposes.      
P a g e  | 202 
 
The use of trade and economic relations for security, political, or strategic 
purposes – or trade-security nexus – is not new and can be traced back to the 
mercantilist era in the sixteenth and seventeenth century (Aggarwal and Govella, 
2013). The historical notion that ‘trade follows the flag’ was popular during the 
heyday of the British Empire, with many believing that colonies would promote 
their mother countries’ trade relations. In modern times, this trade-security nexus 
has been expanded and is now built on two underlying assumptions. First, that 
countries are less likely to go into conflict with one another if they have strong 
trade/economic relations (one prime example is the EU’s economic integration 
as peace project) and second, that trade is more likely to happen between 
countries with strong political/security ties. Despite the inconclusive findings 
regarding these propositions (Aggarwal and Govella, 2013), there is a tendency 
for modern countries to believe that links between the two are still valid which 
explains why trade is often used as a foreign policy tool. For both the EU and 
ASEAN, geopolitical concerns are at the heart of their trade-security nexus, as 
both aim to secure their positions and maintain global & regional stability through 
trade.        
Historically, the EU has a long practice of using trade instruments and 
market access as a response to the shifting global and regional landscape, even 
dating back to the EU’s initial creation. During its formation, two considerations 
were of main importance for the EU’s members states: first, the need to make 
EC a customs union with a common external tariff rather than just a free trade 
area and second, demands by several member states to grant trade concessions 
for their colonies so they could still have continued access with them (Edwards, 
2011). Consequently, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states enjoyed a 
strong and institutionalised network with the EU in trade & aid relations since the 
very beginning as a part of the EU’s former colonies (Edwards, 2011). In the 
present day, EU-ACP relationships have been formalised and reinvigorated 
several times through the Yaoundé agreements, Lomé conventions, and 
Cotonou agreement. Although geopolitical changes in the 1990s drove the EU 
to shift its attention to neighbouring countries, ACP countries still retain special 
status in the EU’s external relations due to historical ties.  
The next geopolitical shift was the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, where 
former communist countries in Europe were trying to consolidate their positions 
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and the EU responded with its Central & Eastern European enlargement policy 
which offered political-economic inclusion within a democratic and trade-barrier 
free Europe. Considering that the EU was a massive common market entity, the 
attractiveness of its market was one of the major impetus for these countries to 
join the EU.  
The 2000s were another decisive moment for the EU when a new global 
security threat emerged in the form of terrorism and the EU, once again, found 
itself close to the new source of instability, the Middle East. In response, the EU 
decided to deepen its socio-political and economic ties with Middle Eastern 
countries through the Euro-Mediterranean (Euromed) partnership, resulting in 
the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, which is an 
upgrade from the 1995 Barcelona Process.121 Prior to UfM’s creation, the EU 
declared 2005 as the Year of the Mediterranean which signaled their renewed 
interest in the region, citing that ‘the world has changed’ and ‘both the EU and 
many of its Mediterranean partners have suffered directly from the impact of 
terrorism’ (Ministerio de la Presidencia, 2005). The UfM partnership included a 
large trade component and nearly all Mediterranean countries – except for Syria 
– have signed an association agreement with the EU (European Commission, 
2019d).  
In addition to these regionally-focused strategies, the EU also deploys a 
global strategy that links trade and security with geopolitical considerations in 
mind, including the GSP, GSP+ and Everything but Arms. The EU’s GSP policy 
started in 1971 following a recommendation from the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), when several ex-colonies have 
successfully consolidated themselves and brought forward the issues of trade, 
aid, debt and development. The GSP is a special trade preference for low and 
low-middle income countries on the condition that they implement several 
international conventions on human rights, labour rights, protection of the 
environment, and good governance (European Commission, 2018c). Everything 
but Arms (EBA), which is duty-free and quota-free trade access for all products 
except arms and ammunition given to least developed countries, is of main 
 
121 The Barcelona Process was a cooperation initiated in 1995 by the EU with countries in the 
Mediterranean region and had the general aim of deepening strategic ties with these 
countries.    
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importance since it implies a security dimension and foreign policy overtones 
from the EU’s side (Smith, 2018). Compared to the EU’s standard FTAs, which 
also include non-trade clauses (i.e. TSD chapter), GSP+ and EBA have stronger 
trade-political ties since their enforcement methods are more consistent.  
Overall, the EU’s use of trade relations has been conditional on the 
changes in the geopolitical and global landscape, which are also evident in 
ASEAN’s external trade relations. However, ASEAN does not have a long 
experience with trade-security nexus and thus, it is more difficult to observe a 
pattern. Historically, ASEAN only engages in pure political/security cooperation 
with its external partners (e.g. ASEAN Regional Forum and Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation) while economic cooperation is reserved for intra-ASEAN 
integration.122 However, since the late 1990s and early 2000s, ASEAN started to 
engage in talks regarding extra-ASEAN economic cooperation, resulting in the 
creation of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and later, ASEAN Plus Six cooperation.123 
However, these cooperation were not trade-intensive and also covered various 
non-economic issues. Factually, the first extra-ASEAN trade cooperation only 
took off in 2002 when ASEAN signed its first FTA with China, following a series 
of talks since 2000. This move from China was both, intended by China and 
perceived by its rivals, as a political and strategic move, prompting Japan and 
India to propose an FTA with ASEAN within the same week of China (Lijun, 2003; 
Cheng, 2004). Rivalry for regional leadership was central in taking this decision, 
particularly from Japan’s side since Japan believed that in order to court ASEAN 
states to support them, it must balance China’s effort in maintaining strategic ties 
with ASEAN (Koo, 2013).  
From ASEAN member states’ perspective, they are now challenged with 
the growing rivalries between their northern neighbours to which they need to 
respond accordingly. Since ASEAN is more of the reactive kind as opposed to 
proactive in managing its FTAs, the only option available for them is to either 
accept or reject FTA offers from its external partners. Strategically speaking, it 
would be unacceptable from any external partners’ point of view if ASEAN were 
 
122 There is, of course Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which started in 1989, but 
this was not an ASEAN-led initiative and ASEAN only has an observer role in it.  
123 ASEAN+3 is an economic cooperation consisting of ASEAN member states, Japan, China 
and South Korea while ASEAN+6 adds India, Australia and New Zealand to the group.   
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to reject their offer and accept other partners offer since this would constitute as 
a political move rather an economic one. Considering that ASEAN’s FTA 
decisions are taken by the head of states and its foreign ministers as opposed to 
trade ministers (Chapter 5), the decision to reject or accept this offer is more of 
a geopolitical move based on careful considerations of the regional security 
architecture rather than pure commercial calculations.  
In other words, since all of ASEAN’s current external trade partners are in 
close proximity, every decision that ASEAN has ever taken regarding its external 
FTAs are in fact, a strategic response to its geopolitical surroundings. Given its 
vulnerable position within the region, ASEAN is very unlikely to reject FTA offers 
from its external partners.  
Aside from the EU and ASEAN’s use of trade as a ‘reward’ and other 
strategic purposes, another similarity between the EU and ASEAN is on how 
they use external trade to strengthen their integration project and justify 
regionalist ideas which, once again, can be interpreted as a reflection of their 
‘discomfort’ on being non-traditional actors in international relations. The notion 
of positioning by regional organisations has been discussed in Chapter 4 
(Section 4.4.2.) to explain why similarities occur in the EU and ASEAN’s legal 
actorness & strong identity and are also applicable to this case.  
Positioning theory argues that regional integration should be viewed by 
understanding ‘the process of how regions are constructed as actors and 
meaning is engendered’ (Slocum and van Langenhove, 2004), which relates to 
the EU and ASEAN’s continued effort to ‘paint’ a positive image of their trade 
relations and integration projects. The EU’s use of external trade to portray 
tangible benefits from economic integration and ASEAN’s use of ‘external trade-
internal integration linkage’ to gain more tangible benefits from its partners are 
one way to of do this. Acquiring a positive image of regional integration and 
receiving internal recognition from its citizens is crucial for non-traditional actors 
like the EU and ASEAN to position themselves globally and attain the recognition 
as a global actor.  
Conversely, negative representation, either internally through the lack of 
legitimacy or externally by rejection as an acceptable entity, is detrimental to the 
EU and ASEAN’s positioning in the global stage. As a result, both the EU and 
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ASEAN need to ensure that at least one facet of their integration project (which 
in this case is their external trade relations), must bring tangible benefits to the 
region. Similarly, the EU and ASEAN’s projection of regional norms through trade 
(i.e. the EU values and the ASEAN Way) are another way to ensure their 
distinctiveness and regional identity, which once again correlates to the identity-
positioning linkage discussed in Chapter 4.  
In conclusion, similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s pursuit of non-
commercial goals through trade relations can be summed up to two main causes: 
regional responses to geopolitical shifts and the need to maintain their 
positioning as separate actors in international relations.          
 
6.6. Conclusion     
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the last component of the EU 
and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy – their trade diplomatic goals – and partly 
elaborate on the causes of these differences and similarities. Findings suggest 
that for both the EU and ASEAN, commercial and non-commercial goals are 
present but with differing degrees where the EU strives more to achieve 
commercial goals and ASEAN focuses more on achieving non-commercial ones. 
There are several main causes for these differences, including variances in their 
degree of integration and role of different political and economic players within 
the region.  
For commercial goals, the EU and ASEAN both gain economically from 
their trade diplomacy although the EU tends to gain more collectively since 
ASEAN member states opt to either use national-level FTAs or resort to the MFN 
rate rather than utilise ASEAN-led FTAs. For non-commercial goals, this 
research identifies two main goals for both the EU and ASEAN: the need to 
acquire strategic position & maintain key relationships and to strengthen their 
regionalist ideology and regional values. The need to achieve this goal is 
stronger in ASEAN compared to the EU due to the organisation’s geopolitical 
position and the need to survive amidst great regional powers. In this sense, 
trade relations are being used to achieve (part of) its external relations’ goals.  
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Based on this research’s analytical framework, this chapter is the last one 
to identify and compare similarities and differences in EU and ASEAN trade 
diplomacy and has fully answered the second research question. Inferring from 
the key findings of these three chapters, one common thread can be identified 
where differences in the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy all stems from internal 
sources while similarities are best explained by external determinants. For the 
next and final analytical chapter, this thesis groups these similarities and 
differences to explain which determinants are relevant and link these findings to 
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Chapter 7 – Analysis & Conclusion: Determinants of Differences 
and Similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s Trade Diplomacy    
 
7.1. Introduction 
This thesis started with three research questions, all relating to how trade 
diplomacy by the EU and ASEAN can be explained, compared, and analysed. 
The preceding three chapters have answered the first two questions, and the 
focus of this chapter is to answer the final research question, relating to the 
determinants of differences and similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
diplomacy and what this means for the wider literature.  Findings suggest that 
while the EU and ASEAN are mostly different in their conduct of trade diplomacy, 
several similarities can also be identified. Previous chapters of this thesis have 
also briefly identified what causes these similarities and differences and this 
chapter aims to elaborate on these causes by clustering them into either internal 
or external determinants to provide better conceptualisation on how trade 
diplomacy by regional organisations can be explained. Generally, regional 
projects, such as the EU and ASEAN, are shaped by both endogenous and 
exogenous factors, and sometimes, it may be difficult to separate the two 
(Hettne, 2002). However, several characteristics or practices are often highly 
innate to a region, which sets them apart from one another and hence, can easily 
be distinguished as endogenous or exogenous to the region.    
Building from previous chapters’ discussions, a comprehensive summary 
of the EU and ASEAN’s differences and similarities in trade diplomacy is outlined 
below:  
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Table 7.1 Comparison of the EU and ASEAN Trade Diplomacy 





Legal Actorness International actor as granted by a 
legal instrument 
International actor as granted by a 
legal instrument 
Similar 
Behavioural Actorness  
Trade presence Strong Moderate Different 
Capabilities Strong Weak Different 
 
Preference Convergence 
Divergences between/among MS 
and the EU institutions; lower level 
of divergences 
Divergences between member 
states; higher level of divergences 
 
Different 









Decisionmaking model Led by EU institutions; 
Unanimity & QMV  
Led by member states; 
Unanimity only 
Different 
Involvement of non-state actors Availability of formal mechanism No formal mechanism Different 
Ratification & implementation process Issue-dependent Country-dependent Different 
Allows flexible participation in external 
trade relations 
No Yes Different 
Negotiation  
Negotiation model Two-Level Game; EC as lead 
negotiator 
Three-Level Game; Individual MS 
as lead negotiator  
Different 
Allows parallel negotiations outside of 
RO 
No Yes Different 












More invested Less invested Different 
 
 
Non-Economic Goals  
Use of trade/market access to 
maintain strategic position & 
strategic relations 
Use of trade/market access to 
maintain strategic position & 
strategic relations 
Similar 
Use of external trade to strengthen 
regionalism & regionalist values 
Use of external trade to strengthen 
regionalism & regionalist values 
Similar  
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Out of the 16 components being compared, the EU and ASEAN are 
different in 11 and similar in 5 components. Previous chapters have also 
identified the determinants of these differences and similarities which can be 
classified into either external or internal.  
 
Table 7.2 Determinants of Differences and Similarities in the EU & ASEAN’s Trade 
Diplomacy 






Legal Actorness Similar The need to be 
recognised externally 
External 
Behavioural Actorness -   
Trade presence Different Level of economic 
development 
Internal 








focused SNI; Regional 
mechanisms for 




Identity Similar The need to be 
recognised externally 
External 
Decisionmaking -   
Decisionmaking model Different Existence of trade-
focused SNI 
Internal 
Involvement of non-state actors Different Existence of trade-




Ratification & implementation 
process 
Different Existence of trade-
focused SNI 
Internal 
Allows flexible participation in 
external trade relations 
Different Existence of customs 
union 
Internal 
Negotiation -   
Negotiation model Different Existence of trade-
focused SNI 
Internal 
Allows parallel negotiations 
outside of RO 
Different Existence of customs 
union 
Internal 
Negotiation levels Similar Changes in the global 










Degree of economic 
liberalisation; Existence 
of customs union; 
Regional mechanisms 













concerns; The need to 





Linking these findings back to the research’s framework in Chapter 3, it can 
be concluded that these differences and similarities can be explained by either 
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internal factors (or endogenous) within the regional organisation or external 
factors (or exogenous), not present within the organisation. Table 3.1 in Chapter 
3 also identifies these internal and external determinants, building from different 
approaches, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism.  
For this research, rather than using a specific theory or approach (i.e. 
realism, liberalism, or constructivism), analysis of the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
diplomacy is explained through an internal and external dichotomy. First, since 
this research aims to develop a general framework of comparison in trade 
diplomacy, it is expected to offer more breadth than depth, making an 
internal/external dichotomy more suitable since it can provide broader 
explanations for trade diplomacy. Second, as a part of RO’s external relations, 
trade diplomacy sits between the national, regional, and global processes which 
make multilevel explanations highly suitable. While a single theory or approach 
is undoubtedly useful in explaining the specific element of regionalism projects, 
it may be challenging to capture a wide range of multiple activities and regional 
processes, such as in the case of trade diplomacy. 
Graphically, the relationship between internal/external determinants and 
RO’s trade diplomacy can be illustrated by this framework of analysis:  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Framework of Analysis 
 
Previous chapters have discussed the relationships between these 
independent and dependent factors separately, while this chapter focuses on 
compiling, clustering, and elaborating these determinants to provide a higher-
level generalisation and link these finding to the corresponding academic 
literature. Building on the findings from previous chapters, this thesis argues that 
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internal determinants best explain why differences occur between the EU and 
ASEAN’s trade diplomacy while external determinants best account for 
similarities between them. The main reason for this is that internal determinants 
of trade diplomacy originate from member states economic conditions, national 
& regional power configurations, and the institutional choices made by member 
states which are difficult to be replicated by other regions. For the EU and 
ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, three internal determinants are central in explaining 
their differences: (a) their institutional choice, particularly in the existence of a 
trade-focused supranationational institution in the EU and absence of one in 
ASEAN; (b) differences in their economic level & position on trade liberalism; and 
(c) their political configurations involving member states’ political systems & the 
role of political players within these systems.  
On the contrary, similarities between the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy 
are best explained by external determinants since the EU and ASEAN both 
operate in a similar global environment, are shaped by similar external 
pressures, and thus, often respond in a similar fashion. Two main external 
determinants are central to this: (a) shifts & changes in the global and regional 
landscape and (b) the need for the EU and ASEAN to position themselves 
strategically within the international system due to their status as non-traditional 
actors. The practice of collective trade diplomacy through ROs, mainly via 
bilateral channels, has proven to be an effective instrument in responding to 
these global changes and the continued use of trade instruments for 
political/strategic purposes have helped mitigate several of the security 
challenges that the EU and ASEAN face. Furthermore, the EU and ASEAN’s 
strong regional identity and their strategic use of trade to strengthen regionalist 
values are essential in ensuring that they maintain a good positioning as non-
traditional actors in IR.  
Elaborating on ROs differences and similarities enables us to generalise 
(up to a certain degree) on RO’s practice of trade diplomacy and their ascending 
role as trade diplomats. Although the EU has long enjoyed this actor/diplomat 
status, other ROs do not have this privilege, and hence, this research offers a 
novel way of understanding and interpreting them as such. The dichotomy 
between internal-external determinants also best situates ROs within the global 
landscape and thus, provides better visualisation of the role of ROs within the 
P a g e  | 213 
 
international system. In explaining this argument, this chapter is structured into 
four sections. The introduction section summarises previous findings and clarify 
this chapter & thesis’ assertion, and the second section will discuss the internal 
and external determinants of differences and similarities, respectively. The third 
section provides a short discussion on what these research outcomes mean for 
the larger academic literature and the final section concludes discussions. 
7.2. Internal and External Determinants in the EU and ASEAN’s Trade 
Diplomacy     
Based on the general findings presented in Table 7.1 and 7.2, it can be 
seen that internal determinants account for differences in the EU and ASEAN’s 
trade diplomacy while external determinants are responsible for similarities.     
7.2.1. Internal Factors as Determinants of Differences in the EU and ASEAN 
Trade Diplomacy 
The notion that internal factors are the leading causes of ROs differences 
has been relatively well established in the literature and various studies that use 
sociological viewpoints have pointed out the idiosyncratic factors that make 
specific regions highly distinctive (Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond, 2010; De 
Lombaerde et al., 2010). Indeed, regions and regional organisations do exhibit 
high degrees of differences, as this research also finds, but they also have 
certain degrees of similarities when assessed through the comparative lens. 
From a comparative viewpoint, differences in the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
diplomacy are a direct result of their internal characteristics which are non-
replicable and often stem from their historical integration processes. Generally 
speaking, causes of differences between the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy 
can be clustered into three main groups: institutional determinants, economic 
determinants, and political determinants.   
7.2.1.1. Institutional Determinants of Differences 
Debates on the institutions and types of cooperation in regional 
integration is perhaps the oldest debate in comparative regionalism studies and 
mostly centres around the supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism 
debate. In fact, it can be argued that the first wave of theorising on regionalism, 
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which lasted from the end of World War II until the late 1980s, was basically a 
debate on supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism (Wunderlich, 2007). 
When applied to trade diplomacy, supranationalism means that the EU has an 
institution beyond the state in charge of managing external trade and where, 
notably, member states surrender parts of their sovereignty and authoritative 
power to this institution.  
For member states, having an institution like the EU means that they 
must give up their authority to make independent trade policy and surrender this 
power to the EU, albeit with several exceptions.124 Within the EU, DG Trade plays 
this role, with the continuous monitoring process from its member states through 
the Council and the Parliament. The EU’s choice to create a supranational 
institution was a deliberate one, which separates the organisation from ASEAN’s 
institutional design in trade diplomacy. Contrary to the EU, ASEAN opts for an 
intergovernmentalism model in external trade meaning that its trade diplomacy 
is driven by individual member states, acting together to manage their collective 
trade relations and although ASEAN Secretariat does exist, it is in no way 
influential in affecting ASEAN’s trade diplomacy.  
As Chapter 4 & 5 illustrate, the existence of a trade-focused SNI has 
affected multiple components of RO’s trade diplomacy, including preference 
convergence, decisionmaking, and negotiation process. One prime example is 
that a trade-focused SNI eliminates one level of negotiation, shifting an otherwise 
three-level game negotiation to a two-level one. It also adds new levels of 
divergences in trade policymaking, between the EU institutions and its member 
states and within the EU institutions themselves. Seeing that the existence of 
trade-focused SNI is crucial to the management of trade diplomacy, it is worth 
looking at the central cause of this difference, which can be traced back to the 
EU and ASEAN’s historical origins and the role that trade plays in their overall 
integration projects.        
As mentioned before, trade is the EU’s ‘reason for being’ (Meunier and 
Nicolaidis, 2011), while for ASEAN, it can be said that diplomatic, political and 
regional stability are its raison d’etre (Kurus, 1993; Narine, 2008) and this 
 
124 Exceptions here refers to trade policy areas that fall within the mixed competence of EU such 
as audio-visual and education services.   
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ultimately shapes the organisation’s regionalism trajectory. Comparing the EU 
and ASEAN’s founding treaty, the two ROs put different emphasis on trade and 
economic cooperation in their legal text, where the EU states that: 
 
“The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market 
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to 
promote throughout the Community, a harmonious development of economic 
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an 
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the 
States belonging to it”. ( Article 2 The Treaty of Rome, 1957)        
 
and ASEAN asserts that:  
 
“The aims and purposes of the Association will be:  
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of 
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a 
prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations; 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for 
justice and rule of law in the relationship among countries of the 
region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; 
3. To promote active collaboration and assistance on matters of 
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific 
and administrative fields;     
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and 
research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and 
administrative spheres;  
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their 
agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the 
study of the problems of international commodity trade, the 
improvement of their transportation and communication facilities and 
the raising of the living standards of their peoples; 
6. To promote South-East Asian studies 
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing 
international and regional organisations with similar aims and 
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation 
among themselves.” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1967)    
 
 
Since its inception, the EU has been clear regarding the focus of its 
regionalism project (i.e. common market), while ASEAN focuses on multiple 
concerns including economic growth, social progress, cultural development, and 
peaceful community. Although the EU was created following a massive scale of 
destruction after the Second World War, and is often seen as a peace project to 
make war ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’ (Schuman, 1950), 
its political and security goals were never explicitly mentioned in its early legal 
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texts. Only after more than a decade did security and foreign policy cooperation 
make it into the EU’s mainstream agenda, starting from the 1970s onward where 
member states formally exchanged and coordinated political positions, resulting 
in the Maastricht Treaty where member states agreed to the creation of a 
common foreign and political security pillar within the EU (Vanhoonacker and 
Pomorska, 2011).  
However, by this time, economic cooperation and its corresponding 
institutions had been well established within the EU, and the Maastricht Treaty 
further reinforced this as evidenced by the creation of an EU common currency 
which then came into force in 1999. Therefore, despite the inclusion of political, 
security and other forms of cooperation within the EU, trade and economic 
cooperation have always held a central place. Basically, historical accounts 
demonstrate that the EU built its institutions, policymaking and integration 
processes against a strong economic background which has trickled down to its 
modern-day trade diplomacy and explains the EU’s creation of a trade-focused 
SNI. Even after establishing the EU’s diplomatic body in 2010, the EEAS, 
external trade issues remained largely centralised within the DG Trade, with 
EEAS only having a supporting role.   
Furthermore, due to its historical origins, the EU has also granted specific 
‘trade rule-making’ power to several of its member states, enabling them to 
shape present-day EU trade diplomacy. For any member state, the ability to 
shape regional rules is a significant advantage (and hence, power) that not all 
member states can acquire, and for the EU, its historical background partly 
determines this. For starters, the EU’s trade competence was granted early on 
during the integration process, and despite multiple changes to this competence, 
the foundation for this competence was a historical advantage only available to 
early members of the EU. The historical origin of the EU’s trade competence can 
be traced back to the Treaty of Rome which was the first legal document to 
regulate how member states should impose an external tariff, including a 
common commercial policy to non-members. Specifically, Article 3(b) of the 
Treaty of Rome states that: 
 
 




For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall 
include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set 
out therein:  
(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common 
commercial policy towards third countries (European Economic 
Community, 1957) 
  
This treaty, which created the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the EU’s customs union,125 was the most important milestone in the EU’s internal 
and external trade since it set the rules on whether individual member states 
could have an independent trade policy and conduct external trade negotiations 
on their own or not. Most importantly, it also set the legal basis for the transfer of 
member states’ trade sovereignty to a higher supranational institution.     
Although this treaty does not (yet) mention any specific phrasing on trade 
negotiation competence, the creation of a customs union generally means that 
all member states will adopt a common external tariff. Simply put, from this point 
onward, all potential members of the EEC (and later EU) must adhere to this rule 
and transfer their trade policymaking and negotiation power to the EU. The 
Treaty of Rome was signed by the six original EU members consisting of 
Belgium, France, Germany (previously West Germany), Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands which, perhaps inadvertently,126 granted them the initial power 
to shape the EU’s external trade relations until now. Although the EU’s 
enlargement (and when finalised, the UK’s withdrawal) may nevertheless change 
power dynamics within the EU, this initial decision has massively shaped the 
EU’s external trade relations, and even with further changes to the EU’s trade 
competence, this historical power privilege remains valid since successive 
amendments only grant larger power to the EU.  
Among these six original members, Germany and France were considered 
to possess the largest relational power vis-à-vis other players due to their 
 
125 It should be noted that the full implementation of EU customs union only happened after 
1968.    
126 Inadvertently in this sense refers to the fact that initially, the EU was not designed to be an 
outward-looking economic bloc and the purpose of having a customs union was to create a 
cohesive internal market. Only later did EU start to expand externally and become an 
outward-looking economic bloc.     
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population, economic size, political capability, and geographical size. However, 
trade negotiations are highly issue-specific and are very dependent on the 
negotiating partner, meaning that a state will only exercise its power if it feels 
that the content or partner of negotiation will threaten its economic interests. 
Thus, while Germany or France are seemingly powerful states in the EU and can 
influence trade diplomatic outcomes, this hypothesis should be tested on specific 
trade agreements and thus, is beyond the scope of this research.          
Contrary to the EU, while ASEAN seemingly puts equal emphasis on 
multiple issues as stated in their declaration, ASEAN was established against 
the backdrop of an escalating Cold War and was cautious about the impact it 
could have on the region. Historically, ASEAN’s raison d’etre was to create a 
conducive regional environment for development and state-building (Narine, 
2008), which highlights their concern for regional security. While ASEAN 
believes that regional development should be the final goal, its member states 
believe that they can only foster development if regional security and political 
environment permit it. During its early years, ASEAN was mostly shaped by 
regional security concerns and extra-regional political shifts which ultimately 
shaped how ASEAN institutions evolved over time (Koga, 2014).  
From 1967-1976, ASEAN was occupied by intra-regional security issues 
including the Vietnam war and presence of extra-regional powers within the 
region. This led to the creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
declaration (ZOPFAN) in 1971 and as a result, economic cooperation was not 
ASEAN’s primary concern during this era. Economic cooperation only became a 
mainstream agenda for ASEAN after more than a decade of its creation. During 
the Bali Concord I in 1976, member states agreed on a deeper economic 
integration, mostly fueled by the increasing economic performance of several of 
its member states. However, this initiative was also foreshadowed by another 
security cooperation agenda, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed 
alongside the Bali Concord I in 1976, which once again re-emphasises the 
dominant role of security in ASEAN cooperation. Although in later years, 
economic cooperation also progressed significantly, security cooperation has 
always foreshadowed it due to ASEAN’s geopolitical position within Asia.    
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In terms of member states’ historical advantage on trade rulemaking 
power, ASEAN member states rarely have one since trade was never meant to 
be ASEAN’s primary concern. Although like the EU, ASEAN does have original 
members and founders, who set ASEAN’s fundamental rules, these rules do not 
cover external trade since ASEAN was initially not meant to be a trading bloc. 
External trade only became ASEAN’s concern later on, and by this time, ASEAN 
had already completed its enlargement process, and a working mechanism of 
external relations was already in place, thus limiting the historical advantage of 
its original member states. The latest member to join ASEAN, Cambodia, was 
accepted in 1999 while ASEAN’s first FTA negotiation was with China in the early 
2000s. By this time, China was already one of ASEAN’s dialogue partners and 
ASEAN-China relationship has been strong, being built on previous non-trade 
cooperation and thus, the ASEAN-China FTA was treated as an additional form 
of economic cooperation with limited needs to develop new mechanisms to 
regulate it. 
Following China, ASEAN has continued to negotiate FTAs with other 
dialogue partners and even after almost two decades of this, ASEAN member 
states still use similar mechanisms, with two slight changes in their trade 
diplomacy. The first is in the creation of a country coordinator-ship system as 
mandated by Article 42 of the ASEAN Charter (signed on 2007), which stated 
that member states should ‘take turns to take overall responsibility in 
coordinating and promoting the interest of ASEAN in its relations with the 
relevant Dialogue Partners, regional and international organisations and 
institutions’ (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2007b). The country 
coordinator-ship system was required to manage increasing cooperation with 
external partners, and its responsibilities included managing external trade 
relations with dialogue partners, more specifically in leading and directing trade 
negotiations. The second change is in ASEAN’s negotiation model, which has 
gradually shifted from sequential to the single undertaking model in order to 
increase efficiency and accommodate global changes.127 Since most trade 
negotiations have shifted to a single undertaking model and external partners 
 
127 Sequential approach focuses on creating a framework agreement which serves as the basis 
for future agreements while single undertaking approach are sets of negotiations aimed at 
creating a comprehensive agreement since the very beginning 
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often request this, ASEAN saw the need to adapt and thus, opted to move to the 
single undertaking model, as was the case with the last four ASEAN FTAs.128  
 Indeed, these two changes have slightly altered ASEAN’s trade diplomacy 
and yet, within these changes, no dominant player can be observed since these 
changes still maintain equal positioning between member states. Although the 
country coordinator may at times take advantage of its position (Pitakdumrongkit, 
2016), rotation of this role means that all member states will have equal 
opportunity to make use of this advantage and thus, is more of a relational power 
rather than a structural one.129 The shift from sequential to the single undertaking 
also does not affect ASEAN’s power configuration since it is mostly related to 
technical details of trade negotiations rather than the regional power play. 
Furthermore, as one interviewee declared during the research interview, ASEAN 
functions on the basis of ‘ASEAN brotherhood’, where member states collectively 
act towards the progression of common goals by respecting each other’s 
sovereignty,130 and while this may sound very rhetoric, it nevertheless bears 
some truth since for a long time , ASEAN has been considered to be lacking 
leadership. In fact, even when there are potentially dominant players within the 
organisation, they are either reluctant or unable to use this advantage.  
Since its inception in 1967, Indonesia has been considered as the natural 
or de facto leader of ASEAN (often referred to as ‘first among equals’ or primus 
inter pares) due to its geographic size, population, military power and position in 
international affairs (Smith, 1999; Rattanasevee, 2014; Emmers, 2014; Roberts 
and Widyaningsih, 2015). Early ASEAN formation was also successful due to 
Indonesia’s attitude as the strongest and largest member state who displayed a 
willingness to compromise and resisted on imposing its will to other member 
states (Feraru, 2015). However, Indonesia’s leadership does not extend to 
economic affairs since Indonesia leaves this role to Singapore and to a lesser 
extent, Malaysia and Thailand, although in several cases it can still block 
economic decisions made by other states (Emmers, 2014).  
 
128 Interview with official from ASEAN Secretariat 
129 Borrowing from Susan Strange (1988), relational power refers to an actor’s ability to influence 
other players with whom they have relations with, while structural power refers to the ability 
in influencing the structure where other actors operate in.     
130 Anonymous interview with official from ASEAN member state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs   
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Factually, Indonesia’s market size and economic positioning alone can 
warrant a dominant place in ASEAN’s external economic relations,131 but until 
now no economic leadership from Indonesia can be observed, including in 
ASEAN’s external trade. Part of this can be attributed to Indonesia’s inherent 
lack of strategy regarding FTAs and the strategic role it can play. Like ASEAN, 
Indonesia is always in the position to accept, reject or postpone FTA requests.132 
Furthermore, the economic & political mismatch between ministries and lack of 
public support often hinders Indonesia’s ambition to play larger economic roles 
within ASEAN.133 One higher-ranking trade official from Indonesia states that 
Indonesia’s strong nationalistic stance and anti-liberalism sentiment often 
preclude the ministry to engage in deeper economic  ties through FTAs due to 
the fear of being criticised by the general public.134     
With regards to ASEAN’s external trade, Singapore is better compared to 
Indonesia in terms of its overall vision and strategy on managing FTAs and thus 
could rightfully lead ASEAN’s external trade relations. However, due to 
Indonesia’s economic positioning and power, Singapore cannot bring ASEAN 
forward without Indonesia being on board since for many external partners, there 
is no point in signing FTAs with ASEAN if Indonesia is not included.135 This 
creates a complicated situation for ASEAN where its de facto leader is reluctant 
to progress ASEAN’s external trade and yet those who are eager to do so, do 
not have the capability. This dilemma, coupled with ASEAN’s historical ignorance 
on external trade, creates stagnancy in ASEAN’s external trade relations, 
resulting in shallow and limited progress in ASEAN trade diplomacy.     
The EU and ASEAN’s historical and institutional differences, particularly 
on how they put (or did not put) emphasis on trade/economic cooperation and its 
subsequent developments, have strongly influenced their conduct of trade 
diplomacy particularly in explaining the existence of the trade-focused SNI in the 
EU and the absence of one in ASEAN. Thus, the EU’s sophisticated external 
 
131 Indonesia is currently placed among the top 20 global economic powerhouses and is the only 
ASEAN member state to be included in the G-20. Furthermore, Indonesia covers more than 
40% of ASEAN’s population and accounts for almost 50% of ASEAN’s market size.   
132 Anonymous interview with official from Indonesia’s Ministry of Trade  
133 Anonymous interview with official from Indonesia’s Ministry of Trade      
134 Anonymous interview with official from Indonesia’s Ministry of Trade 
135 Anonymous interview with official from DG Trade 
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trade mechanism and ASEAN’s less complicated machinery are not just a 
product of present choices and rational decisionmaking but are also a by-product 
of their historical origins and past choices. Either advertently or inadvertently, the 
EU and ASEAN have historically digressed on how they position trade within 
their overall external relations, and these historical choices set the basis for their 
current institutional structure which ultimately affect differences in their trade 
diplomacy.  
7.2.1.2. Economic Determinants of Differences 
Closely related to the institutional determinants are the economic 
determinants, which underpin the working of the said institutions, particularly on 
how their economic rules govern extra-regional trade relations. Economic 
determinants here refer to the three underlying causes mentioned above: the 
existence of a customs union within the specified regional organisations, the 
level of economic development, and the degree of economic liberalism. The 
difference in the existence of a customs union is, once again, a direct 
consequence of the EU and ASEAN’s historical origins where the EU sought to 
establish a customs union early on as stated in Article 3(b) of the Treaty of Rome: 
“the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common commercial 
policy towards third countries” (European Economic Community, 1957), while 
ASEAN does not seek to do so. The level of economic development, which 
corresponds to the EU and ASEAN’s trade presence and organisational 
capabilities are inherent conditions within the region and is highly conditional 
upon the individual member states.  
Different theories of economic development may offer conflicting 
explanations and thus, is beyond the scope of this research.136 What matters 
most for this research is how these different levels of economic development 
affect the regionalism project, which for this case, only correlates to trade 
actorness. Furthermore, although there seems to be a widely held belief that a 
large gap in the level of economic development between member states may 
 
136 For example, post-colonial analysis may attribute a nation’s less-developed state to its 
colonial origins and colonial heritage while Marxist-based analysis may credit the 
unfavourable structure of the international capitalist system as the underlying cause.        
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hinder regional integration, this research finds that for external trade relations, 
differences in the levels of economic development matter less compared to the 
degree of economic liberalisation between member states.            
To put this into perspective, while the level of intra-regional development 
gap can matter significantly for internal trade/economic integration, this gap 
matters less for external trade relations since external trade relations rely more 
on similarities in the degree of economic openness/protectionism. Furthermore, 
since a country’s level of economic development is also not a good indication of 
its position on economic openness (Section 5.4.1.2 in Chapter 5), disparities in 
the level of economic development matter even less for external trade relations. 
For example, a more developed country in ASEAN may be more resistant to 
opening their economy compared to a less developed one (e.g. 
Malaysia/Thailand versus Philippines/ Vietnam, as evidenced by their tariff rate) 
and countries with different levels of development may have closer tariff rates 
(e.g. Malaysia and Myanmar).137  
Thus, the degree of trade liberalism/protectionism is a better predictor for 
cohesiveness in external trade diplomacy, rather than the level of economic 
development which only corresponds to a small portion of trade actorness. 
However, the question on why several countries are more protectionist than 
others is also beyond the scope of this research since this relates more to 
individual choices made by states, rather than collective ones made through 
regional groupings. For the EU and ASEAN, regional decisions relating to their 
trade openness and protectionism tendencies have been discussed in Chapter 
5 and thus will not be explored further. However, it can be concluded that the 
EU’s historical origins, institutional mechanisms, and ideological underpinnings 
have shifted its member states to become collectively more liberal which is in 
contrast to ASEAN, where due to its institutional mechanisms, is struggling to 
achieve a regionally cohesive position on trade liberalism.        
 
 
137 Refer to Table 5.4. in Chapter 5 for a complete list of ASEAN Member State’s tariff rate 
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7.2.1.3. Political Determinants of Differences  
 The third determinant of differences between the EU and ASEAN is the 
political determinanta, mostly relating to the role that different players have within 
the political system. As Chapter 5 and 6 point out, the EU and ASEAN differ on 
the kind of involvement and inclusion of their stakeholders in trade diplomacy, 
where the EU facilitates a specific mechanism for non-state actors’ involvement 
that economic players tend to dominate. In contrast, ASEAN does not have any 
mechanism in place, and the overall process tends to be dominated by political 
players. The underlying cause for this is variances in their political systems, 
where the EU is dominated by democratic countries and ASEAN, on the other 
hand, is mostly driven by authoritarian-leaning countries. To a certain extent, the 
EU’s management of its external trade relations is an extension of its region-wide 
democratic governance while ASEAN’s management is a compromise of semi-
democratic and authoritarian regimes within the region.  
Within a country, the political system determines how decisions are made, 
legal systems are created (and uphold), resources are distributed, and for most 
modern countries, their political system will lie somewhere between the 
democratic and autocratic system axis with minimal countries sitting at the 
furthest end of either democracy or autocracy. Taking this to the regional level, 
regional organisations will ultimately consist of countries with different spectrums 
of political systems, either full democracy, full autocracy or somewhere in 
between with the main challenge being to reconcile these differences at the 
regional level. For the EU, the Copenhagen criteria sets specific guidelines for 
prospective EU members, where upholding democratic governance is one of the 
three criteria to be fulfilled before a country is eligible to become an EU 
member.138 This means that in terms of national governance and acceptance of 
regional rules, the EU does not face any significant discrepancies between its 
 
138 The Copenhagen criteria sets three criteria for countries to be eligible as EU members: 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; and ability to take on the obligations 
of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and 
policies that make up the body of EU law and adherence to the aims of political, economic 
and monetary union (European Commission, 2016a).    
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member states since basically all countries have agreed to a democratic rule and 
thus, adopt a somewhat similar political system. Contrary to the EU, ASEAN 
member states do not impose any rules on political systems, and therefore, 
variances between member states’ political systems can be overwhelming. 
ASEAN’s member states political systems vary from authoritarianism, semi-
authoritarianism to semi-democracy, which is often difficult to reconcile.  
Based on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2019, 11 of 
the EU member states are categorised as full democracies, 16 are flawed 
democracies, and no member states are considered as hybrid or authoritarian 
regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020). In contrast, of the 10 ASEAN 
member states, no country is considered as a full democracy, five countries are 
classified as flawed democracies, no country is a hybrid regime, four countries 
are authoritarian regimes and one country (Brunei Darussalam),139 is excluded 
from the dataset (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020). This means that on 
average, ASEAN member states tend to lean more towards authoritarianism 
rather than democracy. Authoritarianism tends to concentrate power, and for 
ASEAN member states, this power is centralised at the national level with the 
limited intention of power-sharing or creating additional check-and-balances 
mechanisms, both domestically or regionally. States deliberately maintain a 
strong nationalist position, as evidenced by ASEAN’s long-lasting principle of 
non-interference and the pretence of ASEAN ‘brotherhood’ as a way to maintain 
internal cohesion and solidarity by positioning member states as equal relatives. 
At the regional level, ASEAN’s mix of the semi-democratic and 
authoritarian political system is demonstrated through the limited involvement of 
non-state actors in its trade diplomacy (Chapter 5) and the ‘shifting’ of economic 
actors to become political players (Chapter 6). Since power is concentrated 
under only a few who are mostly political players, economic actors respond by 
altering their actions to become more political (e.g. ABAC and CSOs 
‘institutionalised participation’ in Chapter 6). On the contrary, the EU’s 
democratic system has open up more channels for non-state actors’ involvement 
 
139 Brunei Darussalam adopts a national monarchy as its political system with Sultan (king) being 
the head of state, head of government, Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Finance 
Minister. Brunei has no election and power is highly concentrated under its Sultanate, 
making Brunei very likely to be on the authoritarian regime classification of the EIU’s report.         
P a g e  | 226 
 
(e.g. greater power for the Parliament; an enhanced mechanism for civil society 
dialogue), and has extended channels for economic players to better 
communicate their interests to influence trade diplomacy (i.e. close links and 
ideologies between business players and the Commission).  
In sum, while institutional and economic determinants play significant 
roles in understanding differences in the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, 
political determinants also shape several aspects of it, since trade diplomacy is 
still a political process.               
7.2.2. External Factors as Determinants of Similarities in the EU and ASEAN 
Trade Diplomacy 
Although most scholars agree that external factors affect the formation of 
regional integration, the mainstream approaches differ on which external 
determinants are the most influential.140 Neorealism focuses on the effect of 
external powers on the formation of regionalism projects (Hurrell, 1995; Grieco, 
1996; Grieco, 1997),141 while neoliberal institutionalism emphasises that 
complex interdependence accounts for the establishment of regional institutions 
(Keohane and Nye, 1973; Keohane, 1988) and that globalisation, economic 
competition, and domino effects have often resulted in the proliferation of trade 
agreements and regionalism projects worldwide (De Melo et al., 1992; Sbragia, 
2009).  
More recently, a newer external-determinant stream of literature has 
emerged –  diffusion theory – which suggests a novel way of explaining 
similarities between ROs (see for example Börzel and Risse, 2009; Lenz, 2011; 
Jetschke and Lenz, 2013; Jetschke et al., 2016; Risse, 2016a). The underlying 
assumption of diffusion theory is that regional organisations should not be 
viewed independently of each other, but rather dependent on each other and 
thus, several traits of similarities between them can be explained by processes 
of diffusion (Lenz, 2011; Jetschke and Lenz, 2013). However, since diffusion only 
relates to processes, rather than results or outcomes, the opposite of diffusion is 
 
140 For a detailed discussion on these approaches, refer to Chapter 2 & 3 
141 It should be noted though that variants of realism also focus on internal/regional power 
configuration, particularly on the existence of a hegemon, acting as ‘paymaster’ within the 
region (Borzel, 2016).  
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not differences among regional institutions, but rather processes of independent 
and isolated decisionmaking between them (Risse, 2016a). While diffusion 
theory offers a fresh way of analysing ROs, its basic view regarding formation or 
changes within ROs is an externally driven one and thus, is in line with several 
previous approaches.142  
Applying this ‘external determinants’ approach to this research, findings 
suggest that while the neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism approaches can 
explain several similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy, there is no 
evidence of the diffusion process occurring between the two. Although a high 
level of interaction in trade diplomacy does occur between the two, as evidenced 
by the failed, and currently revived, EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations and multiple 
EU-ASEAN cooperation framework, the diffusion process leading to similarities 
in trade diplomacy is not evident. One possible explanation for this is perhaps 
due to the multiple trade interactions between different players, where the EU or 
ASEAN are more likely to emulate other players’ actions or behaviours, rather 
than each other’s. For example, the EU tends to view itself as closer to having 
‘state-like’ properties including in trade (Laursen, 2008; Sbragia, 2009; Warleigh-
Lack and Rosamond, 2010; Meissner, 2016) and thus, may emulate other states 
behaviour, such as the US, rather than other regional organisations’.  
This is perhaps the case for the EU’s shift to a bilateral approach in Asia 
and Latin America which follows the US’s lead (Sbragia, 2009), suggesting that 
although the EU and ASEAN’s similarities are not results of diffusion between 
each other, it may still be due to diffusion from other actors, despite it not 
necessarily being a regional organisation. Since trade relations are highly 
interdependent and are often results of domino effects, ROs are likely to 
internalise multiple ideas and practices, and thus, the diffusion process is more 
difficult to detect and may warrant further investigation which is beyond the scope 
of this study.  
Overall, referring to the findings and discussions from previous chapters, 
external determinants of similarities between the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
 
142 It is worth noting  that diffusion theorists do not completely reject internal determinants, but 
rather that internal determinants often compromise with external ones, resulting in 
processes of selective adoption, adaptation and transformation within the given RO (Risse, 
2016b).    
P a g e  | 228 
 
diplomacy can be clustered into two leading causes: shifts in the global and 
regional landscape, consisting of changes in global trading regime and global & 
regional security landscape, and the need for the EU and ASEAN to position 
themselves as actors, in both the material and ideational sense.     
7.2.2.1. Global and Regional Landscape as a Determinant of Similarities   
Literature review in Chapter 2 shows that trade and economic diplomacy 
are likely to be prominent when economic globalisation occurs but are not 
equipped with adequate global mechanism. As countries need to protect their 
interest against uncertainty, economic diplomacy can be used as a safeguard 
mechanism to achieve this (Coolsaet, 2004). Affirming this, this research also 
finds that for both the EU and ASEAN, the complementary use of trade 
instruments & political goals increases when globalisation of trade increases 
along with changes in the overall global and regional political-economic 
landscape. More specifically, the EU and ASEAN both resorted to bilateral trade 
relations when it became evident that the WTO, as the primary regulator of the 
trading regime, could not assure certainties for many states. Both the EU and 
ASEAN resorted to the bilateral channels to ensure that they had better control 
of trade relationships compared to those offered by WTO.  
The discussion in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.2) also shows that the move to 
bilateralism by the EU and ASEAN was due to systemic forces, particularly the 
increase of global trade competition and pressure to maintain or pursue new 
markets. Although ASEAN’s bilateral choice was more of a reactive rather than 
a proactive one, this choice also resulted in a shift within their dialogue partners’ 
behaviours, triggered by the need to acquire better benefits from global trade. As 
such, whether changes and shifts in the global trading landscape can (or cannot) 
provide certainties for countries may be a good indication on how ROs will 
behave, and more specifically on whether they are more likely to behave similarly 
to one another with regards to their external trade.  
Another similarity between the EU and ASEAN is on how they use 
external trade relations to respond to systemic changes within their external 
environment, both regionally and globally. The EU offers a clear case for this 
where its external trade instruments are tailored to respond to external shifts. 
Section 6.5.2 in Chapter 6 provides examples that illustrate the EU’s trade 
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diplomacy shift from its early establishment to post-Cold War approach and 
further shifts after the global terrorism threat. During each of these times, the 
EU’s trade actions were responses to emerging threats and were used 
strategically to mitigate the impact of regional and geopolitical shifts. Similarly, 
ASEAN also has these underlying tones in their external trade relations, with the 
primary intention of satisficing its dialogue partners. Due to ASEAN’s 
geographical position which sits between major regional powers, it is often used 
as a proxy between great powers making it highly prone to regional instability.  
Moreover, for long time, ASEAN has assumed the role of regional anchor 
for both politics & security and more recently, economics. ASEAN’s decisions to 
accept, reject or postpone FTA offers are not based on pure economic 
calculations (Chapter 6), but also on the political need to ‘reward’ its neighbouring 
countries as a way to maintain ASEAN’s strategic positions and as a medium to 
strengthen diplomatic ties. Specifically, the global shift that most affected 
ASEAN’s external trade relations has been the political-economic rise of China, 
which poses threats to other ASEAN partners. China’s political and strategic 
motivation for engaging in FTAs with ASEAN has ultimately led other ASEAN’s 
partners in a race to pursue similar FTAs with ASEAN (Chapter 6).     
In sum, although factually, the EU and ASEAN operate in different 
regional environments, they react similarly to shifts in their regional political-
security landscape by using external trade to mitigate risks. Since trade and 
economic affairs are becoming increasingly important, the choice to use trade as 
an instrument (or ‘weapon’) is the most sensible thing to do for many countries, 
including those who are members of regional groupings. Although the use of 
economic incentives in foreign policy is not new (e.g. trade embargo), FTAs offer 
a new spectrum of this since they tend to be ‘softer’ and less coercive compared 
to the traditional instruments.     
7.2.2.2. Actor Positioning as Determinant of Similarities  
   The second determinant of similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
diplomacy relates to the EU and ASEAN’s need to ‘position’ themselves both 
regionally and globally. As Chapter 4 discusses, the EU and ASEAN’s similarities 
in their legal actorness and strong identity can be attributed to their needs to 
maintain ‘status’ within the international system in order to attain international 
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recognition. The EU member states’ decision to grant legal status to the EU was 
driven by the need to be externally coherent and avoid ‘external confusion’ 
(European Commission, 1995) while the granting of international legal 
personality to ASEAN by its member states was aimed to ‘reinforce the 
perception of ASEAN as a serious regional player in the future of the Asia-Pacific 
region’ (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2007a). Both of these goals 
were results of external pressures, where the EU and ASEAN felt the need to 
legally strengthen their position since they are, fundamentally, not traditional 
actors in IR.  
Within the international legal system, states have always been the core 
entities and the ‘heart of the international legal system’ (Higgins, 1993 pg. 39), 
and even when non-state actors now participate more in the international legal 
system, this is only because states ‘allow’ them to do so (Aust, 2005). However, 
technically, states and international organisations are both subjects of 
international law, although historically, states have a better advantage since 
international organisations are products of modern-day politics. International 
organisations were born around the late nineteenth century, while early states or 
state-like entities have been around for longer than that. For comparison, the 
Westphalian system, which sets the legal basis for modern-day state 
sovereignty, can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 while the 
oldest international organisation, The International Telegraphic Union (later 
changed to International Telecommunication Union), was established in 1865, 
displaying a more than 200 years gap between the two.  
Among these international organisations, those that are regional-based 
can be considered as the most recent one, borne out of the hype in regionalism 
projects worldwide with the first modern-day regional organisation established 
around the 1950s. The EU, as the first modern-day regional integration project, 
was only established in 1957 (Treaty of Rome) and even until now, can still be 
considered a work in progress (particularly following the UK’s withdrawal) 
reinforcing the fluid characteristics of regional organisations and their ‘unnatural-
ness’ within the international system. Thus, compared to states and other 
international organisations, regional organisations can be considered as 
latecomers in international relations and thus may lack acceptance from other 
actors.  
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The EU’s reason of ‘avoiding external confusion’ and ASEAN’s goal of 
‘reinforcing the perception’ (Chapter 4) can be interpreted as another way of 
saying that due to their unique characteristics, other actors often find it difficult to 
perceive and treat them as natural international actors. Thus, legal statuses can 
function as instruments to assist the EU and ASEAN to be accepted 
internationally, at least in the legal terms. At a more profound level, since the EU 
and ASEAN are not traditional actors, they also need to position themselves as 
something natural and acceptable within the minds and perception of other 
actors. In their writing, Slocum and van Langenhove (2004) introduced the 
concept of ‘integration-speak’ in explaining how different issues in regional 
integration are constructed, discussed, and represented through various 
discourses by multiple actors to create reality. They provide an example in the 
EU, where words such as ‘democratic deficit’, ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘deepening and 
widening’ are used as Euro-speak to describe and shape the EU’s reality.  
This is also the case with ASEAN’s use of the ‘ASEAN Way’, ‘consultation 
and consensus’, ‘ASEAN brotherhood’, ‘non-interference’, and ‘ASEAN minus-
X’ as ASEAN-speak which is deliberately used by ASEAN officials to rationalise 
ASEAN’s behaviour not just internally but also externally (Section 4.3.4 & 4.4.2 
in Chapter 4).143 For example, the fact that ‘ASEAN Way’ never made it into the 
ASEAN lexicon until the 1990s, or almost 25 years after ASEAN’s establishment, 
and approximately around the time when ASEAN was expanding its integration 
project (Yukawa, 2018), can be interpreted as a deliberate action to legitimise 
ASEAN’s regionalist ideology and behaviours. These discursive tools were used 
to ‘normalise’ the existence and reality of regional organisations, in addition to 
their physical being and other material capabilities.    
Putting all this together, the EU and ASEAN’s granting of international 
legal personality and their use of speech-act to construct the reality of their 
regional integration practices are correlated with their inherent need and desire 
to be positioned as actors in international relations. Since legally, they are 
considered to only have ‘supporting roles’ in international law (Aust, 2005) and 
are not considered natural actors in international relations, the EU and ASEAN 
 
143 During the research interviews, many ASEAN and ASEAN member states’ officials also used 
these terminologies frequently.          
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need to undertake actions that can strengthen their existence and social 
acceptance. In other words, similarities in the EU and ASEAN’s legal trade 
actorness, strong regional identity, and inclusion of regionalist values in their 
trade relations are all shaped by their internal needs to be recognised as 
separate actors from states, and the need to maintain positioning within the 
international system.  
So far, this chapter has outlined and answered the last research question 
relating to the underlying factors in the EU and ASEAN’s differences and 
similarities in trade diplomacy. The main argument for this chapter is that 
differences in the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy are due to internal 
determinants while similarities are products of external pressures exogenous to 
the regions. Although several findings within this chapter are not new within the 
literature (e.g. existence of SNI causes differences between ROs), the choice to 
separate between internal/external determinants and to assert that differences & 
similarities are best explained by this internal/external dichotomy is. This is in 
addition to the fact that this research is the first study to compare ROs trade 
diplomacy.  
In short, this chapter – and the thesis as a whole – suggest that since ROs 
are increasingly becoming trade diplomats in their own rights, the need for 
analytical tools to explain this phenomenon is becoming more relevant. Based 
on the overall discussion presented in Chapter 4,5,6 and 7, a graphical summary 
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Figure 7.2 Conceptual Representation of Research Framework & Finding 
 
Chapters within this thesis have discussed these components extensively, 
where Chapter 4,5 and 6 are dedicated to the second and third row while Chapter 
7 focuses on the first row. Linking this to the literature, the first row connects to 
the comparative regionalism literature while the second and third row link to the 
trade diplomacy literature, except for trade actorness which links more to 
comparative regionalism, and to a certain extent, the EU studies. 
7.3. Extending the Research: Explaining the External Dimension of 
Regionalism Through Trade Diplomacy  
This research is built from two strands of literature, the comparative 
regionalism and trade & economic diplomacy literature, where each of these 
relate to specific findings and aspect of this research. The comparative 
regionalism literature provides the general context for comparison, determinants 
of similarities/differences, and understanding of RO’s actorness in IR while the 
trade & economic diplomacy literature offers the conceptual definition and 
operationalisation of the research object. 
7.3.1. Findings & Contributions Relating to Comparative Regionalism  
Building from the discussion in literature review and Figure 2.1. in Chapter 
2, this research seeks to extend the existing literature on the external dimension 
of regional organisations by examining one specific aspect, the external trade 
relations or trade diplomacy. It does so by comparing the EU and ASEAN’s trade 
diplomacy, outlining its differences/similarities and explaining the main 
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determinants for these similarities and differences. The main findings relating to 
comparative regionalism are regarding the internal/external dichotomy and which 
determinants contribute to similarities and differences in trade diplomacy. These 
findings extend the current literature on comparative regionalism in two ways.  
First, they offer a novel way of viewing regional organisations not just as 
actors, but trade diplomats, with several similarities (and differences) between 
them. Although the conception of the EU as a trade actor is not new (see for 
example (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 1999; Young and Peterson, 2006; Meunier, 
2007; Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2011; da Conceicao-Heldt, 2014; Van Den Putte, 
De Ville, et al., 2015), this conception does not cover the diplomatic element and 
cannot be found in other regional organisations. Given the fact that almost all 
regional organisations have by now, engaged in some form of external trade, 
there is a growing need to formulate conceptual/theoretical explanations for 
understanding this phenomenon. Regional organisations are increasingly 
becoming trade diplomats in their own rights, both to replace state practice (such 
as in the EU) or to complement it (such as in ASEAN).  
Second, the research findings suggest that almost all mainstream 
approaches in regionalism studies (realism, liberalism, constructivism) can 
explain one or two similarities/differences of RO’s trade diplomacy, but do not tell 
the whole story. Each determinant corresponds to a different perspective since 
their point of departure are mostly different. For example, the similarity in the EU 
and ASEAN’s preference for bilateralism relates more to liberal 
interdependence’s viewpoint regarding global economic interconnections, while 
variations in the EU and ASEAN’s political structure – leading to differing levels 
of players’ involvement in trade diplomacy – may be best viewed by the realist 
notion of internal power distribution. Of the four approaches discussed in the 
literature review, only diffusion theory fails to explain similarities between the EU 
and ASEAN since no evidence can be found on any similarities originating from 
the process of diffusion between the two. However, as previously mentioned, this 
may be because the EU or ASEAN absorb practices from other actors rather 
than from one another.    
Another core finding relating to comparative regionalism is in the 
application of the trade actorness concept to compare the EU and ASEAN. For 
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ASEAN itself, although the concept of actorness has been applied before (see 
for example (Wunderlich, 2012a; Wunderlich, 2012b; Murau and Spandler, 2016; 
Mattheis and Wunderlich, 2017), it has never been used for a specific aspect of 
ASEAN’s actorness or external relations. Even though economic cooperation is 
ASEAN’s most progressive area of external relations,144 it rarely receives enough 
attention since most scholars focus on ASEAN’s internal economic integration, 
rather than its external economic relations. This research is the first to fully 
consider ASEAN’s external trade relations and introduce it as a separate activity 
by providing a detailed analysis of its processes, goals, and the actors involved.  
7.3.2. Findings & Contributions Relating to Trade & Economic Diplomacy  
The main findings and contribution of this research for the field of trade 
and economic diplomacy is in the formulation and application of the research 
framework to the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy. Empirical findings from the 
fieldwork suggest that differentiation between how ROs organise themselves 
externally is crucial, as is the separation between commercial and non-
commercial goals. The framework from Chapter 3 is, thus, a good representation 
of these considerations and reflects the development of a framework built on 
pure academic literature to one that incorporates findings from empirical work. 
The move to introduce other regional organisation is also a departure from the 
current literature, which focuses mostly on states or the EU. Although several 
previous studies have discussed trade & economic diplomacy by ASEAN (see 
for example Selmier and Oh, 2013; Das, 2014), they examine trade & economic 
diplomacy as a part of a broader concept (e.g. international trade) and primarily 
takes economic diplomacy as given without fully elaborating on its complexities 
and multifaceted nature. Given this understanding, this research is the first to 
fully introduce a general framework of trade diplomacy by regional organisations, 
which applies to both the EU and ASEAN.     
Other empirical findings include the relationship between commercial and 
non-commercial goals in RO’s trade diplomacy and how trade policies often 
intertwine with foreign policies (Okano-Heijmans, 2011). One new finding from 
this research is that non-commercial goals may be more dominant compared to 
 
144 Cremona et al. (2015) find that ASEAN is externally most active in the economic front, where 
82% of its external agreements are in the field of economic cooperation.     
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commercial ones in trade diplomacy, as is evident in ASEAN’s case. This may 
be different from individual states since, for states, external trade relations are 
generally directed at fulfilling commercial goals before any other goals. For most 
states, the function of FTAs, or other types of external trade agreements, is to 
gain market preferences in order to boost the economy, while other goals are 
secondary.  
However, as this research shows, regional organisations that do not have 
a customs union, such as ASEAN, may be directed more towards achieving non-
commercial goals rather than commercial ones since, economically, they can 
obtain more through individual trade relations rather than collectively through 
their respective regional organisations. Hence, the main conclusion here is that 
ROs are more likely to behave and undertake economic calculations like 
individual state if they are engaged in some form of a regional customs union 
which causes the economic loss/gain from external trade relations to be evenly 
felt by all member states. So long as no customs union is present, member states 
are more likely to use external trade through ROs only if it adds commercial value 
to their existing individual trade relations or if it offers a larger non-commercial 
goal which also benefits the member states. 
One instance where individual member states utilise regional 
organisations to obtain additional goals is during the palm oil dispute between 
several ASEAN member states and the European Union. Initially, the palm oil 
dispute was limited to individual disagreements between the EU and two ASEAN 
member states, Indonesia and Malaysia, which was triggered by the EU’s 
restrictions on palm oil use due to social and environmental concerns. As the 
world’s largest palm oil producer, Indonesia and Malaysia perceived this action 
as an unfair trade practice and both countries filed individual lawsuits against the 
EU to the WTO in 2019 and 2021, respectively (Iswara, 2019; Raghu, 2021). 
Indonesia and Malaysia also lobbied other ASEAN member states to include 
palm oil in the EU-ASEAN inter-regional meetings, and the dispute soon 
escalated to the regional level.  
During the 22nd EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2019, the EU and 
ASEAN agreed to establish a joint working group on palm oil, which was 
reiterated once again during the 23rd Ministerial Meeting in 2020, despite slightly 
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altering the phrase to ‘sustainable vegetable oil’, rather than just palm oil 
(European Council, 2019c; European Council, 2020). The ongoing palm oil 
dispute is also likely to be an issue for the ongoing EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations, 
seeing that it remains a sticking point during the EU-Indonesia and EU-Malaysia 
FTA negotiation (Yusof, 2019; Rahman, 2020). Considering Indonesia and 
Malaysia’s position in ASEAN, it is very likely that these two countries will use 
ASEAN as a diplomatic vehicle to defend their commercial interests and, thus, 
reinforce regional organisations' strategic role as trade diplomats.   
In sum, this research has benefitted from both the comparative 
regionalism and trade & economic diplomacy literature and has also offered 
findings and frameworks to extend this body of knowledge further. Reflecting on 
the findings and contributions, several areas for future research and ways to 
increase the applicability of this research’s framework can be identified. First, 
there is a need to conduct a single or multiple case study research on regional 
organisations trade diplomacy utilising the proposed framework to test the 
applicability of this framework. This can be done on other regional organisations 
which are actively engaged in external trade relations such as Mercosur, SADC 
or ECOWAS. Second, given the limitations in this research’s methodology 
(Section 3.5. in Chapter 3), a more detailed study regarding ASEAN’s trade 
diplomacy would be of interest, particularly within ASEAN member states who 
were not covered in this research. Of main interest would be to see whether there 
are variations in how individual ASEAN member states utilise ASEAN as their 
trade diplomatic avenue. Lastly, research on the different facets/strands of 
economic diplomacy (aside from trade) may also be pursued considering that 
recently, regional organisations also engage in commercial diplomacy, financial 
diplomacy and even development diplomacy. Although currently, this may be 
dominated by the EU, several other regional organisations also seem to have 
followed this trend.            
7.4. Conclusion   
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the final research question 
regarding the main determinants of the EU and ASEAN’s differences and 
similarities in conducting trade diplomacy. It starts by clustering the 
commonalities and divergences in the EU and ASEAN’s trade diplomacy before 
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identifying the main determinants of these similarities & differences. In identifying 
these determinants, this chapter categorises three internal sources of 
differences: institutional, economic, and political sources where each of these 
internal determinants relate to a specific aspect of trade diplomacy. Also, it 
elaborates the two external determinants of similarities: changes in the global & 
regional landscape and the need for actor positioning within the international 
system. What can be inferred from this, then, is that despite their internal 
differences, the EU and ASEAN exhibit several similarities which are due to 
systemic pressures – both global and regional – and their distinct characteristics 
as non-traditional actors in IR which force them to utilise their trade relations to 
attain a distinct role and position within the international system. This is in line 
with the general assertion in comparative regionalism studies that regionalism 
projects can be explained by looking at the intra-regional and extra-regional 
factors within the region.  
However, the main difference between this research and previous studies 
is that it is the first to identify differences and similarities in ROs based on the 
dichotomy of internal/external determinants and doing so by using trade 
diplomacy of regional organisations as a core research object. In a way, this 
research extends the existing knowledge for comparative regionalism and most 
importantly, contributes to trade & economic diplomacy literature.     
To conclude, this thesis demonstrates that regional organisations are 
becoming trade diplomats in international relations and yet, the existing 
analytical tools remain limited to explain this phenomenon. Thus, this research 
offers a novel conceptual framework for understanding regional organisations’ 
trade diplomacy using the EU and ASEAN as case studies. Even more so for 
ASEAN, this research is the first to thoroughly examine ASEAN’s trade 
diplomacy on its own, providing a level of details that is not present in previous 
studies. Within the literature, this research expands the current discussion on 
trade diplomacy, not just by states and the EU, but also by other regional 
organisations and therefore, provides a useful step towards understanding the 
growing practice of regional organisation’s external trade relations.  
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